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“… we always measure persons in situations, not persons; there is no psychological 
measurement in the situational vacuum.” 
 
Deinzer et al. (1995) 
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Zusammenfassung 
  
Persönlichkeit ist ein Schlagwort in der heutigen Gesellschaft, das häufig und in 
sehr vielen Zusammenhängen eingesetzt wird. Auch in der psychologischen 
Forschung spielt die Persönlichkeit eine große Rolle. Es existieren zahlreiche 
Persönlichkeitstheorien und –modelle. Diese überschneiden sich zum Teil sehr 
stark. Allerdings gibt es auch konkurrierende Forschungsansätze. So können der 
typologische und der dimensionale Ansatz gegeneinander abgegrenzt werden.  
Typologien der Persönlichkeit bestehen seit der Antike. Hier wurden vier 
Persönlichkeitstypen gemäß der vorherrschenden Körperflüssigkeit unterschieden. 
Im Gegensatz zu Typologien wird bei dimensionalen Ansätzen von einer Reihe 
unabhängiger Persönlichkeitseigenschaften ausgegangen. Unabhängig bezieht sich 
darauf, dass die individuelle Ausprägung auf einer der Dimensionen keinen Einfluss 
auf die individuelle Ausprägung auf einer der anderen Dimensionen hat. Rein 
theoretisch ist es also möglich, mit einem dimensionalen Ansatz unendliche viele 
Persönlichkeitsprofile zu erstellen.  
Lange Zeit herrschte eine große Debatte darüber, wie viele verschiedene 
Dimensionen sinnvoll seien, um die Persönlichkeit eines Menschen zu beschreiben. 
Mit Hilfe von Selbstbeschreibungen und faktorenanalytischen Methoden wurde 
versucht, die Anzahl systematisch einzugrenzen. Nach einem langen Diskurs, 
dessen Ende immer noch nicht erreicht ist, scheint eine Lösung jedoch immer 
wieder aufzutauchen. Hierbei handelt es sich um die sogenannten Big 5: 
Neurotizismus, Extraversion, Offenheit für Erfahrung, Verträglichkeit und 
Gewissenhaftigkeit.  
Ein kurzer Abriss über die Entstehungsgeschichte der Big 5 ist in der Einleitung 
dieser Arbeit gegeben.  
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Die prominentesten Befürworter der Big 5 sind Costa und McCrae (1992b). Ihr 
Fragebogen, das NEO – PI – R gehört zu den am häufigsten eingesetzten Verfahren 
in Wissenschaft und Praxis.  
Jedes psychometrische Verfahren, welches als anerkannt und sinnvoll gelten 
will, muss verschiedene Gütekriterien erfüllen. Zunächst muss die Erfassung 
objektiv und reliabel sein. Da es sich bei den meisten Instrumenten zur Erfassung 
der Big 5 um standardisierte Fragebogenverfahren handelt, kann die Objektivität als 
gesichert gelten. Auch für die Reliabilität liegen zahlreiche positive Ergebnisse vor. 
Bei der Validität können drei verschiedene Aspekte unterschieden werden: Inhalts-, 
Konstrukt- und Kriteriumsvalidität. Die Inhaltsvalidität eines Verfahrens lässt sich 
nicht statistisch absichern, sondern nur theoretisch bestimmen. Ein Verfahren ist 
dann inhaltsvalide, wenn es aus dem theoretisch möglichen Itempool eine 
repräsentative Stichprobe an Items enthält. Mit anderen Worten heißt das, es soll 
das zu messende Konstrukt möglichst komplett erfassen. Die immer noch 
schwelende Diskussion um die Anzahl der Faktoren ist sicher teil der Bestimmung 
der Inhaltsvalidität. Die vorliegende Arbeit war jedoch nicht mit dieser Thematik 
beschäftigt. Vielmehr wurden Fragen der Konstrukt- und der Kriteriumsvalidität 
untersucht. 
Wie bereits erwähnt, wird in der Theorie angenommen, dass die 
Persönlichkeitsdimensionen unabhängig voneinander sind. Im statistischen Sinne 
würde das bedeuten, dass die Verfahren nicht miteinander korrelieren dürfen. In 
einer Vielzahl von Studien zeigten sich jedoch immer wieder substanzielle 
Zusammenhänge zwischen Persönlichkeitsdimensionen. In einer Metaanalyse von 
1995 fanden Mount, Barrick, Scullen und Rounds bereinigte Zusammenhänge bis 
zu .52 zwischen Neurotizismus und Gewissenhaftigkeit. Costa und McCrae (1992b) 
verschweigen diese Zusammenhänge ebenfalls nicht, führen sie jedoch auf fehlende 
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diskriminante Validität einiger Facetten zurück. Weiterhin empfehlen Sie, 
Faktorwerte zu berechnen anhand der Faktorgewichte, die sich in der 
amerikanischen Normstichprobe ergeben haben. Hier zeigte sich jedoch eine 
bivariate Korrelation von .53 zwischen Neurotizismus und Gewissenhaftigkeit. Diese 
ist also noch größer als die bereinigte Korrelation, die von Mount und Kollegen 
berichtet wurde. Es stellt sich also die Frage, ob die Big 5 tatsächlich unkorreliert 
sind oder doch substanzielle Zusammenhänge bestehen. Diese Frage wurde in der 
ersten und in der zweiten Studie der vorliegenden Arbeit untersucht. 
Innerhalb beider Studien wurde ein neuer Erklärungsansatz für die 
Zusammenhänge untersucht. Die Idee dabei ist, dass die Zusammenhänge durch 
einen situativen Einfluss entstehen. Dieser situative Einfluss (situational demand) 
setzt sich im Sinne eines korrelierten Fehlers auf die Varianz der 
Persönlichkeitswerte. Da der situative Einfluss alle Variablen gleich betrifft, steigen 
die Korrelationen zwischen den Faktoren proportional zum situativen Druck. In 
einem Bewerbersetting müsste der situative Druck beispielsweise deutlich höher 
sein als in einer anonymen Laborsituation.  
Mit Hilfe der Latent – State – Trait – Theorie (Steyer, Ferring & Schmitt, 1992) 
und den individuellen kausalen Effekt Design (Steyer, 2005) wurde untersucht, 
welchen Einfluss die Situation auf die Korrelationen zwischen den 
Persönlichkeitsfaktoren hat. 
Bei der Kriteriumsvalidität handelt es sich um die Frage, ob die Big 5 in der 
Lage sind, relevante Kriterien vorherzusagen. So wurde der Zusammenhang zu 
Berufserfolg (z.B. Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Salgado, 2003) und akademischen 
Erfolg untersucht (z.B. Furnham, Chamorro Premuzic & McDougall, 2002). Die 
gefundenen Zusammenhänge sind zwar zumeist gering, allerdings zeigen sie sich 
stabil und inkrementell zu anderen Konstrukten wie Intelligenz. 
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Trotz dieser Argumente werden Persönlichkeitsfragebogen von einigen 
Praktikern nur zögerlich oder ungern eingesetzt. Grund dafür sind Bedenken über 
die Verfälschbarkeit dieser Instrumente. Die entscheidende Frage ist jedoch, woher 
kommt die prädiktive Kraft eines Fragebogens, wenn er verfälscht wurde? Diese 
Frage wurde ebenfalls in Studie 2 untersucht. Mit Hilfe des beschriebenen Designs 
ist es möglich, die Varianz aufzuspalten in Varianz, die auf Persönlichkeit 
zurückgeht und Varianz, die auf Verfälschung zurückgeht. Die prädiktiven Anteile 
können dann getrennt untersucht werden.  
Die meisten Untersuchungen, die sich mit Verfälschung (Faking) beschäftigen, 
gehen davon aus, dass Faking ein uniformer Vorgang ist, der von allen Personen 
gleich ausgeführt wird (z.B. Pauls & Crost, 2005b). Allerdings zeigen neuere 
Untersuchungen, die Techniken aus der Item – Response – Theorie nutzen, dass 
verschiedene Fakingstile unterschieden werden können (Zickar & Robie, 1999; 
Zickar, Gibby & Robie, 2004). So gibt es trotz der Aufforderung zum Faken immer 
noch eine geringe Anzahl von Leuten, die nicht lügen, sondern ehrlich antworten 
(regular responders). Eine weitere Gruppe lügt extrem (extreme faker). Der größere 
Anteil der Personen verzerrt ihre Antwort jedoch nur gering (slight faker). Diese 
Tatsache legt die Frage nahe, ob sich die einzelnen Stile in ihrer Kriteriumsvalidität 
unterscheiden. Diese Frage wurde in der 3. Studie untersucht.  
Eine weitere Frage, die sich stellt, ist die Frage nach dem psychologischen 
Prozess, der stattfindet, wenn Personen ihre Antworten absichtlich verfälschen. 
Auch diese Frage wurde in der 3. Studie mit Hilfe einer qualitativen Untersuchung 
näher beleuchtet. 
Die Ergebnisse der drei Studien werden im Folgenden kurz dargestellt. 
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Studie 1. In der ersten Studie wurden Daten reanalysiert, die Toomela bereits 
2003 publiziert hat. In dieser Stichprobe wurden N = 912 Männer des estnischen 
Militärs mit der estnischen Version des NEO – PI – R und einem Intelligenztest 
untersucht. In seiner Originalarbeit berichtete Toomela, dass in der Gruppe der 
intelligentesten Männer, im Gegensatz zu den anderen Intelligenzgruppen, eine 
vierfaktorielle Lösung besser paste als ein fünffaktorielle Lösung. Der Grund hierfür 
war eine starke Korrelation zwischen Neurotizismus und Gewissenhaftigkeit. 
Dadurch konnten diese beiden Dimensionen nicht voneinander getrennt werden.  
In der hier durchgeführten Reanalyse wurde untersucht, ob sich dieses Problem 
auf einen situativen Einfluss zurückführen lässt. Im Laufe der Reanalyse zeigte sich, 
dass nicht Intelligenzunterschiede, sondern vielmehr Unterschiede im militärischen 
Rang eine Rolle bei der Entstehung der unterschiedlichen Faktorenlösungen spielte. 
Tatsächlich bestand die Stichprobe aus Rekruten, Unteroffizieren und Offizieren. 
Die Annahme, die hier getroffen wurde, lautete, dass der situative Druck, den die 
Probanden verspürten mit dem militärischen Rang anstieg.  
Um dies zu testen, und gleichzeitig zu prüfen, ob die starke Korrelation sinkt, 
wenn der situative Einfluss kontrolliert wird, wurde ein Multigruppen – 
Strukturgleichungsmodell berechnet. Dieses Modell enthielt die beiden latenten 
Persönlichkeitsfaktoren Neurotizismus und Gewissenhaftigkeit sowie einen weiteren 
latenten Faktor (fake), der den situativen Einfluss repräsentiert. Während die beiden 
Persönlichkeitsfaktoren nur von ihren jeweiligen Facetten Ladungen erhalten, zieht 
der situative Faktor Varianz von allen Facetten. Dies ist die Umsetzung der Idee, 
dass situativer Einfluss wie ein systematischer, korrelierter Fehler wirkt.  
Die Ergebnisse der Reanalyse zeigen, dass die Korrelation tatsächlich stark 
zurückgeht, sich sogar umdreht, wenn situativer Einfluss kontrolliert wird. Somit 
liegt eine erste Evidenz vor, dass ein unkorreliertes Modell der Big 5 nicht 
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unrealistisch ist, sofern der situative Einfluss kontrollieret wird. Darüber hinaus 
zeigte sich erwartungskonform, dass die Offiziere den höchsten Mittelwert in der 
latenten Variable Fake erzielten. Sie verspürten also den größten situativen Druck.  
Einschränkend muss festgehalten werden, dass die hier durchgeführte Analyse 
lediglich aus einem Messzeitpunkt bestand. Dadurch ist eine reine Trennung von 
Persönlichkeits- und Situationsvarianz nicht möglich. Um diese Trennung zu 
erzielen, wurde die zweite Studie durchgeführt. 
 
Studie 2. In dieser Studie wurden N = 186 zufällig auf zwei Gruppen verteilt. 
Probanden in der ersten Gruppe (KG) bearbeiteten das NEO – PI – R zweimal, mit 
der Aufforderung, ehrlich zu antworten. In der zweiten Gruppe (EG) wurde das NEO 
– PI – R beim ersten mal ehrlich und beim zweiten Mal mit einer 
Verfälschungsinstruktion durchgeführt. Zusätzlich füllten beide Gruppen weitere 
Fragebogen sowie einen Intelligenzstrukturtest aus. Durch dieses Design war es 
möglich, die Varianz in Persönlichkeits- und Situationsvarianz zu spalten. Darüber 
hinaus konnte der Einfluss des situativen Drucks auf die Korrelationen zwischen 
den Persönlichkeitsdimensionen untersucht werden. Da alle Probanden auch an 
einer später durchgeführten Statistikklausur teilnahmen, konnte ebenfalls die 
Kriteriumsvalidität der beiden Anteile bestimmt werden. 
Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung zeigen, dass die Korrelationen zwischen den 
Faktoren tatsächlich deutlich sinken, wenn der situative Druck kontrolliert wird. 
Lediglich Extraversion und Verträglichkeit wiesen noch einen substanziellen 
Zusammenhang auf. Demzufolge kann geschlussfolgert werden, dass der situative 
Einfluss für einen großen Teil der Zusammenhänge zwischen Dimensionen 
verantwortlich ist. Dennoch zeigte sich bei einigen Facetten eine mangelnde 
diskriminante Validität.  
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Bezüglich des Charakters der Fakingvariable zeigte sich der stärkste 
Zusammenhang mit Selbstwirksamkeitsüberzeugungen. Personen, die glauben, 
andere so beeindrucken zu können, dass sie als kompetent und liebenswürdig 
wahrgenommen werden, verfälschten auch am meisten. Allerdings war der 
Zusammenhang gering, so dass auch andere Variablen bei der Verfälschung eine 
Rolle spielen müssen. 
Schließlich konnte gezeigt werden, dass die prädiktive Kraft, selbst unter 
Fakingbedingungen, immer noch von der Persönlichkeitsvariable kommt. Jedoch 
hat diese Variable nur noch Ladungen von ein oder zwei Facetten. 
Zusammengefasst heißt das, dass die prädiktive Kraft nicht mehr von einer 
Dimension, sondern von den Facetten stammt. Faking hatte nur eine sehr geringe, 
wenn auch positive prädiktive Kraft. 
Aus diesen Ergebnissen wurde geschlussfolgert, dass spezifisches Wissen über 
die Anforderungen eine Rolle spielen muss, wenn Personen Fragebogen 
verfälschen. 
Eine Einschränkung dieser Studie war, dass Faken als uniformer Prozess 
aufgefasst wurde. Deshalb wurde in Studie 3 der psychologische Prozess, der beim 
Verfälschen abläuft, näher beleuchtet. 
 
Studie 3. Im ersten Teil der Studie wurde mit Hilfe von kognitiven Interviews 
und einer Stichprobe von  N = 50 untersucht, welche Strategien Personen 
anwenden, wenn sie ihre Antworten in einem Fragebogen absichtlich verfälschen. 
Die Auswertung, die durch zwei Rater durchgeführt wurde, zeigte, dass zwei 
Verfälschungsstrategien unterschieden werden können: leichte Verfälschung und 
extreme Verfälschung. Ein weiteres, interessantes Ergebnis war, dass nicht alle 
Items verfälscht wurden, sondern nur diejenigen, die von den Probanden als wichtig 
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angesehen wurden. Für diese Einstufung wurden implizite Theorien aber auch 
spezifisches Wissen genutzt. Bei den Fragen, die nicht als wichtig eingestuft 
wurden, antworteten die Probanden entweder ehrlich oder neutral. 
In einem weiteren Teil der Untersuchung wurde die Stichprobe aus der zweiten 
Studie mit der neuen Stichprobe kombiniert und mit Hilfe von Mixed Rasch 
Modellen wurde nach der Anzahl von unterschiedlichen Fakingklassen gesucht. 
Hier zeigten sich drei Klassen: extreme faker, slight faker und regular responders.  
Weitere Analysen zeigten, dass die leichten Verfälscher über eine geringere 
kognitive Leistungsfähigkeit und höheren Neurotizismus verfügen. In beiden 
Verfälschungsgruppen konnte immer noch eine starke Basis an ehrlicher 
Persönlichkeit nachgewiesen werden. Interessanterweise hatten extreme Faker 
höhere Werte im Schlußfolgernden Denken und in der Klausur. Als 
Schlussfolgerung wurde gezogen, dass Personen, die nur leicht verfälschen, nicht 
nur Angsthaben, entdeckt zu werden, sondern auch geringe Fähigkeiten haben, zu 
verfälschen.  
Weiterhin konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Kriteriumsvalidität in allen drei 
Klassen vergleichbar ist. Allerdings fungierte Klassenzugehörigkeit als Prädiktor für 
die Klausurleistung, auch, wenn Intelligenz kontrolliert wurde.  
 
Abschließend wurden die verschiedenen Ergebnisse der einzelnen Studien 
integriert und ein Modell zur Erklärung des Einflusses von situativem Druck auf die 
Beantwortung von Fragebogen vorgeschlagen.  
Das Modell besteht aus zwei Hauptpfaden, die für hohen und niedrigen 
situativen Druck stehen. Weiterhin wird dargestellt, wie es zu den unterschiedlichen 
Antwortstilen kommt und wie diese sich auf die Konstrukt- und die 
Kriteriumsvalidität eines Fragebogens auswirken. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Why are some people more courageous than others? Why did a person choose 
to become a leader? And why was that person a stronger and more efficient leader 
than somebody else? Scientists and laypeople alike have searched for answers to 
these questions for a long time now. The reasons for this interest are the need to 
understand, predict, and alter human behavior. In ancient Greece actors in theater 
plays wore masks to demonstrate the specific character of the role they played 
(Allport, 1961). In order to do this, the first studies of typical characteristics of a 
person were undertaken. Moreover, Hippocrates hypothesized that there are four 
distinct body fluids, namely blood, phlegm, black bile, and yellow bile which 
determine the character of a person. This description can be regarded as the first 
personality typology. Typologies of personality still enjoy popularity today (e.g., 
Furnham, Moutafi & Paltiel, 2005) but have been broadly criticized lately 
(Asendorpf, 2006; McCrae, Terracciano, Costa & Ozer, 2006a; McCrae, Terracciano, 
Costa & Ozer, 2006b). The main criticism has been that reported personality types 
are not replicable, however, personality dimensions are.  
Personality dimensions, also called domains, have become the most popular 
construct for the description of personality. According to Liebert and Liebert (1998, 
p. 5-6) personality as a whole can be defined as: “… the unique, dynamic 
organization of characteristics of a particular person, physical and psychological, 
which influence behavior and responses to the social and physical environment. Of 
these characteristics, some will be entirely unique to the specific person (i.e. 
memories, habits, mannerisms) and others will be shared with a few, many, or all 
other people”. A dimensional view of personality mostly uses the trait concept to 
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describe common differences between individuals. Traits can be seen as “Enduring 
characteristics on which individuals differ” (Liebert & Liebert, 1998, p. 184).  
In 1936 Allport and Odbert published a list of 17.953 single – word descriptors 
they had found in a dictionary and which could be used to describe a person 
(Allport & Odbert, 1936). Cattell (1943a) took up this idea and formulated what was 
to become known as the lexical hypothesis: "All aspects of human personality which 
are or have been of importance, interest, or utility have already become recorded in 
the substance of language" (1943b p. 483). The lexical hypothesis has subsequently 
been the starting point for several different personality theories. The most 
prominent of these theories is the Five Factor Model (FFM) which is also called the 
BIG 5.  
The BIG 5 have been chosen as research object within the present analyses 
because they rank among the most prominent psychological constructs in research 
and practice. The present paper will give an introduction into the different 
applications of the BIG 5 in chapter 1.2. However, the BIG 5 have also been 
criticized on a number of issues. These issues will shortly be presented in chapter 
1.3. Finally, the goals of the present project which aim at answering some of the 
criticisms regarding the BIG 5 are presented in chapter 1.4. As a beginning, though, 
a short overview of the history of the BIG 5 is provided. 
 
1.1.  A Short History of the BIG 5 
 
As mentioned above the pioneer work by Allport and Odbert (1936) has been the 
starting point for a branch of personality research which is also known as factor 
analytical personality research. Factor analysis is a powerful methodological 
instrument which was developed for data reduction and moreover, to find latent 
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factors responsible for correlations between variables. These latent factors also 
were the object of interest in the first factor analytical studies of personality by 
Cattell (1943a, b). Cattell formulated the lexical hypothesis. He also acknowledged 
that the original list of words by Allport and Odbert was insufficient. Thus, he added 
words which he believed to be important descriptors of personality and which also 
represented the state of the art of the research of that time. Using personal 
judgement as well as correlational techniques Cattell limited the vast number of 
words to a list of 35 bipolar adjectives. This list was administered as peer evaluation 
and the resulting data set was factor analyzed. Cattell reasoned that applying factor 
analysis to the data set would help to find the latent personality dimensions which 
are used to describe a person. His analysis came up with twelve personality factors. 
In the forthcoming years this adjective list has been used in many different research 
projects, even though Cattell himself acknowledged the fact that he might have 
eliminated important words. 
However, this adjective list was also used by Tupes and Christal who were the 
first to report five personality factors. Tupes and Christal worked for the US Air 
Force. Their task was to improve officer selection and promotion procedures. In 
eight different factor analyses they always found five replicable factors even though 
the total number of factors in each analysis differed. Later these studies were 
regarded as the discovery of the BIG 5 (McCrae, 1992). Since Tupes and Christal did 
not publish their findings until 1992 they would not have impacted the scientific 
community had not Norman (1963) taken up the idea of five factors. However, 
Norman (1967) also decided to go back to the total variety of words and made a new 
list of 1.431 words (for a more detailed discussion see John, Angleitner & Ostendorf, 
1988). He ordered them into 75 semantic clusters which could be attributed to one 
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of the five factors. By then the first wave of factor analytical studies of personality 
came to an end. 
The second research wave began with Goldberg (e.g., 1981; Goldberg, 1992) 
and still runs until today. Goldberg again started using more adjectives and 
repeatedly found five factors. He coined the name BIG 5 which today stands for the 
five personality factors deemed to be necessary to describe the covariances in 
individual self ratings. Yet, the most prominent proponents of the BIG 5 are Costa 
and McCrae. They used the adjective lists and formulated concrete items. Originally, 
Costa and McCrae investigated the BIG 2 (Neuroticism and Extraversion) and later 
the BIG 3 (Openness was added). However, inclined to develop an instrument to 
assess five personality factors they broadened their item pool to incorporate 
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness into their model. Furthermore, Costa and 
McCrae were not satisfied with only five relatively broad personality factors. They 
reasoned that these factors must comprise lower order personality aspects which 
they called facets. Accordingly, they came up with six facets for each of the five 
factors. At this point, it must be mentioned that Costa and McCrae left the path of 
pure factor analytical research. The facets were based on the mutual understanding 
of both scientist and thus, merely represent their views. The facets were each 
assessed with eight items. Thus, the final questionnaire consisted of 240 items 
assessing the BIG 5 and their corresponding facets (Costa & McCrae, 1992b). Even 
though the facet structure was not derived from factor analyses the following 
research proved that the proposed model fitted the data well. Therefore, Goldberg 
(1992) concluded: “Gradually, agreement has been growing about the number of 
orthogonal factors needed to account for the interrelations among English-language 
trait descriptors" (p. 26). Those factors are the BIG 5, namely, Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. According to Costa 
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and McCrae Neuroticism comprises such facets as anxiety, depression, 
impulsiveness, and vulnerability. Therefore, it has also been labelled Emotional 
Stability. Extraversion contains individual differences regarding activity, 
gregariousness, positive emotions, and excitement seeking. Openness to fantasy, 
ideas, values, and feelings are some of the facets which are a part of Openness (to 
Experience). Agreeableness includes facets like trust, altruism, compliance, and 
modesty. Finally, Conscientiousness comprises amongst others competence, order, 
dutifulness, and achievement striving1. 
Several critics have raised concerns regarding the BIG 5. Some of these 
concerns will be discussed later. Yet, the evidence supporting the BIG 5 model 
seems overwhelming. The model has been replicated in different cultures and using 
different questionnaires (e.g., Digman & Shmelyov, 1996). Moreover, studies have 
shown that estimates of heritability range from .39 for agreeableness to .49 for 
extraversion (Bouchard, 1997). Besides this, there is evidence for the stability of 
BIG 5 scores (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 2006; Roberts, Walton & Viechtbauer, 2006). 
The BIG 5 model has proven its value in numerous other studies and fields. A short 
overview of these different applications will be given next. 
 
1.2.  Applications of the BIG 5 
 
As soon as the majority of the scientific community had agreed upon the BIG 5 
as the most promising personality model it was tested in several fields. Overall, 
virtually no psychological field of research seems to remain where the BIG 5 have 
not been applied. The range covers personality of web page owners (Marcus, 
Machilek & Schutz, 2006), interview competencies of police officers (De Fruyt, 
                                            
1 From here on the personality factors will be written without a capital letter at the beginning to 
improve legibility.  
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Bockstaele, Taris & Van Hiel, in press), and connections to physiological research 
(Smits & Boeck, 2006). To address all the different fields of research in which the 
BIG 5 have been used would clearly be beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Therefore, examples for the value of the BIG 5 within three selected areas of 
psychology will be given next. 
 
1.2.1. Use in Organizational Psychology 
 
Within organizational psychology personality assessment serves several 
purposes. In personnel development skills of employees are supposed to be trained 
and increased. Here personality assessment can help to select those employees who 
bring the necessary motivation and openness along. Looking at teamwork, there 
always seems to be the question of how to mix a team in terms of personalities 
(Peeters, Rutte, van Tuijl & Reymen, 2006). Recent meta analytical analyses show 
that agreeableness can be regarded as the most important personality predictor 
regarding the outcome of teams. Psychologists have also tried to find out for a long 
time which traits enable a person to become a successful leader (e.g., Bono & 
Judge, 2004; e.g., Shao & Webber, 2006). Bono and Judge found extraversion was 
the strongest and most consistent correlate of transformational leadership. 
However, overall correlations between traits and leadership were rather small.  
Yet, one of the most common fields of applications and the field of most interest 
for the present paper is personnel selection. 
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1.2.1.1. Predicting job performance using the BIG 5 
 
Pioneers in the field were Barrick and Mount (1991). They realized that the 
various and partly contradicting results for the predictive power of personality 
within personnel selection might in part be due to the confusing variability in names 
and constructs used to assess personality. At about the same time meta – analyses 
became very popular due to the works by Schmidt and Hunter (Hunter & Hunter, 
1984; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Barrick and Mount 
recognized their chance and used the BIG 5 model to order the different constructs 
applied and moreover, they applied meta – analytical techniques to combine the 
findings. Their article published in 1991 was the most cited psychological article in 
the 1990ies (Mount & Barrick, 1998). The results revealed conscientiousness as the 
only personality factor which showed consistent relations with three different job 
performance criteria (job proficiency, training proficiency, and personnel data) over 
five different occupational groups (professionals, police, managers, sales, and 
skilled/semi-skilled). Extraversion also proved to be a valid predictor for training 
proficiency across the different occupations. Even though most validity coefficients 
were below .20 the results demonstrated that personality is a valid predictor of 
performance within occupational settings. These findings inspired many other 
researchers to further the knowledge base.  
Salgado (1997) was the first who used meta – analyses to combine research 
evidence collected in Europe. His results were identical to Barrick and Mount’s with 
the exception that he also found neuroticism to be a valid predictor across different 
jobs and different criteria. The actual validities reported were again rather small, 
only conscientiousness achieved a higher true correlation with training success of 
.39. Later Salgado (2003) demonstrated that BIG 5 – based questionnaires generally 
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reach higher criterion validities than non BIG 5 – based questionnaires. This lends 
further support to the claim that the BIG 5 are valid predictors of performance and 
preferable to other personality models. 
Judge and Ilies (2002) were able to show that neuroticism (average validity = -
.31) and conscientiousness (average validity = .24) predict performance motivation 
(goal-setting, expectancy, and self-efficacy motivation). Thus, the same two traits of 
all five traits which Salgado found attributed the most to job performance also 
explain motivational aspects within occupational settings. Moreover, Judge and Ilies 
computed that the BIG 5 as a whole explain about 24 percent of the variance in 
performance motivation. This finding can be regarded as exceptional. 
 
1.2.1.2. Predicting academic success using the BIG 5 
 
Beyond the prediction of job performance, the BIG 5 have also been used to 
predict performance in academic settings (e.g., Chamorro Premuzic & Furnham, 
2003; Farsides & Woodfield, 2003; Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004; e.g., 
Furnham, Chamorro Premuzic & McDougall, 2002; Rindermann & Neubauer, 2001). 
Furnham and colleagues investigated the incremental validity of personality above 
and beyond intelligence. In 2004 they reported that personality explained twelve 
percent of the variance in a statistic examination grade above and beyond 
intelligence within a sample of university students. Extraversion and 
conscientiousness were the most important personality predictors. Interestingly, 
higher extraversion was counterproductive for a good result in the statistic 
examination. In a longitudinal study over three years Farsides and Woodfield found 
that the BIG 5 explained about six percent of the variance in the final undergraduate 
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grade above and beyond intellect and motivation. However, only openness reached 
a significant regression weight (β = .25).  
Thus, the evidence concerning the criterion validity of the BIG 5 in predicting 
academic success is positive. However, it remains unclear which traits are 
necessary in which field.  
 
Summing up, the conclusion is that the BIG 5 are valid predictors for 
performance in various fields. Certainly, they are not the strongest predictors 
because this place is reserved for cognitive ability (e.g., Kuncel, Hezlett & Ones, 
2001; Kuncel, Hezlett & Ones, 2004; e.g., Salgado, Anderson, Moscoso, Bertua & de 
Fruyt, 2003; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence for 
the incremental validity of personality in general and the BIG 5 specifically.  
 
1.2.2. Use in Clinical Psychology 
 
Within the field of clinical psychology, the BIG 5 have been linked to many 
different psychological disorders ranging from alexithymia to schizophrenia. Some 
research results will be stated in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
1.2.2.1. Big 5 and Alexithymia 
 
The construct of alexithymia was introduced about three decades ago (Sifneos, 
1973) and refers to a cognitive-affective disturbance manifesting itself with 
markedly reduced symbolic thinking, impoverished fantasy life, and limited ability 
to identify and verbally express emotions. Alexithymic individuals are characterized 
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by reduced ability to recognize and describe feelings, scarceness of fantasies, and a 
concrete cognitive style (Taylor & Bagby, 2004). Throughout the research history of 
the construct its stability and construct validity have been called into question. In a 
recent article Picardi, Toni, and Caroppo (2005) used a Big 5 measure to 
demonstrate stability and construct validity of alexithymia. The results confirmed 
stability. Moreover, and of more interest for the present project the correlations 
with neuroticism (r = -.42) and openness (r = -.36) were significant which indicates 
slight overlaps between alexithymia and personality as assessed by the Big 5. 
 
1.2.2.2. Big 5 and Depression 
 
Depression is one of the most common diagnoses in contemporary 
psychotherapy. Some researchers have claimed that neuroticism as a trait is a good 
predictor for a major depression episode. However, results regarding this 
hypothesis were mixed. Schmitz, Kugler, and Rollnik (2003) used data from the 
National Comorbidity Study (NCS) to investigate this claim in a representative 
community sample. Results from a logistic regression revealed a strong interaction 
between neuroticism and self esteem in the prediction of a major depression 
episode. However, the strongest regression coefficient occurred for neuroticism. 
Thus, low emotional stability increases the odds of a major depression. Moreover, 
low self esteem in combination with low emotional stability also increases the odds 
of a major depression. 
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1.2.2.3. Big 5 and Eating Disorder 
 
Anorexia nervosa can be separated into two subtypes, the restricting type (AN – 
RT) and the binge – eating/purging type (AN – BP) (Dacosta & Halmi, 1992). Bollen 
and Wojciechowski (2004) investigated personality differences between those two 
types. They used the NEO – FFI and found that participants belonging to the 
restrictive type scored significantly higher in agreeableness and conscientiousness 
compared with both other groups. The effect sizes were moderate. Taken together, 
both groups differed significantly from a control group in all personality factors 
except for agreeableness. The patient group achieved higher scores in neuroticism 
but lower scores in all other factors. 
 
1.2.2.4. Big 5 and Schizophrenia 
 
Within the field of research in severe psychosis and schizophrenia Big 5 
measures have not been used as often as with other disorders. However, there are a 
few studies which applied Big 5 measures to schizophrenic patients.  
Gurrera, Nestor, O’Donnell, Rosenberg, and McCarley (2005) investigated the 
relationship between cognitive and motor performance on the one side and the Big 
5 on the other side within a patient and a control sample. A comparison of the two 
samples revealed significant and moderate to large differences in three of the five 
factors. Patients scored higher in neuroticism and lower in extraversion and 
agreeableness. However, when the performance in the cognitive and motor tasks 
and demographic variables were controlled the two groups no longer differed in any 
of the personality factor. Thus, the authors concluded that personality dysfunction 
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in schizophrenia may be mediated by disease-related changes in cognitive 
operations, or the neural processes underlying them. 
 
1.2.2.5. Big 5 and Personality Disorders 
 
Obviously, the major field of clinical research using Big 5 measures is the field of 
personality disorders. Researchers usually try to connect personality factors to 
certain personality disorders (Blackburn, Logan, Renwick & Donnelly, 2005; 
Moxnes, 1996).  
To give a short overview of some of the results a recent study will be reported 
(Furnham & Crump, 2005). Furnham and Crump used a Big 5 measure and a 
personality disorder measure in a sample of N = 431 assessment center candidates. 
Even though the sample was not a clinical sample, the results confirmed prior 
outcomes of other studies. Summarizing, it can be said that neuroticism correlated 
with borderline and avoidant personality disorders, introversion correlated 
positively with avoidant and schizoid personality disorders, and negatively with 
histrionic personality disorder. Moreover, openness correlated with schizotypal and 
conscientiousness with obsessive – compulsive personality disorders. The 
correlations were small to moderate. All in all, the results were in line with meta – 
analytical findings (Saulsman & Page, 2004). 
Saulsman and Page concluded in an earlier article that future research should 
“focus on the ability of neuroticism and agreeableness to screen for general 
personality disturbance and capture those qualities that should distinguish normal 
from disordered personality traits” (Saulsman & Page, 2003, p.83). 
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Summarizing the findings presented above, it is clear that the Big 5 also play an 
important role in contemporary clinical research. Especially neuroticism seems to 
be linked to a number of different disorders.  
 
1.2.3. Use in Pedagogic Psychology 
 
One of the most interesting applications of the Big 5 within the field of 
pedagogic psychology is within the scope of academic emotions. Usually, research 
in this area was mainly concerned with test anxiety. However, a group around 
Pekrun broadened that perspective and also included other emotions (enjoyment, 
hope, pride, relief, anger, anxiety, shame, hopelessness, and boredom) into their 
research program (e.g., Pekrun, Goetz, Titz & Perry, 2002).  Here personality traits, 
mainly trait anxiety, were used to demonstrate the discriminant validity of a specific 
test emotion questionnaire (Pekrun, Goetz, Perry, Kramer, Hochstadt & Molfenter, 
2004).  
The Big 5 were also used to investigate the implicit personality theories of 
teachers in judging their students (ter Laak, DeGoede & Brugman, 2001). Ter Laak, 
DeGoede, and Brugman analyzed 87 students ratings by four teachers. The 
resulting factor structure corresponded well with the Big 5. Thus, the authors 
concluded that teachers implicitly use a Big 5 – like personality theory to judge their 
students. Unfortunately, another result of that study was that the accuracy of these 
ratings is not very high. 
  
Summarizing this brief excursion into the field of pedagogic psychology it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Big 5 have enriched research in this area as well. 
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1.2.4.  Summary 
 
The cited studies from such various fields as clinical, organizational, and 
pedagogic psychology demonstrate that the Big 5 are an essential part of 
contemporary psychological research. Numerous studies have proven the value in 
predicting performance, psychological disorders, and theory building.  
If a construct has impacted the scientific community as intensely as the Big 5 
have done, it is essential that the means of measuring the construct have only minor 
flaws. However, a number of critics have not only doubted the construct itself but 
also the validity of questionnaires routinely applied to assess the Big 5. The most 
common criticisms refer to the number of factors, the methodology used to find the 
construct, the orthogonality of the five factors, the amount of trait and state 
variance, and finally the impact of social desirability. These typical criticisms are 
presented in the next paragraphs.  
 
1.3.  Concerns about the BIG 5 
 
1.3.1. Number of Factors 
 
The number of factors has been debated for a long time already (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992a; Eysenck, 1992). As indicated in the beginning the number of factors 
deemed to be necessary to describe covariances in the self descriptions of people 
was not five when research started. Cattell for example proposed twelve to sixteen 
factors (Cattell, 1943a; Cattell, 1943b). This number was criticized as being too 
large from the day of the first publication. Later, Eysenck and Eysenck (1964) 
developed a questionnaire to assess what he called the Big 3: Psychoticism, 
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Extraversion, and Neuroticism. Both latter traits are still part of the Big 5 model 
known today.  
However, the character of psychoticism raised many discussions. The last 
publicized controversy between Eysenck on the one hand and Costa and McCrae on 
the other hand was published in 1992 (Costa & McCrae, 1992a; Eysenck, 1992). The 
conclusion from that dispute was that Costa and McCrae succeeded in convincing 
the majority of the scientific community that psychoticism is nothing but “… a 
combination of low Agreeableness (A) and low C …” (Costa & McCrae, 1992a, p. 
861).  
Costa and McCrae originally started their research endeavor with the Big 2, 
namely neuroticism and extraversion (John, et al., 1988). Later they incorporated 
openness into their concept and decided to research the Big 3 (Costa & McCrae, 
1980). However, due to the evidence for two further factors, Costa and McCrae 
again expanded their model and included agreeableness and conscientiousness 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992b). This model was welcomed warmly by the scientific 
community (see above) and has proven its value. 
However, in recent years the debate concerning the number of factors has risen 
again (Ashton, Lee, Perugini, Szarota, de-Vries, Di-Blas, Boies & De-Raad, 2004; 
Saucier, 2003; Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis & Goldberg, 2005). Saucier et al. 
(2005) developed a personality questionnaire for Greeks. Results showed that a six 
factor solution might be sensible. Yet, in a different paper Saucier (2003) found that 
one and two factor solutions were the most replicable solutions.  
The different number of factors reported for different samples and with different 
adjective lists might be prove for the repeatedly expressed criticism concerning 
exploratory factor analysis as the method of choice in research engaged with the 
question of the number of factors. This issue will be described next. 
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1.3.2. Methodological Issues 
 
The use of exploratory factor analyses in psychological research is wide spread. 
Exploratory factor analyses search for latent factors which are responsible for the 
covariations between variables. The method was successfully used in intelligence 
research (Buehner, Krumm & Pick, 2005; Buehner, Ziegler, Krumm & Schmidt 
Atzert, 2006; Carroll, 1993). 
With Cattell exploratory factor analysis found its way into personality research. 
Due to the higher efficiency of modern statistical software packages factor analyses 
today can easily be conducted with large numbers of items and participants. Costa 
and McCrae also use exploratory factor analyses to conduct much of their research. 
This approach, however, has been criticized because of the many subjective 
decisions made in the course of exploratory factor analyses.  
Block (1995) is one of the most active antagonists of the Big 5. Within his paper 
from 1995 he also criticized that factor analysis is always bound to rely on a number 
of subjective decisions such as extraction criteria, rotation, and extraction method. 
Moreover, he stated that the homogeneity of the sample affects the results derived 
in a factor analyses. Besides this, Block also argued that exploratory factor analysis 
only uses the common variance of the items. He reasoned that items which correlate 
only lowly with the other items might still be reliable and therefore indices of 
personality aspects. However, these indices would not be considered in a factor 
analytical approach since only items with high loadings on the factors were kept. 
Thus, according to Block, the mere application of factor analyses might lead to a 
loss of important information regarding the personality of humans.  
Costa and McCrae (1995) replied to the critique by Block. Their, in parts rather 
lofty, reply was mostly concerned with listing empirical evidence for the merits of 
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the Big 5. Concerning the use of exploratory factor analyses their reply was short. 
They simply stated that they agree with Block and also wish that such techniques 
were not applied as senseless as in some cases. Moreover, they also called for more 
sophisticated methods to analyze self report data.  
 
1.3.3. Orthogonality 
 
Throughout the history of factor analytical research in personality researchers 
have always preferred a Varimax rotation in their proceeding. The main reason for 
that was that orthogonal solutions are easier to interpret. The goal of a rotation, may 
it be orthogonal or oblique, is to achieve simple structure. That means, items should 
have high loadings on one factor and low loadings on the other factors. However, 
the choice of the rotation method should not be based on convenience. Costa and 
McCrae preferred orthogonal rotation because it provides more parsimonious 
solutions (1995, p. 218).  
Mounting empirical evidence, however, has accumulated demonstrating that 
there are non trivial correlations between some of the personality factors. Mount, 
Barrick, Scullen, and Rounds (2005) collectively analyzed these data within a meta – 
analysis. The results showed that there are substantial correlations between 
personality factors. As is the state of the art in meta – analysis these correlations 
were corrected for restrictions in range and reliability. Thus, Mount et al. always 
refer to true correlations. The largest true correlation occurred between neuroticism 
and conscientiousness and amounted to .50.  
Costa and McCrae acknowledge these correlations and attribute them to a lack 
in discriminant validity for some of the facets. Furthermore, they advice users of 
their questionnaire to compute factor scores based on the results from the American 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction                                                                                              22 
normative sample. However, within this sample the uncorrected correlation 
between neuroticism and conscientiousness was .53. This is even larger than the 
true correlation reported by Mount and colleagues. All this would not be a problem 
if the correlations among the personality factors did not raise doubts concerning the 
construct validity of the Big 5. Maybe personality factors are not uncorrelated after 
all? 
Biesanz and West (2004) offered a different explanation for the correlations. 
They argued that some of the items have a positive connotation and some have a 
more negative connotation. Furthermore, they said that the intercorrelations 
between personality factors result from the use of only one information source. 
They conducted a Multi – Trait – Multi – Method analysis and found that the 
intercorrelations almost disappeared when several information sources were 
combined. This phenomenon was called evaluative bias. 
While this result offers an explanation for the intercorrelations it is not 
satisfying. Usually, only information from one source is available. Moreover, the 
explanation does not offer any help to the user. 
Within the present project a different approach to the problem was chosen. The 
main idea behind this approach were the state and social desirability impact on 
personality questionnaires. The state impact will be discussed in the next section 
before the impact of social desirability is introduced. 
 
1.3.4. Trait and State Variance 
 
The goal of most questionnaires and especially personality questionnaires is the 
assessment of traits. A trait can be defined as enduring characteristic or disposition 
(Liebert & Liebert, 1998, p. 184). The reason why scientists and practitioners alike 
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want to assess traits is that the prediction of behavior is more reliable and 
promising if the measured aspect is stable over time and situations. Thus, one of the 
goals in questionnaire construction is that the items tap aspects of traits.  
However, there is a dilemma. People do not behave stable over different 
situations. This dilemma has become known as the consistency paradox. Obviously 
the situation also plays an important role in determining people’s behavior. One of 
the first to point out this fact was Mischel (Mischel, 1968; Mischel & Peake, 1982). 
He observed that people see themselves as relatively stable personalities. In reality, 
however, the behavior of a person is not cross – situational consistent. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence for temporal consistency. This term refers to the fact that a person 
will behave relatively equal in a specific situation if the situation reoccurs. Mischel 
strongly believed that the situational influence cannot be neglected and interacts 
with personality traits to determine behavior. This interactionist view is accepted by 
most scientists today. Yet, when it comes to the prediction of behavior mostly traits 
are used since it is assumed that personality questionnaires assess only traits. This 
assumption, however, is not correct.  
Besides traits, psychologists often refer to states when characterizing people. 
States can be regarded as temporary conditions (Liebert & Liebert, 1998, p. 185). A 
state that has attracted a lot of attention in research is state anxiety. Many studies 
were conducted in order to distinguish between trait and state anxiety and their 
impacts on different aspects of life. In 1992 Steyer, Ferring, and Schmitt (1992) 
proposed a model which acknowledges the simultaneous presence of state and trait 
in personality measures. Using structural equation modeling and at least two 
measurement points the variance of a personality questionnaire can be split into 
trait variance, state variance, interaction variance, and error variance. With the help 
of this study Deinzer and colleagues (Deinzer, Steyer, Eid, Notz, Schwenkmezger, 
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Ostendorf & Neubauer, 1995) demonstrated that up to twenty percent of the 
variance in a questionnaire filled out in ordinary situations can be attributed to 
state. In other words, the situational influences a person is exposed to impact the 
answer to a personality questionnaire.  
Even though this result has been known in the scientific community for more 
than ten years, the consequences of this situational influence have not been 
investigated in depth. Consequently, the present study will explore situational 
influence on the construct and criterion validity of a personality questionnaire. 
 
1.3.5. Social Desirability and Its Impact on Construct and Criterion Validity 
 
One of the main concerns regarding the use of personality questionnaires is the 
impact of social desirability. Social desirability is viewed as a response set by most 
researchers (Murphy & Davidshofer, 2001). The problem regarding social 
desirability consists of the assumption that it increases or decreases scores in 
personality questionnaires according to the situation.  
A prominent contributor to the body of research concerned with social 
desirability is Paulhus (e.g., Paulhus, 2002; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce & Lysy, 2003). 
Paulhus has dedicated most of his life as a scientist to the research of the construct 
of social desirability. As indicated above, social desirability is a form of deception 
since people do not portray themselves honestly. Paulhus distinguishes two types of 
deception. On the one hand there is self deception. This means that people distort 
their answers to a questionnaire in a direction which is close to the personal ideal of 
that person. This process is supposed to happen unconsciously. Therefore, some 
scientists have strictly tried to avoid the use of questionnaires. McClelland (1987, p. 
187) for example once wrote that a scientist cannot believe what the people say 
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about themselves. However, of more interest is the second type of deception, the 
other deception.  
Other deception, also called impression management, is meant when people 
intentionally endorse other rating categories in a questionnaire in order to impress 
others. In an application setting for example, applicants supposedly portray 
themselves as more conscientious and less neurotic than they actually are. This has 
also been called faking.  
The role of faking or social desirability on the construct and the criterion validity 
of personality questionnaires has been researched broadly (e.g., Collins & Gleaves, 
1998; Ellingson, Smith & Sackett, 2001; Pauls & Crost, 2004; Pauls & Crost, 2005b; 
e.g., Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee & Drasgow, 2001; Zickar & Robie, 1999a). One 
of the findings of these studies is that faking causes correlations between 
personality factors to increase. A result of these higher correlations was the 
extraction of a sixth factor. Schmit and Ryan (1993) extracted this factor with 
loadings from almost all personality facets and called it the ideal employee factor. 
Despite this evidence for the impact of social desirability on the construct validity 
there are some scientists who claim that no serious impact can be found. Ellingson, 
Smith, and Sackett (2001) reported that higher order factor structures for people 
high and low in social desirability do not differ. However, their study used social 
desirability questionnaires to select the samples. Meanwhile, there is evidence that 
such measures can be faked as well and as easily as other questionnaires (Pauls & 
Crost, 2004). Thus, the sample identification might have been flawed. In a different 
study Smith, Hanges, and Dickson (2001) compared the structure of the Big 5 in an 
applicant and a student sample and reported no differences in loading patterns. A 
closer look at their models shows however, that there are differences in the size of 
the intercorrelations between personality factors. Within the applicant sample these 
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intercorrelations where higher. Thus, the conclusion that construct validity is not 
affected by social desirability or faking might have been too early. 
A different but related branch of research investigated the impact of social 
desirability or faking on the criterion validity of personality questionnaires. While 
there is a large amount of evidence which shows that mean scores of such measures 
increase dramatically (e.g., Rosse, Stecher, Miller & Levin, 1998; Ziegler, Bühner, 
Krumm & Schmidt Atzert, submitted-a) due to faking there is also evidence that the 
criterion validity, at least as far as the overall effect size is concerned, is not affected 
by faking. Ones and Viswesvaran in collaboration with other researchers (Ones, 
Viswesvaran & Reiss, 1996; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999; Viswesvaran, Ones & 
Hough, 2001) used meta – analytical techniques to show that even though mean 
scores increase criterion validity as effect size is not impacted. This is an 
encouraging finding for all people interested in using personality questionnaires. 
However, there is also evidence for an indirect impact of faking on such 
questionnaires. Hough (1998) reported that correcting for faking strongly changes 
the ranking of people. While this again had no influence on the criterion validity it 
underlines that personality questionnaires no longer only assess personality when 
they are faked. This aspect will also be investigated in the present project. 
 
1.3.6. Summary 
 
The description of the different critical aspects of the Big 5 shows that especially 
the construct validity and the criterion validity of questionnaires measuring the 
construct have been questioned. Within the present project three studies were 
conducted to find answers to these questions. However, there is one aspect which 
governs all research attempts undertaken in these three studies. From the studies 
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by Deinzer et al. and Steyer et al. it is clear that every personality questionnaire not 
only assesses trait but also state variance. This state variance, or as it will also be 
called from here on situational demand, might be responsible for some of the 
critical aspects of the Big 5. For example, it is reasonable to assume that situational 
demand is part of the orthogonality problem and therefore impacting construct 
validity. Moreover, the research cited above also shows that faking, at least 
indirectly, also impacts criterion validity. Faking can be understood as situational 
demand. If one wants to distort a questionnaire, the most likely reason is the 
situational demand the person feels. Consequently, the present project also 
investigated the impact of situational demand on criterion validity.  
Most of the research concerned with the Big 5 or faking uses complex 
methodological approaches to tackle the research questions. However, so far little is 
known about the actual psychological process occurring when people fake. In other 
words, it is unclear which strategies people might use and why they do so. These 
questions will also be part of this research project. 
Finally, many efforts have been conducted to guard against faking. The present 
project will also test a new method, namely Mixed Rasch models, to detect faking 
and eliminate its impact on scores. 
Within the following paragraphs these research goals and how they are 
implemented in the studies will be explained in more detail. 
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1.4.  Goals of the present project 
 
1.4.1. Impact of Situational Demand on the Construct Validity of the BIG 5 
 
As has been described above the construct validity of the Big 5 has been 
questioned by some researchers. From all the critical points mentioned above the 
reported correlations between theoretically uncorrelated personality factors will be 
an issue in the following studies. The results by Deinzer et al. (1995) demonstrated 
that situational influence can account for up to twenty percent of the systematic 
variance in a personality questionnaire. Moreover, other results (e.g., Pauls & Crost, 
2005b) showed that the correlations between personality factors increase 
dramatically when situational demand and thus, situational influence increases. 
Drawing on these results the following hypothesis was tested in this project: 
Situational demand can be regarded as a systematic measurement error which adds 
on to the systematic variance. Since this error variance affects all faked variables, 
correlations between the variables increase. This means that situational demand 
causes the intercorrelations between personality factors and controlling for 
situational demand will yield uncorrelated personality factors. This hypothesis was 
investigated in study 1 and study 2 (see chapter 2 and 3). 
In order to test this hypothesis, it is necessary to separate trait and state 
variance. The proposed model by Steyer et al. (1992) was used to do that. This 
model uses at least two measurement points to separate the different variance 
shares. The idea is that the trait variance should be part of every measurement 
point. In other words, whenever I ask a person about her or his openness to 
experience the answer should always contain trait variance. However, each time a 
person is questioned certain situational circumstances also influence the answer. 
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Yet, in comparison with trait variance this influence is bound to the specific 
situation. This means that the state variance might impact different variables at 
different times. For example, when a person has been studying for an important 
exam for weeks and therefore has not been to parties at all, her or his extraversion 
scores will be different compared with another time when she or he has just 
returned from a two week vacation in Ibiza. Consequently, state variance is only 
drawn from the variables measured at the same time. Since the items used to 
question a person are the same at each measurement point, the error variances of 
identical facets are allowed to correlate. The resulting structural equation model, 
also called Latent State Trait Model (LST), is exemplified for the conscientiousness 
factor in figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1 Example of a Latent State Trait Model 
 
 
It can be seen that the facets C1 (competence) to C6 (liberation) have been 
measured twice as implied by the second number. The trait variance (C) is then 
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extracted at one side and draws variance from all facets. State variance exists for 
both measurement points, therefore, two latent state variables exist. These variables 
only draw variance from facets which have been assessed at the same time. For 
example, state 1 only has loadings from facets with a 1 as second digit. The 
correlated error variances constitute the fact that the same facet has always been 
measured with the same items. The figure also demonstrates one of the main ideas 
of the present project. If the situational demand at one measurement point is 
simulated to represent an applicant setting, the state variance can be regarded as 
faking variance. In other words, if participants are given a specific instruction to 
fake, then the state variance represents faking variance. Since the trait variance can 
still be drawn because of the first measurement point this faking variance no longer 
contains trait variance. Thus, a separation of trait and faking variance can be 
achieved with this design. It was tested whether controlling for situational demand 
would yield uncorrelated personality factors as was hypothesized. 
The same question was also looked at in study 1 (chapter 2). However, in this 
study no second measurement time existed. Thus, only aspects of LST models were 
realized. Strictly speaking, a bimodal model with a latent trait and a latent state 
variable simultaneously drawing variance from the variables was constructed. 
However, the state variance has loadings from all used variables since it was 
assumed that the situational influence impacts all variables simultaneously. The trait 
variances, however, only have loadings from their respective facet variables. Thus, 
state and trait variances were also separated in study 1. The aim of study 1 was to 
find out whether situational demand was responsible for differing correlation 
patterns between the personality factors in different cognitive ability groups.  
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Summing up, study 1 and study 2 used aspects of or a complete LST design to 
separate state and trait variance and to investigate how controlling for situational 
demand influences intercorrelations between traits. 
 
1.4.2. Impact of Situational Demand on the Criterion Validity of the BIG 5 
 
In the first part of the introduction research results regarding social desirability 
and its impact on the criterion validity of personality questionnaires have been 
illustrated. The prevailing conclusion of these studies is that social desirability does 
not influence criterion validity. 
In studies 2 (chapter 3) and 3 (chapter 4) this conclusion was scrutinized. The 
model described in the previous section allowed the separation of state and trait 
variance. In order to study the effects of situational demand on the criterion validity 
of the Big 5, the LST model was combined with an Individual Causal Effect Model 
(Steyer, 2005). Individual Causal Effect Models (ICE) use a control and an 
experimental group. In study 2 the control group had to fill out the personality 
questionnaire twice, each time as honestly as possible. The experimental group, 
however, only answered honestly the first time. The second time this group was 
given a specific faking instruction. With the ICE design any changes occurring in 
the experimental group at time 2 which do not occur in the control group can be 
attributed causally to the faking instruction. Thus, it is possible to find out whether 
personality factors still differ when faking is controlled. Moreover, and more 
interesting, it is possible to regress a criterion on the personality factors and the 
faking factor. Thus, the question where the predictive power of faked personality 
questionnaires stems from can be answered.  
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In study 3 (chapter 4) a different methodological approach was chosen. Applying 
Mixed Rasch Models (MRM, Rost, 1991) different faking styles were identified. 
Mixed Rasch Models are a combination of Latent Class Models and Rasch Models. 
Such models can be applied to questionnaire or test data. Instead of analyzing 
variance these models analyze answer patterns, though. Within Latent Class models 
the most likely number of different classes necessary to describe the answer 
patterns is computed. People are assigned to one of these qualitatively different 
classes. However, within each class every person is assumed to have the same 
probability of solving an item in an intelligence test or endorsing a category in a 
questionnaire. Rasch models on the other hand assume that the answer patterns 
observed can be attributed to individual differences in one and the same latent 
variable. In other words, a Rasch model tests whether it is likely that one dimension 
is responsible for the observed differences in answer patterns. In contrast to Latent 
Class models people can differ quantitatively in this latent variable. MRMs combine 
both theories and look for the number of qualitatively different classes in which the 
Rasch model holds true and which are most likely given the observed answer 
patterns. The classes still differ qualitatively. Members of one class, however, also 
differ in their probability of answering a question. Thus, MRMs are comparable with 
cluster analyses. However, cluster analyses use distances to group people. 
Therefore, people with the same total score (number of solved items or sum of 
endorsed categories) will most likely end up in the same category. However, they 
might have totally different answer patterns. For example, two people might have 
solved ten items in an intelligence test. The first person solved the first ten and the 
second person the last ten items. Is it really likely that both people belong to the 
same cluster? Since MRMs analyze answer patterns it is possible that people with 
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the same number of solved items will be assigned to different classes according to 
their answer patterns. This is especially interesting in the research of faking. 
Summing up, study 3 used MRMs to find different faking classes and then 
computed the criterion validity of honest, faked, and MRM corrected (see 1.4.4.) 
scores. Applying this technique, a more differentiated look at the impact of 
situational demand on criterion validity is possible. 
 
1.4.3. The Psychological Process behind Situational Demand 
 
Part of study 3 was also a qualitative study. Such studies are relatively rare in 
contemporary psychology since they do not offer sophisticated methodological tests 
to guard against chance occurrences. In early psychological research studies, for 
example Freud (e.g., Freud, 1910), case studies were used more frequently and in 
some instances exclusively. Nowadays, qualitative studies are used to improve the 
legibility of questionnaires for example (e.g., Dillman & Redline, 2004; e.g., Willis, 
2004). Usually, cognitive interviews are applied here. In these cognitive interviews 
participants either express any thoughts they have during the work on the 
questionnaire (concurrent cognitive interview) or they are interviewed afterwards 
(retrospective cognitive interview). In both cases the aim is to find difficulties in 
item wording or categories which impede answering the questionnaire. In 
psychotherapy such think aloud techniques are used to explore semantic networks 
of fear. However, when it comes to faking and the specific psychological processes 
happening when people intentionally distort their questionnaire answers, qualitative 
analyses have not been used before. 
Therefore, study 3 used both cognitive interview techniques to explore this 
psychological process. Two experts analyzed the thought protocols and interview 
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results in order to identify different faking strategies. Moreover, the exact thought 
process was analyzed for systematic patterns. 
 
1.4.4. Dealing with Situational Demand 
 
Researchers and practitioners alike have tried for a long time now to find a way 
to guard against faking or to eliminate its effects from questionnaire answers. In the 
beginning mostly so called lie or faking scales were developed (e.g., Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1964). Especially the Marlowe – Crowne scale has been used by many 
researchers to spot faking (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Usually, a questionnaire is 
developed and its correlation with the Marlowe – Crowne scale or another social 
desirability scale is determined. If the correlation turns out to be low, it is concluded 
that the questionnaire is not susceptible to faking (e.g., Sokolowski, Schmalt, 
Langens & Puca, 2000). Results from faking studies indicate that this conclusion 
might be wrong, though. Ziegler, Bühner, Krumm, and Schmidt – Atzert (submitted 
a) reported that such a measure is also susceptible to faking despite the low 
correlation to the Marlowe – Crown scale reported by the test author. Moreover, 
Pauls and Crost (2005) demonstrated that impression management and deception 
scales can also be faked in an applicant setting. Nevertheless, such scales have 
proven their value in identifying fakers (e.g., Baer, Wetter, Nichols, Greene & et al., 
1995). This task also seems to be of more interest to most practitioners. Be that as it 
may, identifying a faker raises two questions. What do I do with a faker? Is it really a 
faker or does the person really have such a highly developed trait? Other tactics 
have been developed to guard against faking or to detect faking. Ipsative measures 
were long believed to be the best way to help against faking (e.g., Baron, 1996; 
Bowen, Martin & Hunt, 2002; Martin, Bowen & Hunt, 2002). However, they have 
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two disadvantages. First of all, they only allow finding out personal preferences but 
do not allow interindividual comparisons regarding the specific amount of a trait. In 
other words they help to find out whether a person is more extraverted than 
conscientious but not whether the person is more extraverted than another person. 
Secondly, these measures can be faked as well. Ziegler et al. discussed all these 
methods and added cut off scores to the list of possible aids helping to guard 
against faking. However, they concluded that objective measures (McClelland, 
Koestner & Weinberger, 1989) might be the best way to guard against faking. 
Within study 3 a new approach to the problem was chosen. As mentioned above, 
study 3 used Mixed Rasch Models (MRM) to find different faking classes. MRMs do 
not only allow finding different classes, they also estimate person parameters for 
each participant according to the assigned class. In other words, the estimated trait 
score is corrected for the response set chosen. Rost, Carstensen, and von Davier 
(1997) could show that under ordinary circumstances two response styles for 
answering a Big 5 questionnaire can be identified. There are people who prefer 
extreme categories and people who prefer middle categories. When the person 
parameter is estimated in a MRM, these preferences, which influence the score but 
are not due to trait differences, are corrected. Thus, middle crosser get slightly 
larger and extreme crosser slightly smaller person parameters. Thus, with the help 
of MRMs it might be possible to correct for faking and reconstruct parameters close 
to the honest scores. This was tested in study 3. 
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1.4.5. Summary and outlook 
 
In the following chapters the three different studies undertaken to pursuit the 
four goals just stated will be described. The first study (chapter 2) analyzed data 
collected by Toomela (2003) to explore the impact of situational demand on the 
construct validity of a Big 5 questionnaire in different ability groups. In study 2, an 
experimental design with two groups and two measurement points was realized to 
separate trait and faking variance. Thus, the impact of situational demand on 
construct as well as criterion validity could be assessed. Finally, within the third 
study results from a qualitative analysis regarding different faking styles are 
reported. Moreover, MRMs were used to explore differences between different 
faking classes. 
After the three studies have been described and discussed, chapter 5 will shortly 
summarize the results and then provide a discussion of the results from all three 
studies regarding the four research goals.  
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Chapter 2. A Reanalysis of Toomela (2003): Personality Structure - A 
Question of IQ or Situational Demand? 
 
The BIG 5 personality model is probably the most sophisticated personality 
model in psychology. The first to use the name BIG 5 for the personality dimensions 
which consistently occurred in different samples was Goldberg (see Goldberg, 
1981). The five factor model (FFM) as we know it today, consisting of five higher 
order personality traits (neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness), was proposed by Costa and McCrae 
(1992b). Meanwhile extensive research has been conducted and the Big 5 have 
been replicated in different cultures and with different instruments. The BIG 5 can 
be understood as five independent dimensions which describe the pattern of 
covariations between individual personality trait descriptions with a sufficient 
accuracy. Therefore, the most common method to prove the structure of BIG 5 
questionnaires is a Varimax rotated factor analysis (e.g. Toomela, 2003; Costa & 
McCrae, 1992b).  
However, there also seems to be a lot of empirical evidence that the BIG 5 are 
not as uncorrelated as proposed. In a recent meta – analysis by Mount, Barrick, 
Scullen, and Rounds (2005) substantial true correlations between the BIG 5 were 
reported. Most notably for this paper is the reported true correlation of .50 between 
neuroticism and conscientiousness. This is especially interesting since Toomela 
(2003) could not clearly distinguish these two dimensions in a group of highly 
intelligent men using a Varimax rotated factor analysis. In his paper he reported 
difficulties in fitting the FFM in a group of males with above average intelligence. In 
this particular group, a four factor model seemed to be the better solution. 
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Meanwhile, the data have been reanalyzed by Allik and McCrae (2004). Those 
authors followed recommendations by McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, Bond, and 
Paunonen (1996) to use a confirmatory approach to test factor structure after an 
exploratory approach. Using an orthogonal Procrustes rotation, Allik and McCrae 
found that Toomela’s data could be fitted to the American normative sample quite 
well. Therefore, one could argue that the problem was solved. However, we want to 
approach the topic from a different angle. Costa and McCrae (1992b) reported a 
correlation of r = -.53 between neuroticism and conscientiousness in the normative 
sample which was used as target in the Procrustes rotation. Thus, even though the 
factor solution shows convergence with another factor solution, the question of 
where the overlap between the factors stems from remains. This question has been 
discussed elsewhere already. Costa and McCrae (1992) commented on this and 
recommended the use of factor scores to circumvent the problem. Biesanz and West 
(2004) claimed that evaluative bias was responsible for the overlap. They used a 
multi – trait – multi – method approach and found that the intercorrelations between 
personality factors decrease when different information sources are used.  
Within this reanalysis we want to use structural equation modelling to show that 
situational demand increased the state variance in specific scores and caused the 
inflated correlation between neuroticism and conscientiousness. The starting point 
for this claim was the increased correlation between neuroticism and 
conscientiousness reported by Toomela. Moreover, from the study by Pauls and 
Crost (2005b) it is known that correlations between personality factors increase due 
to situational demand (faking). Pauls and Crost (2005b) could show that the 
correlations between personality traits increase with situational demand (selection 
scenario). This effect only occurred for the traits the subjects believed to be job-
relevant. The authors reported a correlation of r = -.76 between conscientiousness 
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and neuroticism, exactly the two personality dimensions Toomela could not 
distinguish clearly. The result that the structure of the BIG 5 might change in 
applicant settings has already been reported by Schmit & Ryan who found a sixth 
factor which they called ideal employee factor (Schmit & Ryan, 1993). However, this 
factor has not always been replicated (see also Cellar, Miller, Doverspike & Klawsky, 
1996; De Fruyt, Aluja, Garcia, Rolland & Jung, 2006).  
This alone would not suffice to start a reanalysis of the Toomela data since 
participants here did not have specific faking instructions. However, Zickar, Gibby, 
and Robie (2004) used Mixed Rasch Models and found that even in incumbent 
samples where faking was always believed not to happen, a sizeable amount of 
people intentionally distorted their answers. The authors concluded that “the 
assumption that applicants fake and incumbents do not appears to be untenable …” 
(p.186). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the same thing happened in the 
Toomela data and caused the inflated correlation. This was tested in the course of 
this reanalysis.  
The first step in the reanalysis was to investigate the question why situational 
demand was not felt equally by all participants. Since the differences in personality 
structure were found in groups of different intelligence, cognitive ability is a likely 
candidate for this phenomenon. The relationship between personality and 
intelligence has received a lot of attention in the last decade (e.g., Ackerman, 1996; 
Chamorro Premuzic & Furnham, 2003; Chamorro Premuzic & Furnham, 2004; 
Chamorro Premuzic, Furnham & Moutafi, 2004; Furnham, 2002; Furnham & 
Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004; Furnham, et al., 2002; Furnham, Moutafi & Chamorro 
Premuzic, 2005; Toomela, 2003). Even though the results repeatedly show 
significant correlations between different personality traits and intelligence (Harris, 
Vernon & Jang, 2005; Moutafi, Furnham & Crump, 2003; Moutafi, Furnham & 
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Paltiel, 2004; Zeidner & Matthews, 2000), these correlations are rather low. 
Moreover, drawing from the differentiation hypothesis from intelligence research 
(Deary & Pagliari, 1991; Spearman, 1927), some researchers have assumed that the 
variability in personality traits also increases with the level of intelligence (Brand, 
Egan & Deary, 1993; Harris, et al., 2005). This would mean that the BIG 5 structure 
should actually emerge easier in groups of highly able people. This is also in line 
with recent findings by Möttus, Allik, and Pullmann (2006) who also used an 
Estonian sample. Those authors reported only small differences in personality 
structure between a group of cognitive able and a group of cognitive less able 
participants. They also reported that intercorrelations between personality 
dimensions were somewhat smaller within the more able group. However, in the 
study by Toomela these results could not be observed. 
To sum up this first part, there are two differing points of view: (1) The BIG 5 are 
a structure of uncorrelated personality dimensions, and (2) the BIG 5 are a structure 
of correlated personality dimensions. The latter allows phenomena like the 
increased correlation reported by Toomela. The first view does not allow such 
correlations. 
Using a different statistical method, we want to bring a new perspective into this 
discussion. At least since Mischel (Mischel, 1968; Mischel & Peake, 1982), there has 
been debate about the situational influence on behavior and its interaction with 
personality. Today, nobody would disagree that actual behavior is determined by 
the situation and personality traits. The controversy remains on the amount of the 
situational influence. In the 1990’s the debate was refueled with a new 
methodological approach called Latent-State-Trait Theory (LST) (see Steyer, et al., 
1992; Steyer, Schmitt & Eid, 1999). This theory pays attention to the fact that states 
might also influence the measurement of a trait. The idea is that each measure of 
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personality contains trait variance, state variance, error variance and variance due 
to the interaction of trait and state. In a large scale research project conducted by 
Deinzer, Steyer, Eid, Notz, Schwenkmezger, Ostendorf, and Neubauer (1995), three 
commonly used personality questionnaires were analyzed to see how much trait 
variance they actually contain. The three questionnaires applied were the NEO Five-
Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992b), the Eysenck Personality Inventory 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964) and a well known German personality questionnaire, the 
Freiburger Personality Inventory (Fahrenberg, Hampel & Selg, 1984). The results of 
the analyses conducted by the authors show that there is a substantial amount of 
trait variance. However, they could also show that the amount of variance due to 
state or interaction can amount to as much as 20% of the total variance. 
Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to compute the different variance amounts. First 
of all, the questionnaire has to be administered at least twice. Secondly, the 
computation is done by structural equation modeling which requires large samples 
for the kind of model applied in this case. These may be reasons why the LST 
approach has not been followed up to a greater extent. However, the results 
reported here clearly indicate that the situational influence on the measurement of 
personality should not be neglected. As Deinzer et al. (1995, p.7) formulated 
pointedly: “… we always measure persons in situations, not persons; there is no 
psychological measurement in the situational vacuum”.  
All in all, there are differing views on the interconnectedness of the BIG 5 and 
the situational influence on the general structure. Our starting point in trying to 
further explore these points of views is the reanalysis of data reported by Toomela. 
The goal of the present study is to propose an extension to the traditional FFM 
which pays attention to situational demands. By doing this, we also hope to shed 
some light into the structure of the BIG 5: correlated or not? Before the current 
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reanalysis will be explained further, a short overview over the study by Toomela is 
given.  
 
2.1.  The study by Toomela 
 
In the study conducted by Toomela N = 912 native-born Estonian men aged 17 
to 68 years participated and filled out the Estonian NEO-PI-R (Kallasmaa, Allik, 
Realo & McCrae, 2000), a structure of word meaning test, and the Estonian 
Cognitive Ability Scale (Pulver, 1999). The analyzed sample, which is also the basis 
for this paper, contains N = 870 people. Five cognitive ability as well as five 
structure of word meaning groups were built. The cognitive ability groups did not 
only differ in their mean level of personality traits but also in the number of 
personality factors. The contra intuitive result was that within the group with the 
highest cognitive ability only 3 or 4 factors emerged using exploratory factor 
analysis. This would be contradictory to the differentiation hypothesis. Moreover, 
the amount of variance explained by a FFM decreased in this group after steadily 
increasing from group to group before. For the word meaning structure groups the 
results were clearer. The FFM was more coherent and explained more variance with 
increasing word meaning structure. Toomela draws on these results to conclude 
that a cultural factor (word meaning structure) offers important tools (words) for the 
development of personality, and that intelligence can be understood as the mastery 
of these tools.  
An alternative explanation for the smaller number of factors in the most able 
group might be the situational demand. This assumption will be supported in the 
following section. All participants (except for N = 21 students) were part of the 
Estonian military or somehow affiliated with it. The sample contains recruits (N = 
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400), non-commissioned officers (N = 201), commissioned officers (N = 186), and 
members of the Estonian Defense League (N = 62). It seems reasonable that this 
fact might have influenced the data. 
 
2.2. Reanalysis 
 
Drawing on the results by Zickar, Gibby, and Robie (2004), Schmit and Ryan 
(1993) as well as Pauls and Crost (2005b), we assume that the critical results found 
by Toomela might be due to situational demand. As mentioned above, Zickar, 
Gibby, and Robie demonstrated that faking even occurs in incumbent samples and  
Schmit and Ryan could show that the BIG 5 model does not fit in an applied setting 
while a six factor model does. Pauls and Crost’s results were derived in a faking 
experiment and show that participants do not fake all personality dimensions but 
only those they believed to be job-relevant. The correlations between those factors 
increased dramatically. We propose that the participants with the highest cognitive 
ability felt a situational demand and “faked” their answers. A recent paper by 
Konstabel, Aavik, and Allik (in press) lends further support to this hypothesis. Those 
authors report that the highest correlations between social desirability measures 
and BIG 5 dimensions in an Estonian sample in an applicant setting occurred for 
conscientiousness and neuroticism.  
Thus, the hypothesis raised here that not intelligence but situational demand led 
to an increased correlation between conscientiousness and neuroticism finds 
additional support. However, this assumption raises the question, why would 
cognitive able people fake? To answer this question, we took a closer look at the 
original data and found that the higher the cognitive ability, the higher the military 
rank. Table 2.1 illustrates this fact.  
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Table 2.1 Percentage of military rank in each cognitive ability group 
   
  Total N CA1 CA2 CA3 CA4 CA5 M SD 
Recruits 400 28.5 25.3 24.0 12.0 10.3 16.8 7.3 
Students 21 14.3 28.6 23.8 19.0 14.3 20.1 7.7 
noncommissioned officers 201 14.4 17.4 30.8 21.4 15.9 21.7 6.5 
Officers 186 5.4 12.4 30.1 29.0 23.1 24.6 5.8 
EDL 62 6.5 12.9 21.0 17.7 41.9 27.6 5.6 
Annotations. EDL stands for Estonian Defense League. CA1 to CA5 represent the 5 ability groups: 
CA1 (1–12 correct answers), CA2 (13–18 correct answers), CA3 (19–24 correct answers), CA4 (25–28 
correct answers), and CA5 (29–35 correct answers) according to Toomela (2003). The maximum 
number of points was 36. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that a situational demand was not felt because of a 
higher cognitive ability, but rather because of a higher military rank. This means 
that people with a higher military rank would have answered the questionnaire in a 
way they believed to be typical or representative for a military person. To put it 
short, people with a higher military rank felt a stronger situational demand. We 
assume that this demand influenced their answer style. Results of this are answers 
believed to be prototypical or representative for military persons. This would lead to 
increased correlations between the factors assumed to be prototypical since they 
would also contain additional variance due to the situation. Thus, it would be hard 
to separate these factors, which in turn would explain the smaller number of factors 
found by Toomela. Of course this assumption is speculative. Participants were 
informed that the data would be handled anonymously and only be used for 
research. Maybe the latter aspect motivated high ranking men to portray a more 
prototypical military personality in order to make the military as a whole look better. 
For all the following analyses we compare three military groups: recruits, non-
commissioned officers, and officers. We collapsed students and recruits into one 
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group. Both have the smallest scores in cognitive ability and probably the least 
motivation to appear as a “prototypical” military person. We assume this because 
the former were not actually affiliated with the military and the latter were recruits 
doing their obligatory military time in the Estonian army. We also collapsed the 
officers and the members of the Estonian Defense League. Both groups have the 
highest results in the cognitive ability test and probably the highest motivation to be 
a representative military person because the military is a big part of their daily life. 
The fact that Toomela found high cross loadings for conscientiousness facets on 
neuroticism and vice versa is in line with findings by Pauls & Crost (2005b) who 
found that people only fake personality dimensions believed to be job relevant, 
leading to increased correlations between those dimensions (see also Konstabel, 
Aavik & Allik, in press). Looking at the results found by Toomela reveals that 
conscientiousness and neuroticism have a bivariate correlation of r = -.77 (p < .01). 
This clearly exceeds the true correlation reported by Mount et al. (2005) and also 
the correlation of -.53 reported by Costa and McCrae (1992). Moreover, the 
correlation reported by Mount et al. was corrected for attenuation as well as range 
restriction which the bivariate correlation is not. To provide evidence for the 
hypothesis that not intelligence, but situational demand caused by different military 
status caused this correlation, the size of it should be equally high in the group 
containing officers and members of the Estonian Defense League. Correlation 
analysis yields a result of r = -.67 (p < .01). This correlation is only slightly smaller 
than in the highest cognitive ability group. Thus, a first shred of evidence for the 
hypothesis is provided.  
Another prerequisite for further analysis is that the factor structure in the three 
military groups reveals the same peculiarities as in the cognitive ability groups. 
Results from Varimax  rotated Principal Component analyses are in table 2.2. 
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It can be seen that the number of substantial cross loadings increases with 
military rank. Within the highest status group the two domains can no longer be 
clearly distinguished. This is the same result found in the cognitive ability groups. 
Since none of the other personality dimensions showed substantial cross loadings 
on any of the other dimensions we conducted all further analyses with only these 
two dimensions: neuroticism and conscientiousness. 
To sum up this first part, we believe that the high correlation between 
conscientiousness and neuroticism was caused by situational demand. This 
situational demand can be regarded as a systematic measurement error. This 
variance adds on to the trait variance and causes the correlations between the traits 
to increase. 
Table 2.2. Exploratory factor analysis within military groups 
 Military groups 
 recruits + students non-commissioned officers officers 
 NE CO NE CO NE CO 
N1 .78  .81  .41 -.66 
N2 .74  .72 -.37 .41 -.67 
N3 .79  .79  .31 -.72 
N4 .74  .70 -.33 .46 -.61 
N5 .37 -.61 .45 -.57  -.77 
N6 .47 -.50 .46 -.59  -.75 
C1 -.32 .60  .71  .78 
C2  .65  .74 .37 .69 
C3  .63  .72  .74 
C4  .77  .78 .33 .67 
C5  .70  .75  .77 
C6  .70 -.34 .67  .77 
Annotations. For facet names see figure 2.1. Loadings smaller than .30 have been omitted. 
 
  To test this hypothesis, we will reanalyze the data using structural equation 
modeling. We will conduct a multigroup analysis using two bimodal models (model 
1a and 1b). Both models contain the facets of the personality dimensions as 
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manifest variables. Each facet represents the sum of the eight items measuring the 
facet. The bimodal models pay attention to the fact that the variables consist of two 
variance components: trait as well as state variance. The trait variance represents 
the personality of the participants. The state variance, however, stands for the 
situational demand the participants felt. Therefore, besides letting each manifest 
variable load on the trait factor it is supposed to measure, we also let each manifest 
variable load on a state factor. We call this factor fake. On the trait side, model 1a 
represents a Varimax rotated solution. This means there are no correlations 
between the personality dimensions. Model 1b additionally contains correlations 
between the personality dimensions and thus represents a correlated traits model.  
Moreover, to shed some more light into the discussion whether the BIG 5 are 
correlated or not, we also tested two models without the latent variable fake (model 
2a and 2b). In model 2a, there is no correlation between the personality dimensions. 
Thus, the model represents a Varimax rotated solution. Model 2b includes 
correlations between personality dimensions.  
If the hypothesis that the situational demand is responsible for the higher 
correlations between personality dimensions was correct, the mean of the latent 
variable fake in models 1a and 1b should increase with the military rank. This would 
indicate that the situational pressure was felt stronger by higher military ranks. 
Moreover, the correlations between the personality dimensions in model 1b should 
be smaller compared to the correlations in model 2b.  
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2.3.  Statistical Analyses 
 
Confirmatory factor analyses (maximum likelihood) were conducted using AMOS 
5.0. One important assumption for such an analysis is a multivariate normal 
distribution. We tested this assumption with the Mardia Test. The result of the 
Mardia Test (multivariate kurtosis = 25.987, c.r. = 11.163, p < .001) shows a 
violation of the assumption. In such a case the χ²-test is too liberal and the p-value 
should be corrected. Therefore, we conducted a Bollen-Stine bootstrap with N = 200 
samples to correct the p-value of the χ²-test.  
The assessment of the global-goodness-of-fit was based on the Standardized 
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) and the Root Mean Squared Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) as recommended by Hu and Bentler (1999). The authors 
also give some advice regarding possible cutoffs for the indices. Thus, the SRMR 
should be lower or equal to .11 and the RMSEA should be less than .06 for N > 250 
and less than .08 for N < 250. Additionally, we looked at the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) as advised by Beauducel and Wittmann (2005). According to Hu and Bentler 
the CFI should have a value of approximately .95. Marsh, Hau and Wen (2004) 
criticized these “golden rules” and pointed out that the recommended cutoffs are 
very restrictive and hardly achievable when using personality questionnaires. 
Nevertheless, we will apply the cutoffs, keeping in mind that they are very strict 
when dealing with personality questionnaires. 
In order to conduct the multigroup analysis and the latent mean comparisons, 
the intercept for each manifest variable had to be set equal in the three groups 
respectively (see Byrne, 2001). Moreover, all latent means were fixed at zero in the 
group containing recruits. Thus, the means in the other groups represent the 
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increase in the latent variable compared to the recruit group. These values can be 
interpreted as effect sizes since the latent means are z – scores.  
To see which of the four models (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b) fits the data best, the fit indices 
should be compared. Using χ² - difference tests models 1a versus 1b and 2a versus 
2b can be compared directly. However, since not all of the models are nested, a χ² - 
difference test cannot be applied to compare the models with and without the latent 
variable fake. Thus, an information criterion (AIC) is used to compare the models 
directly. The lower the criterion is, the better a model fits the data. The information 
criterion also considers model complexity. This means, if a model only fits better 
because of its higher complexity, the information criterion would be larger than for 
a less complex model. 
 
2.4.  Results 
 
2.4.1. Sample description 
 
A detailed sample description can be found in Toomela (2003). Table 2.1 
displays means and standard deviations for the military groups in the cognitive 
ability test. Table 2.3 contains means and standard deviations for the personality 
dimensions of the three groups in our analysis. 
As can be seen, the level of neuroticism falls from recruits to non-commissioned 
officers and the level of conscientiousness rises. Both changes were significant and 
the effect sizes were small. The same can be said for all other comparisons (except 
for agreeableness) between the recruits and the non-commissioned officers. 
However, the non – commissioned officers and the officers no longer differ 
significantly in any of the personality dimensions. 
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Table 2.3. Personality dimensions for the 3 military groups. 
 Military groups Comparisons 
 (1) recruits + students  (2) non-commissioned officers (3) officers (1) vs (2) (1) vs (3) (2) vs (3)
  N M SD N M SD N M SD d d d 
NE 421 85.1 24.8 201 75.8 27.6 248 74.2 25.8 -0.35*** -0.41*** -0.06 
EX 421 111.7 22.6 201 116.7 25.2 248 117.8 22.3  0.21*  0.26**  0.05 
OE 421 97.9 16.4 201 102.5 19.5 248 103.3 18.1  0.26**  0.30**  0.04 
AG 421 108.2 14.4 201 111.3 18.2 248 110.9 15.2  0.19  0.17 -0.02 
CO 421 115.8 21.7 201 120.7 24.2 248 122.5 21.6  0.22*  0.30**  0.08 
Annotations. NE = Neuroticism; EX = Extraversion; OE = Openness to Experience; AG = 
Agreeableness; CO = Conscientiousness. The comparisons depict Cohen’s d using the pooled 
standard deviation as denominator. Bonferroni adjusted significance levels are * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ 
.01; *** = p ≤ .001. 
  
2.4.2. Structural equation analysis 
 
The following analysis combines procedures of multigroup analysis (Byrne, 
2001) and aspects of Latent-State-Trait Theory (e.g. Steyer, et al., 1999). The 
observed variables in the models are the twelve personality facets from the NEO-PI-
R (N1 to N6 for neuroticism and C1 to C6 for conscientiousness). All models contain 
two latent variables called NE for neuroticism and CO for conscientiousness which 
draw variance from the corresponding manifest variables. Moreover, the bimodal 
models include a third latent variable, called fake which draws variance from all 
observed variables. This variable represents the situational demand (state) and 
reflects the assumption that some part of the observed variance was due to the 
situation. Figure 2.1 illustrates the correlated bimodal model (1b) described above.  
The first step in a multigroup approach should always be to test the model fit in 
one of the groups. Since the group of interest is the group of officers, we first tested 
the model in this group. Overall the model revealed an acceptable fit: χ² [42] = 
112.001, Bollen-Stine p-value = .005, SRMR = .038, RMSEA = .082 (90% confidence 
interval: .064 - .101), CFI = .97. Thus, the multigroup analysis was conducted next. 
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The results of the multigroup analyses with the four models can be found in table 
2.4. Comparing the uncorrelated traits solutions with the correlated traits models 
shows that the correlated traits models (1b and 2b) reveal a better fit in both cases. 
The χ² - difference test between model 1a and 1b showed a significant result: ∆χ² 
(∆df) = 19.02 (3), p < .001. The same holds true for the comparison between model 
2a and 2b: ∆χ² (∆df) = 385.15 (3), p < .001. Thus, considering the relationship 
between the personality dimensions always yields a significantly better result than 
an uncorrelated solution.  
 
Figure 2.1. Structural Equation Model of model 1b. 
 
Annotations. Facet names of personality domains: N1: anxiety; N2: angry hostility; N3: depression; 
N4: self-consciousness; N5: impulsiveness; N6: vulnerability; C1: competence; C2: order; C3: 
dutifulness; C4: achievement striving; C5: self-discipline; C6: deliberation. Error variances have been 
omitted. 
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Moreover, the models, which only contained the personality dimensions, but not 
the fake variable, revealed worse fits compared to the bimodal models. According to 
the AIC, the model with correlated personality dimensions and a latent situational 
demand variable represents the data best.   
The latent correlations between neuroticism and conscientiousness in model 2b 
were r = -.62, r = -.70, and r = -.75 and controlling for situational demand (model 1b) 
r = .49, r = .33, and r = .39 for recruits plus students, non-commissioned officers, 
and commissioned officers respectively. Thus, the correlations in the bimodal model 
are clearly smaller, but most notably have reversed directions. However, the 
correlations are corrected for attenuation. In order to compare the correlations, 
which resulted when controlling situational demand, with the original bivariate 
correlation, we calculated the construct reliabilities for conscientiousness and 
neuroticism according to the equation by Hancock and Mueller (2001). The 
construct reliabilities for conscientiousness in model 1b were rtt = 0.42, rtt = 0.24, 
and rtt = 0.28 for recruits plus students, non-commissioned, and commissioned 
officers respectively. The results for neuroticism in model 1b were rtt = 0.66, rtt = 
0.75, and rtt = 0.66 for recruits plus students, non-commissioned, and commissioned 
officers respectively.  
Thus, the correlations between conscientiousness and neuroticism when 
controlling for situational demand were r = .21, r = .14, and r = .17 for recruits plus 
students, non-commissioned officers, and commissioned officers respectively.  
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Table 2.4. Model fit 
 χ² (df) p - value SRMR RMSEA (90% CI) CFI AIC 
Model 1a 483.30 (144) .005 .049 .052 (.047 - .057) .95 735.30 
Model 1b 458.28 (141) .005 .039 .051 (.046 - .056) .95 716.28 
Model 2a 1337.05 (182) .005 .248 .086 (.081 - .090) .81 1513.05
Model 2b 951.90 (179) .005 .093 .071 (.066 - .075) .87 1133.90
Annotations. SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Residual; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of 
Aproximation; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; AIC = Aikaike’s Information Criterion. 
 
Table 2.5 contains the loadings for the three groups in the 4 models. It can be 
seen that all manifest variables consist of variance due to trait, as well as to 
situational demand (state). However, there are changes in the loadings when 
situational demand is controlled (model 1a and 1b). Within the models 2a and 2b all 
manifest variables show high loadings on their respective personality dimensions. 
Considering the situational influence, the picture changes. Conscientiousness is 
dominated by the variable C2 (order), especially within the groups of non-
commissioned and commissioned officers. The other conscientiousness facets have 
higher loadings on the situational factor. Only within the recruits group the loadings 
on both sides of the bimodal models are comparable. For neuroticism the pattern is 
different. The loadings are higher on the personality dimension or comparable to 
the loadings on the situational demand variable.  
Table 2.6 includes the means and variances for all latent variables for the three 
military groups in the different models.  
As mentioned earlier, the latent means for the recruits were fixed at zero. The 
hypothesis regarding the situational demand was that the latent mean for fake 
should increase with military rank. The results show that both officer groups differ 
significantly from the recruits group. The difference between the officer groups is 
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significant as well (t(447) = 4.74, p < .001). The effect sizes can be regarded as 
moderate to large.  
 
Table 2.5. Loadings 
  
 recruits+ 
students 
 
 
non-commissioned 
officers 
officers 
Loadings on Conscientiousness 
  1a 1b 2a 2b  1a 1b 2a 2b 1a 1b 2a 2b 
C1  0.08 -0.01 0.72*** 0.75***  -0.15 -0.11 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.01 -0.15 0.80*** 0.82*** 
C2  0.52a 0.41a 0.70 a 0.69 a  0.42 a 0.34a 0.76 a 0.74 a 0.61 a 0.45a 0.80 a 0.79 a
C3  0.42*** 0.39*** 0.69*** 0.67***  0.34*** 0.35*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.27*** 0.17* 0.80*** 0.79*** 
C4  0.54*** 0.45*** 0.82*** 0.80***  0.08 0.10 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.31*** 0.18* 0.73*** 0.73*** 
C5  0.36*** 0.24** 0.84*** 0.86***  0.22* 0.16* 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.32*** 0.19* 0.87*** 0.87*** 
C6  0.23*** 0.15* 0.54*** 0.54***  0.06 -0.02 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.22* 0.12 0.72*** 0.72*** 
Loadings on Neuroticism 
  1a 1b 2a 2b  1a 1b 2a 2b 1a 1b 2a 2b 
N1  0.65a 0.62a 0.84 a 0.82 a  0.72 a 0.71a 0.82 a 0.79 a 0.67 a 0.66a 0.85 a 0.83 a
N2  0.48*** 0.45*** 0.71*** 0.71***  0.53*** 0.51*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 
N3  0.66*** 0.62*** 0.87*** 0.86***  0.76*** 0.75*** 0.90*** 0.87*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 
N4  0.56*** 0.53*** 0.76*** 0.75***  0.50*** 0.49*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 
N5  0.19*** 0.13 0.42*** 0.44***  0.18* 0.15* 0.53*** 0.55*** 0.16* 0.15* 0.59*** 0.61*** 
N6  0.18** 0.16* 0.68*** 0.72***  0.26*** 0.24*** 0.75*** 0.78*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.77*** 0.80*** 
Loadings on Fake 
  1a 1b  1a 1b 1a 1b 
C1  0.82 a 0.81a  0.90 a 0.86a 0.86 a 0.86a
C2      0.51***     0.59***      0.66***     0.68***     0.66***     0.75*** 
C3      0.55***     0.59***      0.65***     0.65***     0.74***     0.78*** 
C4      0.63***     0.70***      0.63***     0.62***     0.66***     0.70*** 
C5      0.76***     0.81***      0.81***     0.83***     0.80***     0.84*** 
C6      0.48***     0.52***      0.56***     0.59***     0.69***     0.71*** 
N1     -0.53***    -0.57***     -0.44***    -0.46***    -0.57***    -0.57*** 
N2     -0.51***    -0.54***     -0.58***    -0.60***    -0.66***    -0.64*** 
N3     -0.57***    -0.61***     -0.53***    -0.55***    -0.67***    -0.67*** 
N4     -0.51***    -0.54***     -0.56***    -0.58***    -0.55***    -0.54*** 
N5     -0.41***    -0.44***     -0.53***    -0.55***    -0.63***    -0.64*** 
N6     -0.83***    -0.81***     -0.79***    -0.80***    -0.77***    -0.75*** 
Annotations. For facet names see figure 2.1. a = path had starting value of 1, therefore no 
significance test possible. * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001. 
 
The results for conscientiousness are interesting. Not paying attention to the 
situational demand, conscientiousness increases significantly with military rank 
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(t(447) = 6.43, p < .001 for 2a and 2b). Controlling for situational influence, the mean 
for conscientiousness was significantly larger for the non-commissioned officers 
than for the recruits. However, the commissioned officers had a significantly smaller 
mean than the non-commissioned officers (t(447) = 3.58, p < .001 for 1a and 1b). 
Moreover, the commissioned officers did not differ significantly from the recruits in 
their conscientiousness. For the factor neuroticism the mean decreases significantly 
with military rank in model 2a and 2b (t(447) = 15.49, p < .001 for non-commissioned 
vs. commissioned officers). Controlling for situational influence, neuroticism also 
falls significantly with military rank (t(447) = 9.38, p < .001 for non-commissioned vs. 
commissioned officers). Regardless of the model all latent variables except one have 
significant variances. The exception is conscientiousness in model 1b within the 
group of non-commissioned officers. That means controlling for situational 
influence and letting the personality dimensions correlate, conscientiousness does 
not have a variance significantly different from zero in the group of non-
commissioned officers.  
 
Table 2.6 Latent means and significance of comparison with recruits. 
  
  
recruits+students non-commissioned officers officers 
   1a 1b 2a 2b 1a 1b 2a 2b 1a 1b 2a 2b 
CO 
M 
S² 
 0 
4.55*** 
0 
2.74* 
0 
8.27*** 
0 
7.90*** 
1.1 
3.29* 
1.10** 
2.14 
3.58***
11.51***
3.50***
11.21***
.76 
8.21*** 
0.76 
4.46* 
4.19*** 
13.74*** 
4.11***
13.28***
NE 
M 
S² 
 0 
11.09*** 
0 
10.03***
0 
18.17*** 
0 
17.57***
-1.56* 
13.03***
-1.56***
12.56***
-3.82***
16.03***
-3.80***
15.10***
-2.48***
8.87*** 
-2.48*** 
8.69*** 
-5.29*** 
14.38*** 
-5.26***
13.88***
Fake 
M 
S² 
 0 
10.04*** 
0 
11.99***
- - 
3.35***
12.78***
3.35***
11.74***
- - 
3.70***
11.30***
3.70*** 
13.48*** 
- - 
Annotations. CO = Conscientiousness, NE = Neuroticism, * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001. The 
mean in the groups of recruits and students was fixed at 0. 
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One could argue now that intelligence and not military rank is the key variable 
responsible for the increasing mean of the situational demand variable. In order to 
test this we included the variable cognitive ability group into the model and let it 
correlate with fake. This variable stems from the original data set and comprises the 
five different ability groups Toomela created. The correlations were r  = .16 (p < .05) 
for the recruits, r = .10 (n.s.) for the non-commissioned officers and r = -.15 (p < .05) 
for the commissioned officers. The structure of the model itself did not change. 
Thus, the influence of intelligence on the situational demand variable is either 
insignificant or very small. 
 
2.5.  Discussion 
 
The goal of this paper was to reanalyze the data reported by Toomela controlling 
for situational influence. Toomela could not confirm the BIG 5 model in a group of 
highly intelligent men. In this group, the factors conscientiousness and neuroticism 
could not be differentiated. In the course of this reanalysis it was hypothesized that 
situational demand was the reason for this problem. The hypothesis was that not 
intelligence but military rank was the attribute responsible for the influence of 
situational demand. In order to prove this hypothesis, a multigroup structural 
equation model including aspects of LST was used to analyze the data again. The 
results confirm the hypothesis and show that the mean for the latent variable fake 
increases with military rank. This was still the case when cognitive ability was 
controlled. Moreover, the correlation between conscientiousness and neuroticism 
was much smaller when situational demand was controlled. In the course of this 
reanalysis two differing views of the BIG 5 were contrasted: an uncorrelated and a 
correlated model. The results show that a correlated model represents the data 
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better than an uncorrelated model. Moreover, controlling for situational demand 
further improves the model. All in all, the model with correlated personality 
dimensions and a situational demand factor fits the data best. It should be noted, 
however, that the direction of the relationship between the personality dimensions 
switched from negative to positive when controlling for situational demand.  
 
2.5.1. Situational demand 
 
The results provided here show that situational demand (state) is a phenomenon 
which is felt differently by different groups of people. More clearly, in the data by 
Toomela it looks as if men with a higher military rank felt a greater need to obey the 
situational demand and thus appear as more prototypical military. The result was 
that they presented themselves as less anxious, more stable, hard-working and 
conscientious. However, a crucial amount of variance in the personality 
questionnaires was due to the situational demand. It has to be noted, that military 
rank and intelligence are confounded. In other words, with the present data it is not 
possible to differentiate between the amount of state variance due to military rank 
and due to intelligence. Thus, further studies should be conducted to separate these 
sources of variances.  
Interestingly, the loadings on the situational factor are almost always higher than 
on the trait factors in all three groups and in both models (1a and 1b). Thus, 
situational demand seems to play an important role. To estimate the importance, a 
look at the variances of the personality dimensions is very informative. Not 
controlling for situational influence (models 2a and 2b), the personality dimensions 
both have large amounts of variance in all three groups. This changed when 
situational demand was controlled. Now, conscientiousness loses a big amount of 
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variance to the situational demand variable. That means a lot of the differences in 
conscientiousness were actually not due to different values in persons´ 
personalities, but to the way they responded to the situational demand. This is 
especially evident in the group of non-commissioned officers. Here 
conscientiousness no longer has a significant amount of variance. In the group of 
officers conscientiousness does not disappear, but is dominated by a single facet: 
order. All other facets contain mostly situational variance. Thus, situational demand 
has two sides. First, it is felt differently by different groups. Recruits probably had 
the least ambition to appear as a military person. However, with increasing rank the 
demand was felt stronger. Secondly, the effect of the situational demand also is 
different in the groups. One could assume the more the situational demand was felt, 
the less personality variance should be left. However, this is not the case. The 
personality dimensions are not equally affected. This is in line with results by Pauls 
and Crost (2005b) who demonstrated the selective effects of faking, a form of 
situational demand. While neuroticism keeps a big amount of variance, 
conscientiousness seems to fall apart. Thus, conscientiousness seemed to have 
higher importance for the non-commissioned officers and officers in order to appear 
as a military person than neuroticism. At this point a note of caution is appropriate. 
The design of the reanalysis only contains aspects of a real LST design. Thus, the 
amount of variance due to situational demand is probably overestimated. After all, 
Deinzer et al. (1995) could show that it hardly exceeds 20%. Only experimental 
designs can bring more information into this matter. Summing up, there is evidence 
that a specific “faking” took place which caused the two personality dimensions 
neuroticism and conscientiousness to correlate highly. By splitting the variance into 
trait and situational demand variance the personality dimensions can be better 
distinguished.  
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2.5.2.  BIG 5 Models 
 
Another aspect of this reanalysis was to compare an uncorrelated and a 
correlated traits model and to find out which impact situational demand has on 
both. The results show that the correlated traits model fits better than the 
uncorrelated and that controlling situational demand also improves the model. The 
first result seems to indicate that it is inappropriate to regard the BIG 5 as 
uncorrelated. If one only looked at models 2a and 2b, this would clearly be the case. 
Here, the correlated model fits significantly better and the correlation found is in 
line with Mount et al. who reported a true correlation of .52 with a 90% confidence 
interval of .27 to .73. Moreover, the fit indices for the uncorrelated model (2a) are 
clearly worse than for the correlated model (2b). Thus, it seems as if an 
uncorrelated solution can be discarded. However, we would not draw this 
conclusion. In fact, on the basis of the results reported here we would advocate the 
uncorrelated traits solution. There are three reasons for this. First of all, controlling 
for situational demand decreases the correlations between personality dimensions 
drastically. Secondly, if the correction for attenuation was reversed, the correlations 
were only small or negligible, depending on the group. Of course, a correction for 
attenuation is not inappropriate. However, if reliabilities are as low as found in our 
study when controlling for situational demand, the correction for attenuation leads 
to highly increased estimations of the correlations. And after all, the original 
correlation we looked at was a bivariate correlation without a correction for 
attenuation, thus it is only fair to reverse the correction. And finally, the fit indices 
did not improve drastically from model 1a to 1b. One could argue that the χ² - 
difference test was significant. However, with large samples the power for this test 
increases and therefore, even small model violations would yield significant results.  
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Only regarding the fit indices, we draw the following conclusion: If situational 
demand (state variance) is controlled, an uncorrelated traits solution is not worse 
than a correlated traits solution. This is not a trivial interpretation. Costa and 
McCrae (1992b) attributed the missing orthogonality of the BIG 5 scales to a lack in 
discriminant validity. This however must not necessarily be true. The results 
reported here indicate that not a lack in discriminant validity but the common 
influence of situational demand might lead to violations of orthogonality. To our 
knowledge, this aspect has received very little attention in research and practice. 
Therefore, we hope to inspire more research on this topic. 
 
2.5.3.  Relationship between personality dimensions 
 
Interestingly, the correlation between neuroticism and conscientiousness 
reversed direction, when controlling situational demand. Mount et al. recoded 
neuroticism so that all personality dimensions have positive intercorrelations. Thus, 
the correlation found controlling for situational demand is in contrast to the meta-
analytical findings. An obvious reason for this is that the meta-analysis did not 
consider situational influence which always has an impact (Deinzer, et al., 1995). 
The present results would mean that taking the variance caused by situational 
demand out of the trait variance, conscientious people tend to be anxious as well. 
One has to keep in mind however, that conscientiousness no longer contains an 
equal amount of variance from all facets but is dominated by order. Then the 
positive correlation is not counterintuitive. If one is rather anxious, it will be 
beneficial to be more orderly to calm the anxiety. This is, however, just an 
interpretation and needs to be examined further. 
 
 
Chapter 2: Reanalysis of Toomela                                                                             62 
2.5.4. Latent personality means 
 
It is also very informative to look at the latent personality means in the three 
groups when controlling situational influence. Toomela’s original analysis yielded 
results which indicated that neuroticism falls with increasing intelligence while 
conscientiousness increases. These results are hard to interpret since both 
dimensions could not really be distinguished and the facets showed substantial 
cross-loadings. Nevertheless, even when controlling for situational demand the 
mean in neuroticism falls with military rank and thus with increasing intelligence. 
However, the mean for conscientiousness first increases (non-commissioned 
officers) and then decreases again in the group of officers. In other words, up to a 
certain extent intelligence and conscientiousness have a positive relationship which 
switches direction beyond this point. This result is in line with the findings by 
Moutafi et al. (2003) (see also LaHuis, Martin & Avis, 2005) who could confirm a 
negative relationship between conscientiousness and intelligence. Their conclusion 
was that a low ability can be compensated by a conscientious work attitude while a 
high ability does not need a conscientious work style.  
 
2.5.5. Limitations and further research 
 
One major drawback of this paper is the fact that this is a reanalysis and not an 
experimental study. We can only hypothesize that situational demand led higher 
military ranks to portray stronger faking behavior. One could argue that there are 
numerous other possible explanations for the differences in the situational demand 
factor. For example age, amount of life experience, kind of personality, or 
intelligence. At least for intelligence the analysis conducted here show that it has 
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little or no influence on the situational demand variable. The fact that the influence 
is positive for recruits and negative for commissioned officers actually strengthens 
the hypothesis. Intelligent recruits felt the situational demand and faked at least a 
little, maybe to please the test conductors. Commissioned officers on the other hand 
did cheat less with increasing intelligence. One could hypothesize this was the case 
because they did not want to cheat too obvious. Of course, these are mere 
speculations and most of all the influence was rather very small. Concerning the 
alternative explanation that age was responsible for the effects found, a recent 
meta-analysis by Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer (2006) showed that changes in 
personality over the course of several years can only be regarded as modest. 
Nevertheless, the effect sizes found in the data by Toomela between the different 
military groups were more than modest if situational demand was not controlled. 
Thus, it is reasonable that differences in age alone cannot explain the effects found. 
However, only with the help of an experimental design would it be possible to find 
clearer evidence for this hypothesis. Such a design should use Latent – State – Trait 
– Theory to determine the amount of situational impact and also pay attention to the 
reason why situational demand is felt. Only this way a confoundation with 
intelligence and other variables as in the present reanalysis can be avoided. It would 
then also be possible to shed light onto the ability which enables people to fake a 
questionnaire. Clearly, it must be an ability. As Pauls and Crost could show, not all 
dimensions are faked but only those believed to be relevant. Judging relevance must 
be connected to an ability. This raises the question of the role of intelligence. 
Another step should be to test situational demand in real life situations. A selection 
scenario seems very appealing in this regard. In such a context it would be 
interesting to find out whether the predictive power of personality questionnaires 
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comes from the personality variance they contain or from the ability to fill out the 
questionnaire in line with the situational demand.  
Summing up, there is evidence to assume that situational demand was 
responsible for the large, negative correlation between conscientiousness and 
neuroticism. Thus, situational demand has an influence on the structure of the BIG 
5 and should be regarded with more care as hitherto since by doing this the 
proposed uncorrelated personality structure is more likely to appear. All in all, 
regarding the current results an uncorrelated traits model seems very plausible if 
situational influence is controlled. 
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Chapter 3. Personality Structure: A Question of Trait & State 
Interaction 
 
Personality has been the interest of many psychologists and researchers 
worldwide. Especially in the last twenty years models derived from the 
psycholexical branch of research have become popular (e.g. Costa & McCrae, 
1992b; Goldberg, 1981). Most notably, the five factor model (FFM) has enjoyed a lot 
of attention (Aluja, Garcia, Garcia & Seisdedos, 2005; Barrick, Mount & Judge, 2001; 
Chamorro Premuzic & Furnham, 2004; Digman, 1997; Mount, et al., 2005). 
Goldberg (1992) even wrote : “Gradually, agreement has been growing about the 
number of orthogonal factors needed to account for the interrelations among 
English-language trait descriptors" (p. 26). However, the FFM has been challenged 
on several grounds, most prominently: number of factors, methodological approach, 
orthogonality, and impact of social desirable responding. All of these points address 
the question of construct validity. The present study aimed at this question, but also 
investigates problems regarding criterion validity. 
 
3.1. Critic on the construct validity of the FFM 
 
The number of factors has been debated for a long time already (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992a; Eysenck, 1992). Even though the debate was heated, the question 
does not seem to be solved as new models with more or less than five factors 
emerge (Ashton, et al., 2004; Saucier, 2003; Saucier, et al., 2005). However, there 
are also questions regarding the methodological approach. Probably one of the 
most prominent adversaries of the FFM and specifically factor analysis as the main 
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tool used is Jack Block (1995). Block criticizes that factor analysis always is bound 
to rely on a number of subjective decisions. These decisions influence the number 
of factors extracted as well as the relationship between those factors. Costa and 
McCrae (1995) replied to the critique stating that there is mounting evidence for the 
so-called five-factor hypothesis and that it is a “serviceable model”. The third major 
concern is the question of the orthogonality of the factors. Mount et al. (2005) 
conducted a meta-analysis and found substantial correlations between personality 
factors which range up to a true correlation of .50 between neuroticism and 
conscientiousness. Costa and McCrae attribute this to a lacking discriminant validity 
and advice users of their questionnaire to compute factor scores with the factor 
loadings derived from the American normative sample to avoid correlations 
between personality factors. Biesanz and West (2004) claim that an evaluative bias 
causes correlations between the personality factors.  
Recently Ziegler, Bühner, and Toomela (submitted-b) showed that correlations 
between personality factors might be due to situational demand. They argued that 
situational demand leads to an increased state variance which adds on to the factors 
and, like correlated errors, causes correlations to rise. They based their line of 
argumentation on the Latent-State-Trait model (LST) by Steyer (e.g., Steyer, et al., 
1992; Steyer, et al., 1999). In LST models personality questionnaire variance can be 
split into trait, state, interaction between trait and state and error. Using this model 
Deinzer and colleagues could show that up to twenty percent of personality 
questionnaire variance is due to state or interaction between state and trait 
(Deinzer, et al., 1995). This impact of situational demand (faking) on the structure of 
the FFM has been ruled out elsewhere. Smith, Hanges, and Dickson (2001) analyzed 
a student as well as an applicant sample and found the FFM to be adequate in both 
samples. However, they allowed for correlations between personality factors, which 
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is not in line with the theoretical model. Moreover, looking at the correlations shows 
that they are higher within the applicant sample. Smith and Ellingson (2002) used 
the same method as Ziegler, Bühner, and Toomela to separate trait variance and 
what they called a method factor (social desirability). They compared this model in a 
student and an applicant sample and found no different loading patterns between 
both groups. They interpreted this as prove that construct validity is not impacted 
by social desirability (situational demand). This interpretation can be challenged on 
two grounds. First, as Ziegler, Bühner, and Toomela could show, faking can occur 
even in a sample where no one would suspect faking. Thus, the indifferent loading 
patterns might be due to a situational demand felt by the students as well. In line 
with this argument are findings by Zickar, Gibby, and Robie (2004) who reported 
that a large number of incumbents without any need for faking still faked in a 
personality questionnaire. Secondly, Smith and Ellingson only compared loading 
patterns and not latent means. The latent means would indicate whether the 
applicants actually faked more than the students. A flaw of both studies is that only 
one measurement point was used. Thus, a clear separation of trait and state was not 
possible.  
A research line which is closely related to the state trait question is concerned 
with the impact of social desirability or faking on construct validity (e.g., Collins & 
Gleaves, 1998; Ellingson, et al., 2001; e.g., Stark, et al., 2001; Zickar & Robie, 
1999a). Basically results indicate that faking causes increased correlations between 
personality factors. This aspect automatically raises concerns regarding construct 
and criterion validity. These concerns will be discussed next before we turn to the 
question what exactly social desirability or faking might be. 
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3.2. Critic on the criterion validity of the Big 5  
 
The question of construct validity also impacts criterion validity. The size of the 
correlations between personality factors has a direct impact on the criterion validity 
of each factor. Usually, within validity studies criteria are regressed on all five 
factors simultaneously (Chamorro Premuzic & Furnham, 2003; Furnham & 
Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004; Furnham, et al., 2002; Salgado, 2003). However, if 
predictors are correlated, the amount of variance one predictor explains exclusively 
decreases, limiting chances of finding significant regression weights. One could 
argue that this is no problem since the overall amount of explained variance is not 
affected. This argument only holds true as long as one is not interested in finding 
specific predictors. Thus, non-orthogonality affects criterion validity.  
There is evidence that the correlations between personality factors increase in 
applicant settings (e.g., Collins & Gleaves, 1998; Ellingson, et al., 2001; e.g., Pauls & 
Crost, 2005b; Schmit & Ryan, 1993; Zickar & Robie, 1999a). Schmit and Ryan 
coined the term “ideal employee factor” since they found a sixth factor on which all 
facets had loadings. Pauls and Crost could show that not all personality dimensions 
are affected by faking instructions but only those believed to be job-relevant. A 
similar result was obtained by Furnham (1997) who found an impact of faking only 
for three of the five factors, namely conscientiousness, agreeableness and 
neuroticism. However, event though there is evidence that personality measures can 
be faked and that this faking affects the construct validity, there is also evidence that 
the criterion validity of such measures remains untouched (e.g., Salgado, 2003). 
Taking these results into account one could ask the question where does the 
criterion validity of personality measures stem from? Is it really personality that 
predicts performance or is it the additional information which causes correlations 
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between factors to rise? If the latter is true, what exactly is this additional 
information which results from faking?  
Connected to this is the fact that faking increases mean scores in personality 
questionnaires (e.g., Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999; Ziegler, et al., submitted-a). This 
topic has been and still is a major concern for many practitioners keeping them 
from using personality questionnaires. The reason for this is that some practitioners 
doubt that faked personality measures still assess personality. To rule out this 
argument, the impact of social desirability on criterion validity has been 
investigated. Ones, Viswesvaran and Reiss (1996) conducted a meta – analysis and 
stated that social desirable responding does not impact criterion validity, but is in 
fact due to actual individual differences in neuroticism and conscientiousness. 
Paulhus (2002) gives an excellent overview of the emergence of social desirability 
as a construct and also claims that it represents a trait. Research on social 
desirability has one important flaw, though. It is assumed that questionnaires 
constructed to measure social desirable responding cannot be faked themselves. 
This, however, seems to be a wrong presumption as Pauls and Crost (2004) could 
show. Thus, within the present study no social desirability measures will be applied 
to isolate faking. Instead a more sophisticated methodological approach, namely a 
LST model in combination with an Individual Causal Effects (ICE) model (Steyer, 
2005), will be chosen.  
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3.3. Substance vs. style  
 
As some of the above mentioned research indicates, there have been attempts to 
find out what exactly faking in personality questionnaires is. Some researchers 
believe it is social desirability (Paulhus, et al., 2003), fuelling discussions whether 
social desirability impacts criterion validity or construct validity or both (Ellingson, 
et al., 2001; Ones, et al., 1996; Smith & Ellingson, 2002; Smith, et al., 2001). Other 
researchers claimed that faking is an ability (Christiansen, Burns & Montgomery, 
2005; Nguyen, Biderman & McDaniel, 2005; Pauls & Crost, 2005a; Peeters & 
Lievens, 2005; Vasilopoulos, Cucina & McElreath, 2005) and tried to determine its 
correlation with measures of cognitive ability.  
However, as mentioned above, the first line of research is problematic since 
measures of social desirability can be faked as well. The second line of research is 
impaired by a different problem. Usually, faking is operationalized as the difference 
in personality mean scores between an honest and a faking condition. Difference 
scores, however, have low reliabilities, thus the found correlations  between faking 
and cognitive ability which were mostly small to moderate might be an 
underestimation. Pauls and Crost (2005b) residualized the honest variance out of 
the faked variance and used those residuals as measures of faking in order to 
circumvent the problems associated with difference scores. They found a relation 
between general intelligence and the amount of faking. Moreover, they looked at 
the relationship between faking and self-deceptive enhancement and impression 
management (BIDR) as well as measures of self efficacy of positive self-presentation 
beliefs. Their results indicated that the latter was a better predictor of faking than 
both of Paulhus measures. All in all, there is growing evidence that faking can be 
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considered as a trait, yet a clear answer regarding the components has not been 
found. 
 
3.4. Present study  
 
Summing up, there is evidence for state variance within trait measures of 
personality (Deinzer et al.). Moreover, an increase in situational demand and thus, 
in state variance increases correlations between personality factors. This was 
hypothesized by Ziegler, Bühner, and Toomela. Smith and Ellingson (2002) came to 
the conclusion that situational demand does not impact construct validity. However, 
both studies did not apply a complete LST model with at least two measurement 
points which would allow for a separation of state and trait variance. To overcome 
this limitation, personality measures were conducted twice within the present study. 
Moreover, the present study consisted of two groups, one of which received a faking 
instruction at the second time while the other group was asked to answer honestly 
at both times. Undoubtedly, the situational demand in the first group will be higher 
due to the faking instruction. Thus, the question of construct validity is tapped. 
Besides the possible impact of situational demand on construct validity the 
impact on criterion validity is also investigated: Where does the criterion validity of 
personality questionnaires originate – trait variance or state variance? In order to 
investigate this question the present study used an Individual Causal Effects (ICE) 
model (Steyer, 2005) in combination with a LST model. ICE models basically are 
control group designs using structural equation modeling and two measurement 
points. As mentioned above, within the present study two groups (control and 
experimental group) worked on a personality questionnaire without special 
instructions. After an interval they completed the same questionnaire again. This 
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time, however, the experimental group was given a faking instruction. Since the 
control group did not receive a special treatment, any changes within the 
experimental group which do not appear in the control group can be causally 
attributed to the treatment. Through combination with an LST model it will also be 
possible to split variance into trait and state variance and investigate their predictive 
power separately. Finally, the character of the state variable will be investigated. Is 
it an ability or is it a personality trait? 
To sum up, the present study had the aim of investigating the impact of 
situational demand or state on construct and criterion validity of the FFM. The 
following hypotheses will be tested: (1) Situational demand impacts measures of 
personality structure and causes correlations between personality factors. 
Controlling for situational demand will render uncorrelated personality factors. (2) 
Situational demand increases within a specific applicant setting compared to an 
average laboratory situation. (3) Furthermore, the question of criterion validity of 
trait and state variance will be explored: Is it state or trait variance which causes the 
predictive validity of personality questionnaires? (4) Finally, the character of the 
state variable will be explored: Is it an ability or is it a personality trait? 
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3.5. Methods 
 
3.5.1. Participants and procedure  
 
The total sample consisted of 186 (140 women and 46 men) psychology students 
enrolled at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich. The average age and 
semester were 23.03 (SD = 5.77) and 1.89 (SD = 2.01), respectively.  
As described above, the experiment was conducted with two different groups, a 
control group (CG, N = 94, 27 men) and an experimental group (EG, N = 92, 19 
men). All tests were administered with a computer in a laboratory containing seven 
work stations. Group assignment was random. When participants arrived at the 
laboratory, they first had to fill out a personality questionnaire following the normal 
instructions. Afterwards participants in both groups worked on a cognitive ability 
test, a lexical knowledge test and a measure of self efficacy beliefs of positive self-
presentation, which lasted for about two hours. After those tests participants 
received a specific instruction depending on their group assignment. In the CG 
participants were told that they should not be surprised if they knew the upcoming 
test and should answer the questions as honestly as possible. Within the EG, 
however, participants received a fake good instruction. Rogers (1997) stated a list of 
advisable design features in a faking experiment. Most importantly, the sample 
should have practical relevance and a realistic scenario accompanied by a note of 
caution regarding obvious faking should be given. Within the present study 
psychology students from early semesters were used as a sample. The practical 
relevance for this sample is high, since universities have to select students for 
admission. A personality test might be used by some universities as selection tool. 
The scenario was in line with this practical point and gave the experiment 
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ecological validity. Participants in the faking group were given the following special 
instruction:  
 
Universities have to select their students. For this task a number of 
instruments like the following are being tested right now. Please imagine that 
you are participating in a student selection procedure. Of course, it is your 
goal to get an admission as a psychology student. Therefore, you have to fill 
out the following questionnaire in a way that assures your admission. 
However, you have to be careful since a test expert will check the results for 
obvious faking and you do not want to be spotted.   
 
After reading this specific instruction, all participants filled out the personality 
questionnaire for a second time. Upon completion, they were asked whether they 
had followed the specific instructions or not. All participants stated that they had 
followed it. Finally, they were thanked and dismissed. 
 
3.5.2. Test materials 
 
Both groups had to fill out the NEO – PI – R (Costa & McCrae, 1992b) twice. This 
well-known personality questionnaire consists of 240 items which assess six facets 
for each of the five factors of the FFM, i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, openness to 
experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Thus, each facet contains eight 
items. Items ask participants to rate themselves in typical behaviors or reactions on 
a five-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to ‘‘strongly agree’’. 
Alphas for the factors range from .87 to .92. For the facets they range from .53 to 
.85. 
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The cognitive ability test was the basic module from the Intelligence Structure 
Test (IST 2000 R) (Amthauer, Brocke, Liepmann & Beauducel, 2001). This module 
consists of nine subtests with twenty items each. Three subtests combine to 
measure verbal intelligence, numerical intelligence, and figural intelligence, 
respectively. Those three kinds of intelligence are combined to a reasoning score 
(Cronbach α = .97). The theoretical basis for the reasoning measure (gf) has been 
shown (Beauducel, Brocke & Liepmann, 2001). 
As a measure of crystallized intelligence in the form of lexical knowledge, the 
Lexical Knowledge Test (Lexikon-Wissen Test, LEWITE, Wagner-Menghin, 1998) 
was used. The LEWITE is an adaptive test measuring crystallized intelligence (gc) in 
form of Rasch parameters (Cronbach α = .86). Participants have to complete 
sentences which define difficult words. Participants also have to state first whether 
they know the word or not, which allows the computation of a self-over-estimation 
score (SOE) reflecting how much participants overestimate their own ability. This 
measure has the same reliability. 
Furthermore, the same questionnaire used by Pauls and Crost (2005b), the 
Efficacy of positive Self-Presentation Questionnaire (Mielke, 1990), was applied to 
get a measure of how much participants believe to be able to make others like them 
and think they are smart and capable people. All in all, 33 items have to be rated on 
a four point Likert scale ranging from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”. The 
questionnaire has been described in more detail by Pauls and Crost. As those 
authors suggested, a total score for self efficacy beliefs of positive self-presentation 
(SEB) was computed. Cronbach α (on item level) of this measure was .86. Within the 
present sample the total score correlated r = -.46 (p < .01) with neuroticism. 
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As criterion variable served the score from a statistics examination2 which all 
psychology students have to take after their first semester. The variable was chosen 
because usually especially statistics is the most problematic subject and hence 
should have sufficient variance for prediction purposes. Besides this, the grade has 
been used in other studies as well (Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004) and 
proved to be predictable by personality measures. The statistic examination 
consisted of 33 multiple choice items with an internal consistency of α = .80. All 
participants took the examination at least 2 months after being subjected to the 
other tests used in the study. 
 
3.5.3. Models 
 
As described above, the study combines an ICE design and a LST design. Both 
methods make use of structural equation modeling. Thus, the analyses consisted of 
three different structural equation models: (1) an uncorrelated trait model (see 
figure 3.1), (2) a correlated trait model, and (3) a prediction model. Since it is 
assumed that not all personality factors are faked, the models only contain those 
factors which were faked (Pauls & Crost, 2005b). The experimental design allowed 
to split the variance into trait and state variance. Since the items were the same at 
both measurement times, correlated errors between identical facets were included 
representing method variance. It was hypothesized above that (1) situational 
demand impacts measures of personality structure and causes correlations between 
personality factors. Controlling for situational demand will render uncorrelated 
personality factors. If this holds true, bivariate correlations between personality 
                                            
2 24 % of the participants did not take part in the statistic examination. Their score was estimated 
using SPSS 14.0 and the EM method. In order to get better estimates, scores from the tests taken 
between the personality questionnaires were also used for estimation 
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factors should be higher in the EG than in the CG if situational demand is not 
controlled and comparable as well as smaller if it is controlled. Moreover, model 1 
should have a better fit than model 2. (2) It was proposed that situational demand 
increases within a specific applicant setting compared to an average laboratory 
situation. If this holds true, the latent mean for state 2 should be significantly higher 
in the EG than in the CG. Moreover, since the circumstances for the CG did not 
change, the correlation between state 1 and 2 should be high in the CG while it 
should be low in the EG due to the treatment, and, state 1 should be equal in both 
groups. (3) Furthermore, the question of criterion validity of trait and state variance 
will be explored. In order to do this, the points achieved in the statistics 
examination will be taken into the model and regressed on the personality factors as 
well as state 2. (4) Finally, the character of the state 2 variable will be explored. 
Correlations between state 2 and reasoning, lexical knowledge, self efficacy beliefs 
of positive self-presentation, and self-overestimation will be computed. Since all 
these measures were assessed at the same time, no regression was conducted. 
 
 
3.5.4. Statistical Analysis  
 
Besides the structural equation models, the data will be subjected to an analysis 
without controlling for situational demand using SPSS 14.0. Therefore, in a first 
step bivariate correlations between personality factors without control for situational 
demand will be compared for the two groups. In a second step scores on the 
personality factors will be compared between measurement points and between 
groups. Therefore, a multivariate analysis of variance with the independent 
variables CG vs. EG and time 1 (t1) vs. time 2 (t2) and the personality factors as 
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dependent variables will be conducted. If the faking treatment is successful, the 
interaction between group and repeated measurement factor should be significant. 
 
Figure 3.1 Structure Equation Model 
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Legend: Facet names of personality domains: N1: anxiety; N2: angry hostility; N3: depression; N4: 
self-consciousness; N5: impulsiveness; N6: vulnerability; E1:warmth; E2: gregariousness; E3: 
assertiveness; E4: activity; E5: excitement-seeking; E6: positive emotion; A1: trust; A2: 
straightforwardness; A3: altruism; A4: compliance; A5: modesty; A6: tender-mindedness; C1: 
competence;C2: order; C3: dutifulness; C4: achievement striving; C5: self-discipline; C6: deliberation. 
The letter A behind the facet name  refers to time 1 and B to time 2. Correlated errors between 
identical items represent method variance. 
 
Both main effects are not insightful. The main effect group would tell whether 
the two groups differ at all and the main effect time would tell whether there was a 
change from time 1 to 2 at all. Of interest for the present study, however, are 
changes within groups across time and between groups at a given time. Therefore, 
results for the main effects will be omitted and t-tests will be conducted in a next 
step. Significance levels will be Bonferroni corrected for the number of significance 
tests conducted within each method. One-tailed tests will be conducted for the 
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comparison of CG and EG at time 2 since it can be expected that participants 
portrayed themselves as less neurotic, more extraverted, open minded, agreeable, 
and conscientious when asked to fake. For the comparison within the EG between 
both measurement points one-tailed tests will be applied as well for the same 
reason. For all other comparisons no hypothesis can be made since changes in both 
directions might occur. Thus, two-tailed tests will be applied.  
Confirmatory factor analyses (maximum likelihood) were conducted using AMOS 
6.0. Multivariate normal distribution was tested with the Mardia Test (multivariate 
kurtosis = 45.58, c.r. = 2.54, p < .05) which showed a significant deviation. 
Therefore, Bollen-Stine bootstraps with N = 200 samples were performed to correct 
the p-value for the χ² - tests. Moreover, the sample used in the present analysis is 
rather small compared with the number of parameters which need to be estimated. 
This disparity can lead to severe estimation problems. To avoid such problems and 
the possible mistakes in the interpretation the trait loadings in the CG were set 
equal for each trait. Results showing comparable trait loadings support this 
procedure (e.g., Allik & McCrae, 2004). 
The assessment of the global-goodness-of-fit was based on the 
recommendations by Hu and Bentler (1999) as well as Beauducel and Wittmann 
(2005). Thus, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR, should be lower 
or equal to .11), the Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA, should be 
less than .06 for N > 250 and less than .08 for N < 250) and the Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI, should have a value of approximately .95) were used.  
In order to conduct the multigroup analysis and the latent mean comparisons the 
intercept for each manifest variable had to be set equal in both groups (see Byrne, 
2001). All latent means were fixed at zero in the CG (except for state 2). The latent 
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means in the EG can thus be regarded as effect sizes for the difference between 
both groups. 
Comparison between the correlated and the uncorrelated model will be done by 
using a χ² - difference test as well as a comparison of the CFI (Cheung & Rensvold, 
2001). Significant results are indicated by a difference in CFI larger than .01. 
 
3.6. Results 
 
Descriptive statistics for the used measures for both groups can be found in 
table 3.2. It can be seen that differences between CG and EG at time 1 were small 
and statistically insignificant. 
 
3.6.1. Without controlling situational demand  
 
Before looking at the results derived from structural equation modeling, the data 
were checked for effects which appear when situational demand is not controlled. 
The first step was a comparison of the bivariate correlations between personality 
factors at both measurement points. Results are in table 3.1. 
As can be seen there are only small correlations between the personality factors 
within both groups at time 1. Only extraversion correlated with neuroticism and 
openness in both groups. Neuroticism also had a significant correlation with 
agreeableness in the EG. However, the size of the correlations was rather small. The 
picture remained the same within the CG at time 2. In fact, the correlations hardly 
differed. Within the EG, however, correlations between the personality factors 
increased dramatically. Only the correlations with openness remained about equal.  
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Thus, the results show that disregarding situational demand can lead to 
dramatically increased correlations between personality factors if the demand is 
high. It is very informative to inspect the variances in both groups. Within the CG 
the variance remained unchanged from time 1 to time 2. Within the EG, however, 
variance actually dropped. This is especially interesting in light of the fact that the 
correlations increased. Usually, a restriction in variance goes along with worse 
correlations. Here the opposite occurred. On the one hand, this is further evidence 
for the impact of situational demand on personality questionnaires. On the other 
hand, this might also be caused by a ceiling effect. Maybe the variance would have 
remained equal as well if the rating scale had been larger. Despite this, the increase 
in correlations in the face of diminishing variance is impressive. 
Table 3.1 Correlations between personality factors 
 N E O A C 
time 1      
N - -0.42*** -0.11 0.09 -0.26 
E -0.32* - 0.30* -0.03 0.13 
O -0.13 0.36** - 0.16 -0.02 
A -0.36** 0.15 0.18 - 0.03 
C -0.20 0.05 0.11 0.16 - 
time 2      
N - -0.42*** -0.02 0.13 -0.28 
E -0.43*** - 0.29* -0.06 0.11 
O -0.28 0.59*** - 0.24 -0.04 
A -0.39** 0.32* 0.27 - 0.03 
C -0.78*** 0.46*** 0.28 0.34** - 
SEM a N E A C  
N - .03 .04 -.41**  
E -.05 - .44** .20  
A -.42** .85*** - .03  
C -.10 <-.01 .12 -  
Annotations. Below the diagonal are the correlations within the EG and above within the CG for time 
1 and time 2, respectively. Significance levels have been Bonferroni corrected for 10 tests within 
each off-diagonal. a Significance levels have been omitted due to small sample size and violations of 
normal distribution. 
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The second step in the analysis was a multivariate analysis of variance with the 
independent variable group and repeated measurement factors for the personality 
factors. This analysis was followed by within and between group comparisons with a 
series of t-tests. All results as well as the descriptive statistics for both groups can 
be found in table 3.2. 
The interaction between group and time was significant for all factors, openness 
being the exception. The between group analyses showed that the interaction was 
due to the fact that groups did not differ at time 1 but very much so at time 2. As 
was hypothesized, participants within the EG depicted themselves as less neurotic, 
more extraverted, agreeable, and conscientious. The effect sizes can be regarded as 
large. However, groups did not differ on the openness factor. Within each group, 
the change over time was as expected as well. Participants in the CG did not change 
from time 1 to time 2 except for a significant but slight drop in neuroticism and 
conscientiousness. Effect sizes were very small, though. Participants in the EG 
changed dramatically in their average personality factor scores. Openness again 
being the exception. As before, effect sizes can be regarded as large. 
 
 
  M (SD)     between  within 
  CG  EG   interaction  effect c  effect d
neuroticism t1  91.94 (25.99)  92.15 (24.85)  F 207.87*** t1 -0.01 b CG  0.14* b
neuroticism t2  89.39 (24.56)  50.77 (20.49)  η² .53 a t2 1.57*** a EG  2.35*** a
extraversion t1  116.12 (19.35)  121.45 (19.67)  F 29.12*** t1 -0.27 b CG  0.05 b
extraversion t2  115.40 (18.16)  133.40 (14.03)  η² .14 a t2 -0.99*** a EG -0.86*** a
openness t1  128.62 (15.35)  128.88 (17.99)  F 2.72  t1 -0.02 b CG  0.08 b
openness t2  127.73 (16.57)  131.50 (14.09)  η² .02 b t2 -0.23 b EG -0.21 b
agreeableness t1  117.50 (19.13)  116.33 (17.48)  F 31.62*** t1 0.06 b CG -0.10 b
agreeableness t1  118.91 (19.51)  129.40 (13.21)  η² .15 a t2 -0.54*** a EG -1.06*** a
conscientiousness t1  118.96 (20.10)  123.04 (19.31)  F 208.75*** t1 -0.21 b CG  0.13* b
conscientiousness t2  116.97 (18.51)  153.82 (17.15)  η² .53 a t2 -1.99*** a EG -2.25*** a
reasoning (gf)  114.15 (17.35)  118.77 (19.35)   t1 -0.26 
b   
LEWITE (gc)  .76 (.77)  .68 (.76)   t1 0.11 
b   
LEWITE (SOE)  6.51 (2.32)  6.90 (2.22)   t1 0.17 b   
SEB  4.56 (4.94)  5.74 (4.47)   t1 -.025 b   
statistics  44.54 (36.35)  53.26 (28.80)   t1 -0.25 b   
Annotations. η² = partial eta squared, significance levels for the interactions were Bonferroni corrected (5 tests), df (1,184); a power > .95; b power < .80; c 
displayed is Cohen’s d (difference of the means divided by pooled SD in case of t1 and SD in CG in case of t2) as well as the Bonferroni corrected (10 tests) 
significance two-tailed for t1 and one-tailed for t2; d displayed is Cohen’s d for repeated measurements (difference of the means divided by SD t1 and 
multiplied by √2) as well as the Bonferroni corrected (10 tests) significance one-tailed for the EG and two-tailed for the CG; Maximum reasoning score possible 
was 210. PSE minimum score possible was -102, possible maximum was 102.
n                                                                       84 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics and ANOVA results 
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3.6.2. Controlling situational demand  
 
Using structural equation models the following analyses controlled for the 
influence of situational demand on construct and criterion validity of the FFM. The 
multiple group model was designed as shown in figure 3.1. From the prior analyses 
it is obvious that openness was not faked. In order to reduce model complexity, 
openness was dropped from the following analyses. In order to achieve an 
acceptable model fit correlated errors between deliberation and angry hostility 
respectively straightforwardness had to be introduced to the model.  
The model achieved an acceptable model fit: χ² [2089] = 3859.61, Bollen-Stine p-
value = .32, SRMR = .139, RMSEA = .068 (90% CI .065 - .071), CFI = .803. 
According to the significance test the model cannot be rejected. However, the 
SRMR and the CFI indicate more connections not considered. Regarding the trait 
loadings an interesting result emerged in the EG. With the exception of the 
extraversion facet activity (E4), all other facets had significant trait loadings at time 
1. However, at time 2 the trait loadings mostly dropped to insignificance in the EG. 
Conscientiousness had only one significant loading from achievement striving (C4), 
agreeableness from modesty (A5), neuroticism from anxiety (N1) and vulnerability 
(N6), and extraversion had four significant loadings, assertiveness and activity being 
the exceptions. A closer look at the loading pattern for extraversion revealed 
generally higher trait loadings at time 2 compared with time 1. Results for the 
control group are not reported because loadings on one factor were set equal. 
Regarding the state loadings within the CG, all loadings were significant except for 
straightforwardness (A2), modesty (A5) only at state 1, order (C2), and impulsivity 
(N5) which had no significant state loadings at both times. Within the EG the 
loading pattern was about equal at time 1, the only difference being additional 
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insignificant loadings for dutifulness (C3) and achievement striving (C4). In both 
groups loadings at time 1 were small to moderate and highest for extraversion 
facets. At time 2 the picture changed within the EG. With the exception of 
compliance (A4), modesty (A5), and excitement-seeking (E5B) all state loadings 
were significant. Loadings increased dramatically for neuroticism and 
conscientiousness facets (all a > .62) and dropped for extraversion. The correlation 
between state 1 and state 2 amounted to r = .97 (p < .001) within the CG, but only to 
r = .27 (p < .05) within the EG. Obviously, the situational demand did not change 
within the CG, but it did change dramatically within the EG. Moreover, people in the 
EG responded differently to situational demand at time 1 and time 2, leaving only a 
small resemblance in rank.  
Table 3.3 displays the means and variances for the latent variables derived from 
model 1. The table also contains the effect sizes for the latent mean comparisons. It 
can be seen that controlling for situational demand yielded only insignificant and 
meaningless group differences in all personality factor means. The only significant 
and moderate difference which occurred was for the mean of state 2 which was 
significantly higher in the EG. Both state variables had significant variances at both 
times and in both groups. The latter, however, cannot be said for extraversion which 
had no significant variance in the EG.  
Of further interest was a comparison with a correlated trait model (model 2). 
Model 2 achieved the following fit: χ² [2078] = 3809.43, Bollen-Stine p-value = .34, 
SRMR = .131, RMSEA = .067 (90% CI .064 - .071), CFI = .807. Thus, the difference 
in CFI between both models was .04, indicating an improvement by letting 
personality dimensions correlate. The χ² - difference test yielded the following result 
χ² [11] = 50.18, p < .001. This also indicates a significant improvement from model 
1 to model 2. 
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Table 3.2 Means and variances for latent variables 
  M σ² 
  CG EG CG EG 
N  0 -0.02 (.00) 7.99*** 21.63*** 
E  0 0.12  (.05) 3.97** 0.75 
A  0 0.18  (.03) 8.27*** 3.19* 
C  0 0.48  (.08) 7.26*** 4.16** 
state 1  1.82 1.82 3.33** 4.74** 
state 2  0 5.86*** (.78) 8.30*** 6.71*** 
Annotations. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Means within the CG were fixed to be 0, thus, 
significant means in the EG represent significant group differences. An exception is the mean for 
state 1 which was set equal in both groups to express equal situational demand. Values in 
parenthesis are Cohen’s d’s for latent means (see Hancock, 2001). 
 
However, looking at the correlations (see table 3.1) reveals only small values, 
mostly close to zero, with only two significant correlations in each group. In the CG 
extraversion correlated with agreeableness and neuroticism with conscientiousness. 
In the EG it was also extraversion and agreeableness as well as agreeableness and 
neuroticism. A note of caution must be given at this point. Correlations between 
latent variables are corrected for attenuation and are therefore larger than bivariate 
correlations. Applying the equation from Hancock and Mueller (2001), yields 
construct reliabilities which allows to revoke corrections for attenuation. The 
construct reliabilities for neuroticism, conscientiousness, extraversion, and 
agreeableness in the CG were rtt  = .85, rtt  = .89, rtt  = .63 and rtt  = .93, respectively. 
Within the EG extraversion reached a construct reliability of rtt  = .59, and 
neuroticism and agreeableness both reached rtt  = .83. Undoing the corrections for 
attenuation yields correlations between extraversion and agreeableness of r = .34 
within the CG and r = .59 within the EG. The correlation between neuroticism and 
conscientiousness found in the CG decreases to r = -.36. And finally, the correlation 
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between agreeableness and neuroticism drops to r = -.35 within the EG. All in all, 
the results indicate a slight advantage in model fit for the correlated trait model. 
However, the actual correlations found indicate almost unrelated personality 
dimensions.  
The next step in the analyses was an investigation of the criterion validity of trait 
and state variable. The analysis was conducted with model 1 since the correlations 
between personality factors were only of secondary size. The only change to model 
1 was that the manifest variable points in statistics examination (PSE) was 
introduced to the model and regressed on all personality factors as well as state 2. 
Table 3.4 contains the standardized loadings and the amount of variance explained 
for the latent regression (SEM) as well as the manifest regressions for both 
measurement times (t1 and t2). 
 
Table 3.3 Regression coefficients  
  CG EG 
  t1 t2 SEM t1 t2 SEM 
N   .30*  .32*  .22 -.20 -.16 -.15 
E  -.03  .04 -.04 -.16 -.13 -.15 
A  -.08 -.03 -.02 -.22*  .04 -.26* 
C   .08  .16  .16  .14  .03  .09 
state 2      -   - -.19    -    -  .09 
R²   .09  .09  .11  .09  .03 a  .13 
Annotations. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. t1 = Manifest regression with variables collected at 
time 1. t2 = Manifest regression with variables collected at time 2. SEM = Latent regression. a = 
correction for variance restriction (Buehner, 2006) results in R² = .09. 
 
The results for the latent regression in table 3.4 indicate that the effect was 
comparable in both groups. However, the variance sources responsible for the effect 
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differed. In the CG it was mainly neuroticism which explained PSE. The direction 
indicated higher scores for those who described themselves as more afraid. Within 
the EG not only did this relationship switch here it was mainly agreeableness which 
explained criterion variance. The negative relationship indicates that less agreeable 
people achieved higher scores. This pattern is in line with the results from the 
manifest regressions analyses. The differences might be due to the unequal number 
of men in each group3. The other coefficients were comparable between both 
groups except for state 2. Within the CG state 2 had a negative loading which 
became positive in the EG. Moreover, the amount of explained variance strongly 
decreased in the EG at time 2 when situational demand was not controlled. This was 
caused by a restriction in variance. Correcting for this restriction rendered exactly 
the same amount of explained variance found at time 1. However, effects found in 
the manifest regressions were slightly smaller than in the latent regressions.  
In a final analysis model 1 was used to explore the character of the state 2 
variable in the EG. Therefore, the manifest variables reasoning (gf), lexical 
knowledge (gc), the self-overestimation score (SOE), and self efficacy beliefs of 
positive self-presentation (SEB) were introduced to the model and allowed to 
correlate with state 2. Results can be found in table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.4 Correlations between state 2 and reasoning (gf), lexical knowledge (gc), self-overestimation 
(SOE), and self-efficacy beliefs (SEB) 
 CG EG 
gf .07 -.08 
gc .02 .13 
                                            
3 There were more men in the CG who were also less neurotic. Just looking at the men the 
correlation between neuroticism and PSE is positive and negative for the women. Since the group of 
men was very small no further investigations were conducted. 
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SOE -.02 -.08 
SEB .07 .31** 
Annotations. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. 
Within the CG state 2 had only very small and insignificant correlations with all 
four measures. However, in the EG there was a moderate and significant correlation 
with self efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs. Of course, the same 
argument mentioned above, namely that the correlations might be overestimated 
due to correction for attenuation, holds true for these correlations as well. Yet, the 
correction was only for unreliability within state 2 and therefore of minor impact 
since state 2 had twenty four loadings, most of which were moderate to large and 
thus a construct reliability of rtt  = .96 within the EG. This yields an uncorrected 
correlation of r = .30 with SEB within the EG.  
 
3.7. Discussion 
 
Aim of the present study was to explore the impact of situational demand on the 
construct and criterion validity of a personality measure. It was hypothesized that 
situational demand impacts measures of personality structure and causes 
correlations between personality factors and that controlling for situational demand 
would render uncorrelated personality factors. Evidence for this hypothesis was 
provided. Furthermore, it was proposed that situational demand increases within a 
specific applicant setting compared to an average laboratory situation. This 
hypothesis could be confirmed. Regarding criterion validity of trait and state 
variance it could be shown that the state variable did contribute only little to the 
prediction when people faked. Thus, the conclusion that the actual criterion validity 
results from individual differences in personality traits can be drawn. Finally, the 
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results of the present study indicate that naming the additional variance state 
variance might be misleading. The character of the variable depends on the amount 
of situational demand: Low demand goes along with a state and high demand with a 
trait character. Moreover, the trait character can partly be explained by self efficacy 
of positive self – presentation beliefs. 
In the introduction the most common critics on the FFM, namely, the number of 
factors, the methodological approach, orthogonality, and the impact of social 
desirability were listed. These critics mainly concern construct validity, but also 
criterion validity. Regarding the number of factors, the present study offers no new 
insights since this was not an aim. However, much can be added to the arguments 
dealing with the latter three problems.  
 
3.7.1. Construct validity  
 
The present analysis used a LST design and structural equation modeling. 
Structural equation models are insightful since they offer actual tests for models. 
Unlike in exploratory factor analysis, the model test helps to find out whether a 
proposed model fits the data or not. Another methodological advantage of the 
present study is the LST design. It allows to control for situational demand. The 
result is quite astonishing. Not controlling for situational demand leaves large 
differences in personality factors between CG and EG. However, all these 
differences can be led back to the situational demand, yielding groups which no 
longer differ. Thus, a LST design might be helpful whenever a situational impact is 
likely. This means virtually always, since we never assess people in a situational 
vacuum (Deinzer et al.). 
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Regarding the problem of orthogonality, it was hypothesized that correlations 
between personality factors are merely due to situational demand or state. The 
present results provide evidence for this hypothesis, but also show that even when 
situational demand was controlled, a few correlations remained. Thus, a lack in 
discriminant validity as suggested by Costa and McCrae (1992b) cannot totally be 
ruled out. The SRMR underlines this problem since it indicates further connections 
between the facets. However, considering that most correlations between 
personality factors were insignificant when situational demand was controlled, the 
lack might not concern all factors. Most of all extraversion and agreeableness seem 
to be problematic since they still shared variance in both groups even when 
situational demand was controlled. Extraversion, furthermore, had another 
peculiarity. Its pattern loading on the state and trait variables was more dependent 
on situational demand than was the case for any of the other personality factors. In 
the EG the state loadings were smaller when people faked than under honest 
conditions. In other words, when situational demand was low extraversion loaded 
higher on the state variable indicating that it contains more state variance than 
other factors. However, when people faked and the character of the state variable 
changed, the loadings also decreased. This highlights findings by Rost, Carstensen, 
and von Davier (1999) who conducted analyses for unidimensionality according to 
item response theory within the data from the German normative sample for the 
NEO-FFI and found extraversion to be a substantially heterogeneous construct.  
However, usually it is the correlation between neuroticism and 
conscientiousness which raises concerns and constantly is the highest correlation 
reported (Mount, et al., 2005; Pauls & Crost, 2005b; Toomela, 2003). This 
correlation was also the highest in the present study when situational demand was 
high. Controlling for situational demand not only decreased the correlation, it fell to 
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virtual unimportance. All in all, there is a lot of evidence for the hypothesis by 
Ziegler, Bühner, and Toomela that correlations between personality factors are not 
only caused by a lack in discriminant validity, but more so by situational demand. 
Orthogonality might, after all, be a question of situational demand. 
The last concern described above deals with the impact of social desirability. 
Two contradicting lines of research were presented above. Smith and Ellingson 
(2002) concluded that situational demand (social desirability) does not impact 
construct validity. On the other side were Ziegler, Bühner, and Toomela suggesting 
the opposite. Both used structural equation models to underline their claims. 
However, neither of them applied a LST model. This model was realized within the 
present study, allowing a clear separation of trait and situational demand variance. 
The results show that situational demand impacts construct validity of measures of 
personality structure. Within a faking condition, correlations between manifest 
variables increased. This increase could be reversed controlling for situational 
demand. Moreover, means for all personality factors, except openness, were 
significantly larger under a faking instruction compared to an honest condition as 
well as a control group. Controlling for situational demand, the CG and the EG no 
longer differed in any of the personality factors. Thus, it could be shown that 
situational demand (social desirability) or state impacts relations between 
personality factors.  
 
3.7.2. Substance vs. style  
 
In the first part of this paper it was mentioned that there is a debate about the 
character of faking: is it an ability or is it social desirability? In order to shed light 
onto this question, the variable state 2 was correlated with two ability and two trait 
 
Chapter 3. Trait and State Interaction                                                                       94 
measures. In the CG there were no correlations with any of these measures. State 2 
was mainly marked by neuroticism facets. The negative regression weight which 
occurred for the prediction of points in a statistic examination shows that it might 
be aspects like test anxiety which drive this variable. Within the EG the character of 
state 2 was different. There was a significant correlation with self efficacy of positive 
self – presentation beliefs. In other words, the belief to be able to impress others 
was correlated with state 2. Moreover, state 2 had a positive regression weight in 
the prediction of points in a statistics examination. Thus, people who believe in 
themselves achieved higher scores. Furthermore, SEB was negatively and 
moderately correlated with neuroticism. Thus, one can conclude that state 2 also 
reflects individual differences in neuroticism. However, while it is test anxiety in the 
CG, it is the opposite, namely, having no fear and high self confidence in the EG. It 
has to be noted, though, that SEB accounted only for a small portion of faking 
variance. Thus, there is room for other variables to explain faking as well. 
All in all, the present analysis lends support to the findings by Ones, 
Viswesvaran, and Reiss that faking reflects actual individual differences in 
personality traits. However, there is a switch in the character of the situational 
demand variable (state 2): Depending on the amount of situational demand it is 
more like test anxiety or more like a self efficacy variable. Thus, the term social 
desirability does not capture the whole spectrum of possible meanings of the 
variable and might in fact be misleading. Thus, the question should not be 
substance versus style, but which substance? 
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3.7.3. Criterion validity  
 
In the introduction the question was raised whether the predictive power of 
faked personality questionnaires results from trait or faking variance. The present 
results show that the contribution of faking variance is only very small. Thus, it must 
be real individual differences in personality traits which cause criterion validity. 
However, the results also show that only very few facets have significant loadings on 
the personality traits under faking conditions. This means that the criterion validity 
does not result from the personality trait as a whole, but from specific facets. The 
present analysis revealed that for the chosen criterion it were low modesty and low 
depression for example. This is in line with recent findings which favor the use of 
the facets instead of the factors when predicting performance (Lounsbury, 
Sundstrom, Loveland & Gibson, 2002). Ones, Visveswaran, and Reiss (1996) came 
to the conclusion that social desirability does not affect criterion validity. The 
present results indicate that the contribution of faking variance is indeed small. 
However, criterion validity is affected since faking decreases personality to a few 
facets. 
 
3.7.4. A hypothesis regarding faking 
 
From the present results it could be hypothesized that a mediation took place. 
People do not fake everything as the present analysis confirmed. Thus, faking 
requires a decision on whether to fake or not. This decision can be based on 
specific knowledge: It could be assumed that people base their judgment of what to 
fake on specific knowledge regarding the circumstances of the situation. This 
means, in our case, if I know what qualities are expected of a psychology student, I 
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can portray myself in that way. However, faking is connected to the confidence of 
being able to live up to the distorted picture drawn as can be seen by the correlation 
between state 2 and SEB. Thus, the hypothesis drawn from this study is that SEB 
mediates the relationship between specific knowledge and amount of faking. 
Unfortunately, lexical knowledge as assessed in the present study is no good 
indicator for such specific knowledge and the hypothesis cannot be tested. This 
mediation would be in line with part of the model of faking suggested by McFarland 
and Ryan (2000). They hypothesized that ability to fake, beliefs toward faking, 
opportunity to fake, and situational influences (e.g., desire for job, warning of Lie 
scale) could be important factors predicting faking behaviour on personality tests. 
At least as far as beliefs towards faking are concerned, the present study supports 
that model. Nevertheless, further research is still needed here. 
 
3.7.5. Limitations 
 
The biggest limitation of the present study is the relatively small sample size 
given the complexity of the models. Sample size influences the accuracy of 
parameter estimations. Thus, a replication with larger samples is needed. 
A replication study will also give information on the correlated errors which 
were added here. If they cannot be replicated, they were nothing but sample 
peculiarities in the present study.  
Furthermore, it could be argued that a study using students and a statistics 
examination bears only little practical relevance. Of course, testing the hypotheses 
in applicant settings would be most interesting. However, as Rogers (1997) stated, 
the sample should have practical relevance. Since the whole experimental design 
was customized for a university setting, this practical relevance is given. However, 
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this practical relevance is limited to a university setting. Within a workplace setting 
like an applicant setting different results regarding factors faked and facets affected 
by faking might occur. The only drawback of the present sample is the fact that it is 
partly pre – selected for intelligence. All psychology students have been selected for 
their grades in school. A certain cutoff had to be passed. Thus, a more 
homogeneous group regarding intelligence occurred. This might have affected the 
correlation between reasoning and state 2.  
Summing up, the present study clearly showed an impact of situational demand 
on construct as well as criterion validity of a personality structure questionnaire. 
Controlling for situational demand not only deleted effects of faking on personality 
means, it also yielded an almost uncorrelated personality model. Moreover, 
controlling for situational demand recovered regression coefficients which occurred 
under honest conditions. Unfortunately, the question whether faking is a personality 
trait or an ability could not be answered. The present results point into the direction 
of personality traits.  
Thus, the current item set used by Costa and McCrae certainly is a “serviceable 
model” (Costa and McCrae, 1992a), but it might even be closer to the final 
orthogonal factor solution of personality than believed. 
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Chapter 4. Situational Demand, Response Sets, and Faking in the Light 
of Cognitive Interviews and Mixed Rasch Models 
 
Psychological tests are one of the most commonly used methods in selection 
processes. A lot of research is concerned with the predictive validity of these tests 
(e.g., Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Psychological tests can roughly be divided into 
subjective self assessments and objective ability tests. A prominent representative of 
the former are personality questionnaires. The research on the predictive validity of 
personality questionnaires is sizeable (e.g., Barrick, et al., 2001; Chamorro Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2003; Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004; Furnham, et al., 2002; 
Salgado, 2002; Salgado, 2003). All in all, results suggest that using personality 
questionnaires is a good way to improve the predictive validity of selection processes. 
However, as long as such questionnaires exist there have been doubts regarding their 
susceptibility towards faking. Three research lines concerned with faking can be 
distinguished. There are those researchers who try to find out whether faking impacts 
criterion validity of questionnaires (e.g., Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp & et al., 1990; 
Schmitt & Oswald, 2006; e.g., Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). The meta-analysis by 
Viswesvaran and Ones came to the conclusion that faking impacts mean scores but not 
criterion validity. Ziegler and Bühner recently demonstrated this effect (submitted). 
Using sophisticated methodological models they could show that the variance due to 
faking contributes only little to the prediction of a real life criterion. Even though those 
results indicate that the overall criterion validity is not affected by faking there are also 
research results which demonstrated that faking does affect the ranking of people. 
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Hough (1998) could show that participants who faked more ranked higher. This 
underlines the hypothesis proposed by Ziegler and Bühner that faking reduces the 
number of predictive facets to just a selected few. This in combination with the little 
added information gained from faking might cause changes in ranking.   
A second line of interest is the impact of faking on the construct validity of 
questionnaires (Ellingson, et al., 2001; Pauls & Crost, 2004; Pauls & Crost, 2005b; 
Schmit & Ryan, 1993; Smith, et al., 2001; Topping & O'Gorman, 1997; Ziegler & 
Bühner, submitted; Ziegler, et al., submitted-b). While results in the first line of 
research all pointed in one direction, the picture here is less clear. Some researchers, 
like Smith and Ellingson, concluded that neither social desirability nor applicant 
settings impact the construct validity of personality questionnaires. In the same work 
mentioned above, Ziegler and Bühner could show that this conclusion was premature. 
They showed that situational demand influences the correlations between personality 
factors and thus, construct validity.  
The third line of research is concerned with the question: What is faking? So far 
one thing is clear, people differ in the way they fake and do not just endorse the 
highest categories  (e.g., Rosse, et al., 1998; Ziegler & Bühner, submitted; Ziegler, et 
al., submitted-b). Rosse and colleagues could show that there are extreme fakers, 
slight fakers, and even honest participants within an applicant sample. This finding 
was confirmed by other researchers using an item response theory approach (Zickar & 
Robie, 1999a; Zickar, et al., 2004; Zickar & Robie, 1999b). Thus, there is evidence that 
faking is performed differently by people. McFarland and Ryan (2000) proposed a 
model of faking, linking it to several variables such as ability to fake, beliefs about 
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faking and situational circumstances. However, the empirical base of this model is 
scarce. Pauls and Crost (Pauls & Crost, 2005a) could show that faking can be predicted 
by cognitive ability and self efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs. The latter 
has been confirmed by Ziegler and Bühner. However, a shortcoming of those studies 
was that it was believed that all participants would act the same when situational 
demand is high. Consequently, all fakers were treated as one group. The results by 
Zickar, Gibby, and Robie imply that this is not appropriate.  
Summing up, there is evidence that situational demand causes faking which does 
not impact criterion validity, but construct validity of personality questionnaires. 
Moreover, responding to situational demand is not a homogeneous response set. 
Consequently, the present paper aimed at four goals. The first aim was an 
investigation of the psychological processes which occur when questionnaires are 
faked. Secondly, the replication of the number of response classes reported before was 
intended. Thirdly, it was tried to find out why people differ in the faking strategy they 
use. And finally, the criterion validity found in the different faking classes were 
compared. Within the following paragraphs the four goals are described in more 
detail. 
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4.1. The present study 
 
4.1.1. Psychological processes  
 
In order to identify the psychological processes happening when people 
intentionally distort their answers to a personality questionnaire, a qualitative analysis 
technique, the cognitive interview, was used (Dillman & Redline, 2004; Fowler, 1995; 
Willis, 2004). Two different cognitive interview types can be distinguished: the 
concurrent and the retrospective method. The concurrent method, also called think 
aloud technique, requires participants to express any thought crossing their mind 
when working on the questionnaire. These thoughts are recorded in writing as well as 
on tape. Later, the thought protocols can be analyzed to find strategies. The second 
method, the retrospective cognitive interview, takes place after participants filled out 
their questionnaire. Using a structured interview, participants are then asked 
questions regarding cognitive processes which occurred during questionnaire 
completion. Usually, cognitive interviews are conducted to improve legibility of 
questionnaires. However, the method can also be used to identify different strategies 
for distorting a questionnaire. In the present study, both techniques were applied on a 
sample of participants asked to fake a personality questionnaire. The retrospective 
interview asked participants directly for their strategy. The answer could later be 
tested using the information from the concurrent cognitive interview. 
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4.1.2. Replication of response classes 
 
As mentioned above, using an item response theory approach three different faking 
classes have been identified: regular responders (rr), slight fakers (sf), and extreme 
fakers (ef). The method used to find these classes is called Mixed Rasch Models 
(MRM) and was developed by Rost (e.g., Rost, 1985; e.g., Rost, 1991; Rost, et al., 
1997). The MRM basically is the fusion of Latent Class Models and Rasch Models. 
Thus, it allows classes which differ qualitatively in the measured trait or ability. 
However, unlike in a Latent Class Model people in one class can differ quantitatively in 
the trait or ability. In other words, MRMs look for the number of qualitatively different 
classes in each of which the Rasch Model holds true. Moreover, these classes are 
supposed to describe best the answer patterns observed. Rost, Carstensen, and von 
Davier (1999) also were the first to use MRMs in personality research. Analysing the 
data from the German normative sample of the NEO – FFI, they found two classes of 
people, those who endorsed middle rating categories with a higher probability and 
those who preferred extreme rating categories. This result has been replicated by 
Austin, Deary, and Egan (2006) in a British sample. Thus, even when situational 
demand is low, there are two different classes of people. This fact can be attributed to 
different response sets. However, if situational demand increases, the number of 
classes goes up to three. Now, two different faking response sets can be distinguished. 
There are slight fakers and extreme fakers. Finally, an honest response group can be 
identified. What are possible reasons for these classes? The present study will use data 
from the qualitative analysis as well as data collected by Ziegler and Bühner in a 
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different study to find answers to this question. One of the advantages of that study 
was its known group design (Rogers, 1997) which allows to put people in one of two 
groups: faker (F) and non-faker (NF). Participants from the qualitative analysis were 
asked to fake and belong in group F. The number of different classes within the 
combined sample will be investigated. Afterwards, the distribution of the classes in the 
two groups can be analyzed. 
 
4.1.3. Causes for differences in responding to situational demand 
 
McFarland and Ryan (2000) proposed a model of faking. So far, cognitive ability 
and self efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs (SEB) have proven to be 
connected to faking (Pauls & Crost, 2005a; Ziegler & Bühner, submitted). However, 
different faking strategies were not differentiated. Within the present study this will be 
done using MRMs. In order to find causes for the different faking styles, class 
membership will be predicted by cognitive ability (fluid and crystallized), SEB, self 
overestimation (SOE), age, gender, and personality traits assessed under no specific 
situational demand and thus fairly honest. Ziegler and Bühner conducted the 
personality questionnaire twice starting with an honest condition for each participant.  
 
4.1.4. Criterion validity 
 
As far as we know, no research on differences in the criterion validity within 
different faking classes exists. This issue will be explored within the study as well. 
 
Chapter 4. Situational Demand under the Spotlight                                                    105 
After the faking classes will have been found, separate regressions of a statistics 
examination score on the personality scores assessed will be conducted and 
compared. Moreover, a new way of correcting for faking will be explored. Using 
MRMs not only allows to find different classes, it also corrects the person parameter 
according to class membership. Thus, the person parameter of an extreme faker will 
be corrected for faking. The corrected person parameters will also be used in separate 
regressions and results will be compared with the results derived from the uncorrected 
values under honest and faking conditions. Ferrando and Chico (2001) showed that 
ordinary lie scales can detect faking better than person fit indices within a two 
parameter logistic model (2PLM). The present analyses will also investigate the ability 
of MRMs to detect faking. Since a known group (Rogers, 1997) design was used, the 
accuracy of MRMs in detecting faking can be assessed. Compared with 2PLMs, MRMs 
offer the advantages of the Rasch model, especially specific objectivity and are thus, 
preferred within the present analyses. Moreover, Ziegler and Bühner found that 
individual differences in responding to situational demand contributed positively to the 
prediction of points in a statistic examination. Using class membership according to 
the MRM results as predictor and controlling for intelligence, it will be tested whether 
class membership and thus, individual differences in faking techniques contribute to 
the prediction of points in the statistics examination. 
Furthermore, the ranking of the corrected personality parameters will be compared 
with the ranking found under honest and faking conditions. If the correction of the 
personality parameters is good, the ranking should be highly comparable to the honest 
condition and less so to the faking condition.  
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4.2. Method 
 
As mentioned above, the current study consists of two parts: a qualitative and a 
quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis is the first part and was conducted in a 
sample of N = 50, especially drawn for that purpose. Aim of the qualitative analysis 
was to find out which different strategies are used to intentionally distort a personality 
questionnaire. The second part of the study, dealing with the MRM analyses and the 
exploration of the resulting classes, will use the data from the qualitative analysis as 
well as from a previous study (Ziegler & Bühner, submitted). Thus, the combined 
sample had a size of N = 236. Detailed descriptions regarding sample and procedure 
for the latter data can be found there. Thus, the following sample and procedure 
description is only concerned with the sample from the qualitative analysis. 
 
4.2.1. Sample and procedure 
 
The sample consisted of 50 (34 women and 16 men) students enrolled in different 
faculties at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich. However, 27 of them were 
psychology students. The average age and semester were 22.26 (SD = 1.91) and 1.89 
(SD = 2.01), respectively. 
All participants had to fill out the personality questionnaire twice. When working on 
it the first time, participants were given the same fake good instruction used in the 
previous study. Thus, they were told to imagine themselves in a selection scenario: 
The following test would be used to select psychology students and only good 
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performance would assure selection. The second time was without a special 
instruction. Participants were asked to answer as honestly as possible. While working 
on the questionnaire for the first time, participants were further instructed to express 
any thoughts aloud. An approval for taping was asked and given by all participants. An 
experienced test expert also took notes. Afterwards participants were administered a 
semi – structured interview. They were asked how they tried to achieve the given goal, 
whether they applied that technique to all questions, and finally if they could name the 
strategy they had used. After the interview participants completed the personality 
questionnaire for a second time. Due to the think aloud technique participants were 
administered the tests one at a time using a computer. Since this was very time 
consuming, it was not possible to administer the cognitive ability tests or any of the 
other measures used by Ziegler and Bühner besides the personality questionnaire. 
Unfortunately, the sample consisted of students from higher semesters, which made it 
impossible to use their statistic examination grades and thus, the sample in the 
quantitative analyses regarding criterion validity only consisted of participants from 
the previous study (N = 186).  
All fifty interviews and thought protocols were analysed by two people whose task 
it was to find the different strategies and assign each participant to one of them. To 
assess the degree of convergence between the raters, Cohen’s Kappa was computed.  
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4.2.2. Test materials 
 
The NEO – PI – R (Costa & McCrae, 1992b) was used as personality measure. It 
consists of 240 items. Eight items always measure one of the six facets for each of the 
five factors of the FFM, i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Items ask participants to rate themselves in 
typical behaviors or reactions on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘‘strongly 
disagree’’ to ‘‘strongly agree’’. Alphas for the factors range from .87 to .92. For the 
facets they range from .53 to .85. 
The basic module from the Intelligence Structure Test (IST) (Amthauer, et al., 2001) 
was used to measure fluid intelligence (reasoning). Three out of nine subtests combine 
to measure verbal intelligence, numerical intelligence, and figural intelligence, 
respectively. The combination yields a reasoning score (Cronbach α = .97). The 
theoretical basis for the reasoning measure (gf) has been shown (Beauducel, et al., 
2001). 
The Lexical Knowledge Test (Lexikon-Wissen Test, LEWITE, Wagner-Menghin, 
1998) was applied as a measure of crystallized intelligence. The LEWITE is an adaptive 
test measuring crystallized intelligence (gc) (Cronbach α = .86). Participants complete 
sentences which define difficult words. They also have to state whether they know the 
word or not, which allows the computation of a self – over – estimation score (SOE) 
reflecting how much participants overestimate their own ability. 
Furthermore, the Efficacy of positive Self-Presentation Questionnaire (Mielke, 
1990) was applied. It assesses how much participants believe to be able to make others 
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think they are smart, likeable and capable. Thirty three items have to be rated on a 
four point Likert scale ranging from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”. The 
questionnaire has been described in more detail by Pauls and Crost. As those authors 
suggested a total score for self efficacy beliefs of positive self – presentation (SEB) was 
computed. Cronbach α (on item level) of this measure was .86. 
As criterion variable served the score from a statistics examination4. The grade has 
been used in other studies as well (Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004) and proved 
to be predictable by personality measures. The statistic examination consisted of 33 
multiple choice items with an internal consistency of α = .80. All participants took the 
examination at least 2 months after being subjected to the other tests used in the 
study.  
 
4.2.3. Statistical analysis  
 
Analyses were conducted using SPSS 14.0 and WINMIRA 2001 for the MRMs. As 
far as the qualitative analysis is concerned, only one statistic, Cohen’s Kappa, was 
computed to assess rater agreement.  
As mentioned above, MRMs were conducted to identify the number of classes 
which best describe the data. In the current analysis MRMs were only conducted for 
the six conscientiousness facets. There are two reasons for this. First of all, 
conscientiousness has proven to be a good predictor of performance across different 
jobs and criteria (Barrick, et al., 2001; Chamorro Premuzic, et al., 2004; LaHuis, et al., 
                                            
4 24 % of the participants did not take part in the statistic examination. Their score was estimated using 
SPSS 14.0 and the EM method. In order to get better estimates, scores from the tests taken between the 
personality questionnaires were also used for estimation 
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2005; Robertson, Baron, Gibbons, MacIver & Nyfield, 2000; Salgado, 2003). Secondly, 
since the number of classes is only one of the topics, it would be beyond the scope of 
the present paper to investigate results for all five personality factors. Usually, item 
answers are the basis for analysis. However, within the present study 
conscientiousness as a whole was to be investigated. The NEO-PI-R combines six 
different facets as a measure of conscientiousness. The items for these six facets 
surely measure one higher order factor, but also a lower order factor. It would be 
impossible to fit a MRM to all items since they do not measure exactly the same trait 
or combination of traits. Thus, a different approach was chosen. Item answers per 
facet were averaged and the six mean facet scores were used in the analyses. These 
mean facet scores reflect the answer category chosen on average for each facet. 
Models ranging from one class to four classes were tested. Model fit was judged by 
two model test statistics: Cressie Read (C.R.) and Pearson χ² (P²). The test statistics 
can be interpreted like p – values in a significance test. The null hypothesis is that the 
model fits the data. Thus, a value below .05 indicates that the chosen number of 
classes does not fit the data. Both test statistics only assess model fit accurately if each 
possible answer pattern is observed at least once. The combined sample consisted of 
N = 236 participants. Given the five possible categories for each of the six mean facet 
scores, the number of patterns to observe would be 3072. However, only 93 different 
patterns were observed. Thus, the test statistics were evaluated using a bootstrap 
procedure with 200 samples (Buehner, 2006). Other authors have used information 
criteria to find the best model (Austin, et al., 2006; Zickar, et al., 2004). While 
information criteria find the best model of a given number of models they do not 
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assure that this model fits the data at all. Thus, they were not used for decisions in the 
present study.  
In order to predict class membership by the variables mentioned above, a 
multinomial logistic regression was conducted. The logistic regression was preferred 
over a discriminant analysis because it makes no assumptions regarding the 
distribution of the independent variables (Howell, 2002, p. 583). Criterion validities 
were assessed with a linear regression. Unfortunately, not all participants took the 
statistics examination and were also part of the faking group. Thus, the sample for the 
linear regressions consisted of only N = 92. 
Since reporting and discussing results for the two different parts would not 
improve the understanding of the results, both parts will be separated. At first results 
from the qualitative analysis will be reported and discussed. Afterwards, results from 
the quantitative analyses will be reported followed by a general discussion. 
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4.3. Qualitative Analysis 
 
4.3.1. Results 
 
After analyzing the cognitive interviews and the thought protocols the two judges 
independently of each other concluded that there were two main strategies for 
intentionally distorting the questionnaire. The strategies were named slight faking and 
extreme faking in accordance to Zickar et al (2004). Cohen’s Kappa for rater 
agreement was .77 which can be regarded as good. About 20 percent of the 
participants used the second strategy and the majority of 80 percent only faked 
slightly. When analysing the data the first step in the analysis was the answer of the 
participant on the direct question for a strategy. In most cases this proved to be of little 
merit since participants could not really name a strategy. Of more help were the 
participants’ answers to the question how they had tried to achieve the goal of faking 
good. Here the two strategies emerged. Most of the people said something like they 
took their real answer and pushed it a little in the right direction. These answers were 
confirmed by the actual thought protocols. To give an example, one participant said 
the following when pondering his answer to question 40 (I keep my things clean and 
tidy.): “Well, I guess I don’t really do that, but if I want to be selected I better endorse 
a four.” Only few participants, those labelled as extreme fakers, stated that they 
endorsed the highest possible category. However, one important aspect which needs 
to be mentioned is that participants did not fake all items regardless of their content. 
Before considering an answer, participants judged whether such a question would 
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reveal information important to select psychology students. If that was the case, they 
faked. If it was not the case, participants did one of two things. They either answered 
honestly, or they answered neutrally, some even did both alternatingly.  
Another interesting finding could be observed. Students enrolled in psychology 
faked other aspects than students from other faculties. The differences were rather 
severe. While psychology students tended to endorse conscientiousness items and 
portray themselves as low in neuroticism, other faculty students faked openness and 
portrayed themselves as more neurotic. These observations were tested using a 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance with faculty as independent and the faked Big 5 
scores as dependent variables. The result showed a significant and large effect (F[5;44] 
= 3.07; p = .02; η² = .26; Power = .82). Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni corrections 
revealed significant differences in neuroticism and conscientiousness. The effect sizes 
were d = 1.00 (p < .01; Power = .97) and d = -.61 (p < .05; Power = .69), respectively. 
These effect sizes are the difference in group means divided by the standard deviation 
of the psychology students. Positive values indicate a higher mean for students from 
other faculties. Thus, psychology students faked significantly and moderately to largely 
more in neuroticism and conscientiousness.  
 
4.3.2. Discussion 
 
The results from the qualitative analyses confirmed the quantitative evidence for 
individual differences in faking. Some people have no fear of being detected and 
simply endorse the maximum category while other people are more careful. This is in 
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line with findings by Zickar and colleagues (Zickar, et al., 2004; Zickar & Robie, 1999b) 
who had reported those faking styles in their quantitative analysis of a combined 
applicant and incumbent sample. Even the class sizes reported there are in line with 
the class sizes found in the present analysis. However, analyzing data from a faking 
experiment with an honest and two different fake good groups, Zickar et al. (2004) 
only reported two different classes. This might have methodological reasons since a 
different questionnaire was used than in the other analysis. The authors themselves do 
not offer any more specific explanations why they found two classes in one analysis 
and three in the other. 
Moreover, the results also lend support to the hypothesis that people do not simply 
fake all items when situational demand is high (e.g., Pauls & Crost, 2005b; Ziegler & 
Bühner, submitted; Ziegler, et al., submitted-b). People first evaluate the importance of 
an item in terms of the situational demand (e.g., application for a certain job or student 
program). If the item has no importance regarding the demand of the situation, they 
do not fake. As a consequence, even the use of the maximum response strategy does 
not necessarily result in the maximum score. This result bears two questions. First, 
what enables people to judge the importance of an item? Ziegler and Bühner 
(submitted) have proposed that it is specific knowledge, e.g., about the job applied for. 
The current results underline this hypothesis, since participants always considered 
what would be good for a psychology student.  
Another result showed that students with a psychological background faked 
differently from students with no psychological background. Other faculty students 
portrayed themselves as more neurotic and less conscientious. This was not only found 
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by the two raters, but was also confirmed by a significance test. This fact not only 
underlines the importance of specific knowledge it also shows that implicit theories 
might be used by those lacking that knowledge. Thus, judgement of item importance 
can be based on specific knowledge or implicit theories about the requirements for a 
psychology student. 
All in all, the qualitative analyses confirmed individual differences in the way 
people intentionally distort a questionnaire. The psychological process of faking is not 
as easy as some might have believed. The actual answer is derived after an evaluation 
of item importance which is followed by either an aggravation of one’s own score or 
the endorsement of the maximum category, respectively. The evaluation of item 
importance must at least in part be based on specific knowledge. 
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4.4.  Quantitative Analysis 
 
The next paragraphs report the results from the quantitative analyses. The order is 
in accordance with the issues raised in the introduction. 
 
4.4.1. Replication of faking classes 
 
The results of the MRM analyses for the six mean facet scores of conscientiousness 
are presented in table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Results of MRM analyses. 
number of classes Cressie Read Pearson χ² CAIC 
1  <.001 <.001 2145.50 
2 .01 <.001 2300.88 
3 .14 .08 2509.84 
4 .02 .02 2763.31 
Annotations: Values below .05 indicate model misfit. The best solution is printed bold 
 
From table 4.1 it can be seen that the solution with three classes fitted the data 
while none of the other solutions did. Thus, the sample consisting of fakers and non 
fakers can best be described with three classes. The first class contained 59 percent of 
the participants, the second 25.2 percent and the third 15.8 percent. The estimated 
mean probabilities of assigning a person to the correct class were .92 for class 1, .93 
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for class 2, and .90 for the third class. The probabilities of assigning a person to a 
wrong class were all below .10. Thus, class assignment can be regarded as accurate. 
Table 4.2 contains the percentage of fakers and non fakers in each of the classes as 
well as the descriptive statistics for the other variables. The anova reliabilities 
estimated by WINMIRA were .81 (class 1), .78 (class 2), and .90 (class 3) and can be 
regarded as satisfactory.  
It can be seen that most fakers belong to class 1. However, most non fakers do so 
as well. Nevertheless, a big part of the non fakers belongs to class 2, while only very 
few fakers were assigned to that class. Regarding class 3 it was the other way around. 
Looking at the faked conscientiousness score, class 1 can be regarded as the slight 
faking class, class 2 as the regular response class, and class 3 as the extreme faking 
class. Table 4.2 also contains comparisons between the three groups. It can be seen 
that all groups differed significantly in the various conscientiousness measures with 
values increasing with amount of faking. Effect sizes can be regarded as large with one 
exception. The honest conscientiousness scores of the two faking groups differed only 
slightly. 
Interestingly, both faking groups differed in the other honest personality factor 
scores, reasoning, and their self efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs (SEB). 
Effect sizes were moderate and the direction indicated higher values for the extreme 
faking group. The differences between the extreme faking group and the regular 
respondents also reached moderate effect sizes in these variables, the direction being 
the same. However, both groups were rather small and thus, power was not sufficient 
to yield significant results. 
class 1 (sf) 2 (rr) 3 (ef) sf vs. rr sf vs. ef rr vs. ef 
non faker  48 (51.1%) 42 (44.7%) 3   (4.3%) - - - 
faker  81 (69.2%) 5   (4.3%) 32 (26.5%) - - - 
theta 1.66 (1.94) -1.22 (1.64) 5.72 (3.94) 0.91*** -1.29*** -2.20***
faked C a 148.67 (12.89) 114.20 (19.02) 168.61 (9.49) 2.01*** -1.16*** -3.18***
honest C 124.41 (18.41) 108.13 (17.40) 127.49 (22.85) 0.81*** -0.15** -0.96***
honest N 93.25 (25.91) 91.40 (24.82) 79.46 (21.59) 0.07 0.54* 0.47
honest E 116.68 (20.14) 118.60 (17.39) 127.46 (18.86) -0.10 -0.55** -0.45
honest O 124.47 (17.79) 129.51 (15.62) 133.20 (20.76) -0.28 -0.48* -0.20
honest A 116.54 (18.91) 114.40 (17.16) 123.66 (13.28) 0.12 -0.40 -0.52
gf 114.82 (18.62) 115.78 (19.11) 122.47 (15.86) -0.05 -0.42 -0.36
gc 0.68 (.75) 0.79 (.75) 0.76 (.82) -0.14 -0.10 0.05
SOE 6.80 (2.24) 6.76 (2.57) 6.31 (1.89) 0.02 0.21 0.20
SEB 4.54 (4.99) 5.07 (4.45) 7.29 (3.52) -0.11 -0.58* -0.47
age 22.81 (5.44) 24.80 (7.32) 21.28 (3.39) -0.35 0.26 0.61*
women in % 77.5 74.5 62.9 - - - 
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Annotations: Displayed are means and standard deviations (in brackets) for all continuous variables and percentages for categorical variables. sf 
= slight faking; rr = regular response; ef = extreme faking. The last three columns contain Cohen’s d (difference in group means divided by 
standard deviation derived from the total sample) and Bonferroni corrected significance levels (*** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05) for the 
continuous variables. The significance tests were only conducted with participants from the first study by Ziegler and Bühner, group sizes were: 
N = 129 (class 1), N = 45 (class 2), and N = 32 (class 3). Power was above .80 for effect sizes larger than .50 (sf vs. ef), 43 (sf vs. rr), and .59 (ef 
vs. rr). gf = reasoning, gc = crystallized intelligence, SOE = self – overestimation, SEB = self efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs. 
a All 
statistics were derived from the total sample minus the N = 94 participants from the first study who were part of the control group. 
Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics for the three classes. 
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The only further observed difference in the continuous variables occurred in age 
which decreased with faking. Kruskall – Wallis – tests were conducted for the 
categorical variables faker / non faker and gender. The differences in gender between 
the classes did not reach significance (χ²[2] = 3.09, n.s.) while the difference in faker / 
non faker reached significance (χ²[2] = 56.30, p < .001). Thus, from the differences in 
the descriptive statistics it can be concluded that more reasoning, extraversion, more 
openness, less neuroticism, and more self efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs 
lead to an extreme faking style and not to a slight faking style. The slight faking style 
mostly rests on a higher base in the honest trait (C) compared with the regular 
responders.  
Using a repeated measure ANOVA with class as independent variable and 
conscientiousness (honest and faked) as repeated factor, the within group changes 
from honest to faked answers were tested. The analysis yielded a significant and 
moderate interaction between class and measurement time (F [2;114] = 5.75; p  = .004; 
η² = .092; Power = .90). Post – hoc tests revealed effect sizes of d = .88 for slight faker 
and d = 1.45 for extreme faker between both measurement times. The effect size 
represents the difference between time 2 (faked) and time 1 (honest) divided by the 
honest standard deviation. Within the regular response group no difference occurred 
(d = -.01).  
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4.4.2. Causes for differences in responding to situational demand  
 
In order to further investigate causes for the different response sets, a multinomial 
logistic regression with class membership as dependent variable and class 2 (rr) as 
reference category was conducted. In a first step all predictors were used and the 
results were hard to interpret due to the large number of predictor variables. Most 
predictors had very small regression coefficients. In order to improve interpretability, 
the predictors with the smallest regression coefficients (<.01) were dropped from the 
analysis. The resulting model fitted the data according to the Likelihood – ratio – test 
(χ² [16] = 59.28, p < .001). Nagelkerke’s R² was .32, indicating a moderate effect. Table 
4.3 contains the overall significance for each predictor as well as regression 
coefficients. The regression coefficients reflect changes in the log odds of being a 
member of one of the faking classes compared to the regular respondent class. 
Negative values indicate that the log odds of being a member of one of the faking 
classes go down if the value of the predictor goes up. 
Table 4.3. Results of the multinomial logistic regression with class 2 (rr) as reference category. 
 χ² B (1) B (2) Wald χ2 (1) Wald χ2 (2) 
A 10.15* -.005 .037* .17 4.97
C 26.07*** .054*** .047* 21.12 10.10
gf 1.67 -.004 .014* .12 .68
gc .63 -.228 -.240 .58 .37
SOE 1.81 -.030 -.152 .11 1.55
SEB 12.04* -.081 .091 2.69 1.98
age 5.89 -.066 -.133 3.79 3.29
gender 2.25 .242 .876 .25 2.09
Annotations: B (1) contains the regression coefficients indicating changes in log odds of being in class 1 
and not 2, the same holds true for B (2). Degrees of freedom for all ² tests were 2 and for the Wald ² 
tests 1. A = Agreeableness (honest), C = Conscientiousness (honest) for names for the other variables 
see table 1. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 
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Table 4.3 reveals that agreeableness, conscientiousness, and self efficacy of 
positive self – presentation beliefs served as significant predictors for class 
assignment. Regarding the classification as an extreme faker higher agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, reasoning, and SEB increased the log odds. Furthermore being 
young and being male increased the log odds of classification as extreme faker. For 
the slight faking class it was mostly higher conscientiousness which contributed to 
class assignment. All other variables decreased the log odds of being assigned to the 
slight faking group. However, sample size and the rather large number of predictors 
decreased power. Thus, it might be worth to consider all coefficients regardless of 
their significance.  
The next step in the analysis was a comparison of criterion validities for the honest, 
the faked, and the MRM conscientiousness scores. Points in a statistics examination 
served as criterion. Moreover, in a second step class membership was tested as a 
predictor. 
 
4.4.3. Criterion validity 
 
During the analysis of the classes it could be seen that they differed in regard to 
their mean scores of conscientiousness in the honest, the faked, and also in the MRM 
scores. The differences were large except for the difference in honest 
conscientiousness between the two faking groups. In other words, fakers on average 
did not differ much in their conscientiousness, but the differences in faking styles 
yielded large differences in faked group means. Thus, criterion validities for the three 
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scores were computed. The resulting R²’s were .01 for the honest conscientiousness 
score, .02 for the faked conscientiousness score, and .03 for the MRM 
conscientiousness score. Neither of the values reached significance, which can be 
attributed to a lack of power which was below .40 in all three cases. The smaller value 
for the honest conscientiousness score can be attributed to a smaller variance within 
the score. Thus, the criterion validities for the three different scores do not differ.  
In order to test the predictive validity of individual differences in response style, the 
points in the statistics examination were also regressed on class membership. In a 
second step reasoning was added to control for intelligence. Class membership 
explained 2.4 percent (p < .05) of the variance. Reasoning added 14.2 percent (p < 
.001). The standardized regression coefficient for class membership decreased from 
.17 (p < .05) to .12 (p < .09) when reasoning was added. Comparing the means in the 
statistics examination for the different classes revealed the highest scores for the 
extreme faking group. The difference to the slight faking class was d = .50 (p < .05; 
Power = .77), and to the regular response class d = .48 (n.s. ; Power = .27). The slight 
faking and the regular response class did not differ d = .08 (n.s. ; Power = .29). Thus, 
class membership contributed to individual differences in points in the statistics 
examination: extreme fakers achieved higher scores. Moreover, this contribution was 
only to a smaller part due to reasoning. 
Another impact of faking can be seen in the ranking of participants. In order to test 
whether MRM scores reconstruct the ranking seen under honest conditions, the three 
different rankings were compared. To give a quick overview three scatter plots for the 
different conscientiousness score combinations were drawn (See figure 4.1). 
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As can easily be seen from the plots, the ranking in the honest condition differs 
strongly from both other conscientiousness scores. The faked score and the MRM 
score, however, result in largely comparable rankings. The results from the visual 
inspections were confirmed by a look at the three Spearman’s rhos which were .30** 
(honest and faked), .27** (honest and MRM), and .94** (faked and MRM). A closer look 
at the ten most conscientious people according to the honest condition revealed that 
only two of them remained within the top ten in the faking scores and MRM scores. 
Regarding the top twenty, six of them remained in the top twenty in the faking scores 
and four in the MRM scores. Thus, the ranking found under honest conditions differs 
strongly from that found under faking condition and cannot be reconstructed through 
the corrections performed within the MRM analyses. 
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Figure 4.1 Scatter plots of the rankings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend. C honest = Honest conscientiousness cores; C faked = faked conscientiousness scores; MRM C = MRM corrected conscientiousness 
scores 
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4.5.  General Discussion 
 
The present analyses had four goals which all aimed at understanding more of 
the psychological process taking place when people intentionally distort their 
answers to a questionnaire. In other words, the study was supposed to investigate 
what happens when people react to situational demand. Moreover, possible causes 
for individual differences in responding to situational demand were investigated. 
Finally, it was explored whether there were any differences in the criterion validities 
of different conscientiousness scores. The results of the qualitative and the 
quantitative analyses show that the psychological process happening when people 
fake a questionnaire starts with the evaluation of the importance of an item 
regarding the situational demand. This evaluation is based on specific knowledge, 
implicit theories, and reasoning. The actual answer then depends on the preference 
for one of three response sets: regular response (rr), slight faking (sf), and extreme 
faking (ef). People with high self efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs tend 
to endorse extreme categories. Moreover, the actual answer has a solid base in the 
real conscientiousness score. Finally, it was shown that honest, faked, and MRM 
corrected conscientiousness scores did not differ in their criterion validity, but in 
the ranking of people. In the following paragraphs the different response classes 
will be discussed and a model of responding to situational demand will be 
proposed. Moreover, the practical implications of the other findings will be 
discussed. 
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4.5.1. Response classes 
 
In line with Zickar et al. (2004) three different response classes were found: An 
extreme faking class, a slight faking class, and a regular response class. The results 
of the comparison between the three classes show that people with higher 
neuroticism only faked slightly. This is probably due to the fact that these 
participants were more afraid of being caught with a lie. They did not want to 
exaggerate their answers too much, probably fearing not being able to live up to 
that standard. The role of neuroticism in faking has already been mentioned 
elsewhere (Viswesvaran, et al., 2001). However, more important for the 
classification as a slight faker is the reported honest trait. In other words, people 
who have higher conscientiousness scores when responding honest also have a 
higher probability of being assigned to the slight faking class when intentionally 
distorting the answers. Thus, within the slight faking group the score has a solid 
base in the real trait. Within the qualitative analyses it could be seen that slight 
fakers add one or two points to the answer they would give under honest conditions. 
Extreme fakers on the other side are characterized by high self efficacy of positive 
self – presentation beliefs. They also have the highest honest conscientiousness 
scores. Thus, the extreme response set might be due to a high starting point in 
some cases – there just was not enough rating scale left. Yet, it is also reasonable to 
assume that the extreme faking was caused by the belief to be able to impress 
others (SEB) and by the ability to find out which items must be faked to impress 
most. This latter ability is partly due to reasoning ability. However, the qualitative 
analysis also showed that participants use their knowledge and implicit theories to 
evaluate the importance of an item. Pauls and Crost (Pauls & Crost, 2005a) reported 
similar results, but did not differentiate between different faking styles. They argued 
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that the self efficacy beliefs gave people the courage to fake and reasoning the 
ability. Under the light of the present results, this line of argumentation has to be 
restricted to the extreme faking group. Within the slight faking group there were 
participants with smaller reasoning ability and self efficacy beliefs. These 
participants also fared worse in the statistic examination compared with the 
extreme faking class. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that slight fakers did not only 
lack the courage to fake extremely, but also the ability. However, even the slight 
faking group achieved larger faked conscientiousness scores compared with the 
regular response group and also with their own honest scores. Summing up this 
evidence, it can be concluded that extreme faking is triggered by higher self 
efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs, higher honest trait scores, and 
cognitive abilities. Slight faking on the other hand results from honest trait scores 
which are gently exaggerated into the right direction. This slight exaggeration is in 
part due to higher neuroticism but also to smaller reasoning. Ziegler and Bühner 
hypothesized that faking comprises specific knowledge about the goal of situational 
demand. They based that hypothesis on the finding that a situational demand 
variable contributed a little, but positively to the prediction of a real life criterion. 
Within that analysis they did not differentiate between the different response sets 
reported in the present study. Thus, slight fakers and extreme fakers were regarded 
as one. From the present analyses it is clear that reasoning increases the log odds 
for classification as extreme faker and decreases them for classification as slight 
faker. In other words, reasoning had an inverted relationship to extreme faking 
compared with slight faking. This might explain why Ziegler and Bühner found no 
correlation with reasoning. Thus, the original hypothesis by Ziegler and Bühner 
must be expanded and reasoning must be added to the list of personality 
characteristics contributing to individual differences in responding to situational 
 
Chapter 4: Situational Demand under the Spotlight                                                128 
demand. A reasonable possibility is that people use knowledge to judge an item and 
hence fake it. However, if they do not possess this knowledge, they make inferences 
using their reasoning ability. Disturbing is the result that a higher crystallized 
intelligence increased the log odds of being assigned to the regular response class 
and not one of the faking classes. At first glance, this contradicts the hypothesis. 
However, the qualitative analysis showed that the evaluation of an item must be 
based on knowledge since participants used their knowledge of the necessities for a 
psychology degree. Moreover, knowledge was operationalized as lexical knowledge 
within the present study. Lexical knowledge certainly does not contain a lot of 
information regarding psychology studies. Moreover, the actual differences in 
lexical knowledge between the different response sets were small and thus, the 
results in the logistic regression might be attributable to chance. The following 
paragraph sums up these results and proposes a model for responding to situational 
demand. 
 
4.5.2. Model of responding to situational demand 
 
As mentioned above the actual answer to an item in a personality questionnaire 
depends on the situation (situational demand high or low) and on attributes and 
traits of the person responding (e.g., age, gender, SEB, gf, gc) which result in a 
preference for a certain response set. This psychological process of evaluation 
based on knowledge and followed by an interaction of traits and attributes of a 
person is evidenced by the present results. Figure 4.2 illustrates a model of 
responding to situational demand. 
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Figure 4.2 Model of Responding to Situational Demand 
 
 
Figure 4.2 consists of two different major paths. The lower path proposes the 
psychological processes occurring when situational demand is low. As reported by 
Ziegler and Bühner this results in a state of the person which influences responses 
to the questionnaire. Possible influences can be traits like test anxiety and social 
desirability. This state has its base in the personal and situational circumstances. 
Within a laboratory setting state anxiety is probably higher than in an everyday 
situation. Moreover, the result in a personality questionnaire would certainly be 
different when a person was out partying last night or has just been left by his or 
her partner. Such state variance can account for up to twenty percent of the 
variance in a personality questionnaire (Deinzer et al., 1995). The only difference 
which still seems to occur even under normal conditions is the preference for a 
certain response set (Austin, et al., 2006; Rost, et al., 1999). Some people prefer 
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middle categories and others extreme categories. Austin and colleagues reported 
that men and younger people prefer more extreme categories. However, a 
qualitative analysis as was conducted here would shed more light onto this part of 
the process. The upper path of the figure shows what happens if situational demand 
is high. People judge the items based on their specific knowledge, implicit theories, 
and reasoning and choose a response set based on certain characteristics of the 
person and the situation. Thus, cognitive ability, personality, and situational 
characteristics determine the preference for a response set. Under high situational 
demand only five percent of the participants who were asked to fake still used a 
regular response style. It may be that these persons did not follow the instructions 
or were just too honest to fake. The vast majority, however, either used a slight or 
an extreme faking response set. Possible causes for the difference might lie in the 
cognitive ability and in the real personality traits of a person as discussed above. 
Another possibility is that the response set preferred under normal conditions 
caused the faking response set. Middle crosser might prefer a slight faking and 
extreme crosser an extreme faking response set. The connections between the 
different response sets under the different situational demands should be 
investigated further. As McFarland and Ryan proposed in their model of faking, the 
opportunity to fake also plays a role within the process. This is acknowledged by the 
situational influence on the preference for a response set. Opportunity to fake might 
also include aspects such as the announcement of cross checking (Supervision). 
However, one of the main differences between slight and extreme fakers are the 
higher beliefs to be able to impress others within the latter class. 
Another result of the present study and the prior study by Ziegler and Bühner is 
the impact of situational demand on the validity of personality measures. Both 
studies demonstrated that criterion validity is not affected by situational demand as 
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far as the overall effect size is concerned. This is indicated in the model through one 
criterion validity to which both paths lead. However, construct validity is directly 
affected because situational demand causes correlations between personality 
factors. This is highlighted in the model by two different construct validity variables. 
The construct validities not only differ in terms of correlations between personality 
factors, but also in the composition of variance which indirectly affects criterion 
validity. This is discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
4.5.3. Practical implications 
 
Ziegler and Bühner could show that the response to situational demand served 
as a positive, but small predictor for a real life criterion when situational demand 
was high. They hypothesized that the predictive validity stems from knowledge and 
self efficacy beliefs. The present results lend support to this hypothesis and add 
reasoning to the list of contributors. Furthermore, it also shows that the preference 
for a response set affects the overall score and thus, the ranking. Moreover, extreme 
fakers performed better in the criterion making class membership a valid predictor 
as well. Thus, even though criterion validity remains the same under honest and 
faking conditions, the sources of predictive power differ. This is underlined by three 
aspects. First of all, the changes in ranking which occur under faking conditions 
indicate different compositions. Secondly, the faking variable within the study by 
Ziegler and Bühner served as a positive  predictor. And thirdly, class membership 
also served as a valid predictor with higher scores for extreme fakers. Thus, if one 
selects personnel using personality questionnaires, the base for selection still 
consists partly of true differences in personality, but also of differences in cognitive 
ability and other traits like self efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs. Some 
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people might want to circumvent this by correcting for faking. The present study 
indicates that using MRM corrected scores does not help very much. Previous 
findings showed that lie scales detect faking better than IRT models (Ferrando & 
Chico, 2001). Ferrando and Chico used a two parameter logistic model (2PLM) and 
person fit indices to detect fakers. The present analyses show that using Mixed 
Rasch Models (MRM) helps to detect fakers with an exceptional accuracy of about 
95 percent. However, using MRMs to correct for faking proved less useful. This 
might be due to the small number of facets used. With more items the estimation of 
the person parameters is more accurate and more differentiated. Thus, under these 
circumstances MRM corrections might prove more helpful. Other methods for the 
correction of faking have been proposed as well. For example lie scales (e.g., 
Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964), ipsative measures (e.g., Baron, 1996; Bowen, et al., 
2002; Martin, et al., 2002), objective measures (McClelland, et al., 1989), cut off 
scores (Ziegler, et al., submitted-a), and many others as well. Ziegler et al. 
discussed the different methods and came to the conclusion that using objective 
measures probably is the best way to guard against faking. Yet, the question 
remains whether one needs to guard against faking. The present results indicate 
that faking might not be such a problem after all. Of course, the purity of the 
measure is lost, however, personality traits remain the main contributors to the 
criterion validity. And, moreover, new and most importantly valid information is 
gained. After all, the individual differences affecting faking seem to help to achieve 
goals in real life. Having higher self confidence and cognitive abilities certainly 
helps to achieve goals in life. Thus, future research should investigate the type of 
knowledge responsible in evaluating item importance and how it contributes to 
success in life. 
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4.5.4. Methodological implications 
 
As described above, other researchers have used information criteria to find the 
best fitting MRM model (e.g., Zickar, et al., 2004). These criteria take the number of 
parameters to estimate into account and also use the likelihood of the data. Thus, 
the model with the smallest number of parameters and an acceptable likelihood is 
chosen as the best. However, these criteria do not test whether the specific 
assumptions of the Rasch model are actually fulfilled. Thus, even though the 
information criterion might be the smallest, the model might not fit. This is 
underlined by the present results. According to the CAIC a 1 class model would 
have fitted the data best. However, the model tests show that only the 3 class model 
really fits the data. Thus, it is suggested to use a combination of both. Model tests 
should be used to find the models which actually fit and information criteria can be 
looked at to find the best model of those fitting. 
 
4.6. Limitations  
 
The present analyses used complex methodological models which require large 
samples. The sample used here certainly was not small, but it might not have been 
large enough either. Thus, a replication of the results is necessary. Moreover, the 
results are limited to the special setting. 
Furthermore, it could be shown that the number of items used in a MRM affect 
chances of finding all possible response sets (Zickar & Burnfield, 2003). Within the 
present study six items representing the six facets of conscientiousness have been 
used. While this is a small number, the results found are in line with the results by 
Zickar et al. (2004) who also reported three response classes. 
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Of course, one can criticise the fact that the sample used consisted of students 
only. This might be a threat to the external validity of the experiment. However, in 
accordance to the suggestions by Rogers (1997) the faking scenario was realistic for 
participants, ensuring external validity. Nevertheless, a replication of the current 
results within a real life setting such as an applicant setting would broaden the base 
of the proposed model. 
Summing up, the present analyses demonstrated that situational demand causes 
a psychological process involving cognitive abilities as well as personal and 
situational characteristics resulting in a specific response set. Thus, scores in faked 
personality questionnaires not only contain actual personality traits, but also other 
sources of variance. However, these sources of variance contribute to the prediction 
of performance. So the answer to the question of whether to use personality 
questionnaires for selection should be: “Yes, but beware of the content!” 
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Chapter 5.  Conclusions 
 
5.1.  Summaries of the three studies presented 
 
5.1.1. Study 1 
 
Study 1 reanalyzed data collected by Toomela (2003). The data consisted of 
personality self ratings and cognitive ability test results from N = 912 men with 
military background. In his original article Toomela showed that in the group with 
the highest cognitive ability neuroticism and conscientiousness had substantial 
cross loadings and could no longer be clearly separated using exploratory factor 
analysis. The present reanalysis was based on the hypothesis that situational 
demand was responsible for this. It was assumed that situational demand was a 
systematic error which adds itself to all personality facets affected by faking and 
causes correlations between these factors to increase. In a first analysis step it was 
explored why the different ability groups responded differently to the situation. In 
other words, why did the highest cognitive ability group respond more intensely to 
the situational demand than any of the other groups? During this analysis it was 
hypothesized that the situational demand was felt due to military rank and not due 
to intelligence. This was assumed since the men in the highest military group 
mostly came from the group of officers. The group of non commissioned officers 
mostly portrayed average ability and finally, the group of recruits below average 
ability. Drawing from these results it was reasoned that officers responded more to 
the situational demand because they felt obliged to draw a prototypical military 
picture of themselves. While this might have occurred within the non commissioned 
officer group as well, it certainly was not felt by recruits who only do their required 
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military service time. All in all, it was assumed that situational demand was felt 
highest by the officer group, followed by the non commissioned officers, and finally 
the recruits. Using a multigroup structural equation model with aspects of Latent 
State Trait theory the hypothesis could be confirmed. Moreover, the results indicate 
that an uncorrelated trait model might represent personality better when situational 
demand was controlled. The officer group had the highest means in the latent 
variable containing the situational demand variance. Both other groups followed as 
was hypothesized. The control of situational demand strongly decreased the 
correlations between the personality factors. Thus, first evidence that situational 
demand interferes with the orthogonality of personality factors was provided. 
However, since the data only contained measures from one measurement point, the 
hypothesis could not be confirmed terminally. Therefore, study 2 was conducted 
using an experimental design. 
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5.1.2. Study 2 
 
In study 2 N = 186 participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. 
The first group was a control group which twice filled out a personality 
questionnaire honestly. Participants of the other group, the experimental group, 
were given specific faking instructions at the second time. Between both 
measurements the groups worked on a reasoning test, a test of crystallized 
intelligence, and also a questionnaire of self efficacy of positive self presentation 
beliefs.  
This design was chosen for two reasons. First of all, the two measurement points 
allow the separation of questionnaire variance into trait and state variance. Thus, 
the influences of state variance on the correlations between personality factors 
could be investigated. As in study 1 it was hypothesized that controlling for 
situational demand would strongly diminish the correlations between personality 
factors. The second reason concerned criterion validity. Due to the separation of 
state and trait variance it was also possible to distinguish trait and faking variance. 
Thus, it could be explored whether the predictive power of personality 
questionnaires in applied settings is a result of trait or faking variance. Moreover, 
the ability to fake, represented by the individual differences in the latent state 
variable fake, were correlated with the other assessed measures in order to find out 
what enables people to fake. The two differing views that faking is an ability versus 
that faking is a personality trait were compared. 
The results again gave evidence to the hypothesis that situational demand is 
responsible for correlations between personality factors. Just looking at the bivariate 
correlations between the personality factors showed substantial correlations in both 
groups. However, when people faked these correlations strongly increased as was 
 
Chapter 5. Conclusions                                                                                            139 
hypothesized. When situational demand was controlled using structural equation 
modeling the correlations in both groups strongly decreased. Most correlations 
were close to zero when situational demand was controlled. Yet, extraversion and 
agreeableness still correlated substantially. Thus, it was concluded that situational 
demand is one of the causes for the correlations between personality factors. 
However, the lack in discriminant validity, claimed by Costa and McCrae (1995), 
cannot totally be ruled out even though it can be limited to two specific personality 
factors.  
As a further result the faking variable revealed the strongest relationship with 
self efficacy of positive self – presentation beliefs. None of the other variables 
shared variance with faking. Thus, it was concluded that faking is promoted by the 
belief to be able to impress others.  
Finally, it could be shown that individual differences in faking added positively, 
but very little to the prediction of a real life criterion. The personality traits, 
however, had the lion’s share of the explained variance. Drawing from these results, 
it was hypothesized that faking must also rely on specific knowledge which helps to 
be successful. More precisely, it was assumed that knowledge is necessary to fake, 
however, only those who also believe to be able to impress others actually do fake. 
One of the short comings of study 2 was that faking was seen as a homogeneous 
response set. No individual differences in faking strategies were assumed. In order 
to find out whether such strategies exist and to shed more light onto the 
psychological process of intentionally faking in a questionnaire, study 3 was 
undertaken. 
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5.1.3. Study 3 
 
Study 3 actually consisted of two different parts. In the first part of study 3 a 
sample of N = 50 participants was asked to fake a personality questionnaire using 
the same specific instruction as in study 2. Moreover, participants were asked to 
express any thoughts aloud. This was followed by an interview about faking 
strategies and another filling out of the questionnaire under honest conditions. The 
analysis of the thought protocols and the interviews revealed two different faking 
strategies. Common to both strategies was that not all items were faked. Only those 
answers to those items which were perceived as important regarding the faking 
goal were distorted. The faking style, though, differed. In one group people only 
increased their honest score slightly. This group, which made up eighty percent of 
the sample was called slight fakers. The other twenty percent chose the most 
extreme answer category to portray themselves. Unimportant items were either 
answered honestly or by using the middle category. Another interesting finding was 
that participants who were not enrolled at the psychology faculty faked different 
personality aspects. They portrayed themselves as more neurotic and less 
conscientious then students from the psychology faculty. Thus, the qualitative 
analysis of study 3 provided evidence for the assumption that specific knowledge is 
part of faking. Moreover, it also showed that implicit theories also play an important 
role. 
The second part of study 3 used MRMs to analyze the combined data from study 
2 and 3. MRMs were used to find different response classes. The personality factor 
conscientiousness was chosen for the analysis. In accordance with previous 
research findings three different response sets could be identified: extreme faking, 
slight faking, and regular response. Participants which were part of the control 
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group in study 2 make up the bigger part of the latter class. Fakers from study 2 as 
well as study 3 were mostly assigned to one of the faking classes. Thus, the findings 
of the qualitative analysis were confirmed.  
In a series of further analyses it could be shown that the slight fakers were also 
more neurotic than extreme fakers. Moreover, it could be shown that honest 
conscientiousness scores built a solid starting point in both faking classes. Extreme 
fakers also showed the highest values in self efficacy of positive self – presentation 
beliefs. An interesting finding was that extreme fakers also had a larger reasoning 
ability. Thus, it was concluded that slight fakers are not only more afraid of being 
caught, they also lack the ability to fake and do not believe they could live up to an 
overly exaggerated picture of themselves. Extreme fakers on the other side have 
high self efficacy beliefs and reasoning ability. Thus, reasoning was added to the list 
of contributors to faking. 
Moreover, it was shown that membership in one of the classes served as a valid 
predictor for a real life criterion. Members of the extreme faking class fared better. 
Controlling for the higher reasoning ability, class membership still contributed to 
the prediction.  
Regarding the comparison of criterion validities in the different classes, no 
differences could be observed. Thus, criterion validity can be regarded as 
unaffected by different response sets. However, the ranking of participants under 
honest and faked conditions strongly differed. MRM corrections were also not able 
to reconstruct honest scores. This means that even though criterion validity remains 
unaffected by situational demand, the ranking is strongly affected. This bears 
consequences for the construct validity. 
Drawing on the different results, a model of responding to situational demand 
was proposed. The model allows for two different response paths depending on the 
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situational demand. Low situational demand either leads to middle crossing or to 
extreme crossing. Mediating variables might be situational circumstances as well as 
age and gender. High situational demand on the other hand leads to one of the 
three response sets reported above. Personal as well as situational variables are 
proposed as mediators. Finally, it was assumed that both paths lead to the same 
criterion validity, but have different construct validities. 
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5.2. Conclusions regarding the goals of the present project 
 
In the introduction four different goals of the present project were deduced. 
These goals were pursued with three studies whose results were described and 
discussed above. In the following four sections each goal will be revisited and the 
various results will be integrated. Finally, a short summary and an outlook for future 
research are provided.. 
 
5.2.1. Impact of Situational Demand on the Construct Validity of the BIG 5 
 
The Big 5 have been proposed as a theoretical model consisting of five 
orthogonal factors (Costa & McCrae, 1992b; Goldberg, 1992). However, there is a 
lot of empirical evidence that the factors have substantial correlations (Mount, et al., 
2005). Costa and McCrae attribute this fact to a lack in discriminant validity for 
some of the facets. Other possible explanations have been presented in the 
introduction. 
Within the present project it was hypothesized that situational demand in the 
form of systematic error variance causes those correlations. In this sense situational 
demand would influence the response given by a person. This influence would 
impact all items which are susceptible to the specific situational demand. 
Accordingly, correlations between those items would increase. Evidence for this 
hypothesis was provided.  
Using Latent State Trait theory this situational demand was separated from the 
trait variance. Correlations derived under these conditions were smaller than 
correlations without controlling for situational demand. However, a few correlations 
between the personality factors remained. Specifically, extraversion and 
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agreeableness still shared variance. However, the other correlations strongly 
decreased when situational demand was controlled.  
This contradicts conclusions drawn by Ellingson et al. (2001) as well as Smith 
and Ellingson (2002). Both researcher teams had reported that situational demand 
has only little influence on the construct validity of personality questionnaires. 
However, they only used one measurement point and were therefore not able to 
clearly distinguish between state and trait variance. Moreover, they allowed 
personality factors to correlate. When they compared applicant and student samples 
and concluded that they did not differ, they only consulted the loading patterns, 
though. A look at the intercorrelations reveals different patterns with larger 
correlations in the applicant setting. Thus, this shortcoming in combination with the 
results from the present studies let a different conclusion appear more likely. 
Situational demand influences construct validity of personality questionnaires: 
Correlations between personality factors inflate with increasing situational demand. 
Another interesting finding was that higher situational demand changes the 
ranking of people in a questionnaire compared with honest results. This has already 
been reported by Hough (1998). However, he did not consider the implications for 
construct validity. Differences in ranking denote differences in the composition of 
the variance under high demand conditions from that under honest conditions. One 
could argue now that this change is due to individual differences in faking and thus, 
in cognitive ability or another personality trait. However, the present results also 
allow for a different explanation. When situational demand increases and people 
fake, personality factors lose variance. This can be explained by the increasing state 
variance. A consequence of this variance loss is that a personality factor just has 
loadings from a few selected facets. Here people still differ and thus, the facets have 
variance which allows for higher loadings. Consequently, changes in ranking might 
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be attributable to these facets. In other words, a broad personality factor no longer 
represents six facets as under honest conditions, but only one or two. Within these 
facets the ranking might differ strongly from the ranking in the factor. This, in 
combination with the individual differences in faking and faking style, leads to a 
changed ranking. 
All in all, the present project revealed an impact of situational demand on the 
construct validity of a personality questionnaire. Not only does it cause correlations 
between personality factors, it also changes the variance composition of a given 
personality factor. 
 
5.2.2. Impact of Situational Demand on the Criterion Validity of the BIG 5 
 
If situational demand impacts the construct validity, it is likely to assume that it 
also affects the criterion validity of a personality questionnaire. In line with previous 
findings (Ones, et al., 1996; Viswesvaran, et al., 2001) the present studies show that 
this is not the case. The variance of a real life criterion explained by a personality 
questionnaire remains about equal no matter whether honest, faked, or corrected 
scores are used.  
However, it was also shown that individual differences in faking add little, but 
positively to the prediction of a real life criterion. Moreover, the present analyses 
explored such possible individual differences in faking and showed that different 
response sets are used to fake. People with higher cognitive ability, less fear, and 
more self efficacy beliefs fake extremely. Less bright and more fearful people fake 
only slightly. Thus, the differences in faking style represent differences in important 
personality aspects. These aspects are certainly important in real life and might 
explain why faked questionnaires keep their predictive validity. However, this 
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conclusion would be premature. Despite the evidence for the predictive power of 
individual differences in faking, the present results also demonstrate that 
personality traits contribute most strongly to the amount of explained variance. 
Thus, it is not faking, but personality plus a little faking which explains variance. In 
the previous section it was explicated that faked personality questionnaires have 
different construct validity. The factor variance no longer comes evenly from the 
facets, but is highly determined by a few facets. Taking this into consideration, the 
conclusion for the criterion validity is that it does in deed not result from the 
personality factors, but from the facets which determine it. Thus, criterion validity 
would be due to only a few facets. Recent studies have shown that using facets 
instead of personality factors might help to explain more variance (Lounsbury, et al., 
2002). Future research should try to explore which facets keep their variance and 
are thus, the most likely contributors to criterion validity. Furthermore, it should be 
investigated whether the same facets are the only contributors to criterion validity 
under honest conditions. While this is highly likely, a contradiction of that result 
would be highly interesting since it would mean that different personality aspects 
contribute to criterion validity depending on the assessment situation. An 
explanation for this would be that life also consists of different situations and thus, 
different personality aspects might influence the behavior of a person leading to a 
more or less successful goal achievement. 
All in all, the present results indicate that situational demand has no direct 
impact on the criterion validity of a personality questionnaire. However, an indirect 
impact could be demonstrated. Criterion validity no longer results from a broad 
factor, but only from a few selected facets. Faking ability adds only little. 
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5.2.3. The Psychological Process behind Situational Demand 
 
Especially the qualitative analysis helped to shed more light onto the 
psychological process of intentionally distorting answers to a personality 
questionnaire. These results in combination with the other results led to the 
proposition of a model of responding to situational demand. 
The model (figure 5.1) distinguishes between high and low situational demand. 
Low demand represents ordinary assessment situations. Such situations are 
characterized by absolute anonymity and bear no consequences for the participant. 
Despite this, there is evidence that situational influences account for up to twenty 
percent of the variance (Deinzer, et al., 1995). Thus, situational circumstances 
influence the answering behavior. Moreover, Rost, Carstensen, and von Davier 
(1997) could show that under normal conditions two response sets can be found: 
Middle and extreme crosser. In a recent paper Austin et al. (2006) showed that men 
and younger people preferred extreme categories. Thus, besides situational 
influences, personal characteristics also influence the answer. The result is one of 
the two response sets. Since most of the research regarding the development of the 
Big 5 was conducted with students in laboratories under low situational demand 
conditions (John, et al., 1988), construct validity should equal the results from most 
of these studies. Criterion validity has also been investigated under these 
circumstances (Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004; Furnham, et al., 2002) and 
was found to be comparable with results derived in applicant settings with higher 
situational demand. 
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Figure 5.1 Model of responding to situational demand 
 
The psychological process occurring under higher situational demand is 
depicted in the upper path of the proposed model. From the present results it can 
be concluded that people first judge the importance of an item. Cognitive abilities 
like reasoning and specific knowledge are used as well as implicit theories for this 
judgment. Importance in this case refers to the achievement of a certain goal which 
caused the situational demand. Such goals can range from simple impression 
management to getting a job. If an item is assumed to be unimportant, people either 
answer honestly or neutrally. The mediating variables remain unclear so far. If the 
item is important in the eye of the participant, one of three different response sets is 
chosen. Very few people choose to answer honestly, despite the situational demand. 
The majority fake slightly and some participants fake extremely. Neuroticism, self 
efficacy beliefs, reasoning, and the faked trait itself mediate this as well as 
situational variables like the announcement of a test expert checking the results. 
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Furthermore, the results show that even under these conditions the criterion validity 
remains the same. However, construct validity is different as was explained above. 
The proposed model also contains two question marks. During the qualitative 
research it became clear that participants either answered honestly or neutrally to 
items they believed to be unimportant. However, it was not possible to determine 
reasons for these different answer styles. It is reasonable to assume that the trust 
the participants had into the anonymity of the research project determined the 
answer style.  
All in all, the proposed model based on the results of the three studies depicts 
the psychological process and its consequences which occur when people respond 
to situational demand. 
 
5.2.4. Dealing with Situational Demand 
 
One of the goals of the present study was to test a new approach for the 
correction of faking. In study 3 MRMs were used to determine the number of 
different faking classes. However, one of the advantages of MRMs is that they also 
estimate person parameters for all participants which are located on the same trait 
variable. This means that the person parameters from different classes can be 
compared. Since MRMs consider the class attributes in the parameter estimations, 
the parameters are corrected for the response set. In other words, extreme fakers 
get parameters which are corrected towards the middle and slight fakers get 
parameters corrected away from the middle. Thus, it might be possible that MRMs 
reconstruct the trait as it can be observed under honest condition.  
The results of the present analysis showed that MRMs are extremely sensitive to 
faking. That means fakers were assigned to one of the faking classes with a high 
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security. While this is an encouraging result, the corrected scores performed as bad 
as the uncorrected faking scores. Moreover, the corrected scores were closer to the 
faked scores than to the honest scores. This result does not advocate the use of 
MRMs for the correction of faking. However, this conclusion is not justified. Within 
the present analysis only six items were used. Thus, the parameter estimates were 
not as accurate as they would be with more items. Moreover, such a small number 
of items limits the range of possible parameters. All members of one class who have 
the same sum score are assigned the same person parameter. Thus, the variation of 
parameter scores is closely linked to the number of items. Therefore, it should be 
tested whether a larger number of items is more able to reconstruct the honest 
score. 
Before closing this section, it has to be pointed out that the results of the present 
studies imply another conclusion. It was shown that the criterion validity of the 
personality questionnaire did not change when faked. Moreover, the biggest share 
of explained variance belonged to the trait and only a small part to the faking 
variance. Furthermore, the faking variance proved to be a positive predictor 
containing variance due to cognitive abilities and self efficacy beliefs. Thus, the 
need to guard against faking seems to be unnecessary. 
 
5.3. Summary and outlook 
 
The present project aimed at exploring the impact of situational demand on the 
construct validity and the criterion validity of a personality questionnaire. It was 
shown that situational demand causes correlations between personality factors and 
influences the variance composition of a trait. While construct validity is affected by 
situational demand, the results also show that the criterion validity is only indirectly 
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affected. This means that the explained variance does not change due to situational 
demand. However, only facets contribute to the explanation and the ranking in the 
personality factors assessed also changes. Thus, the impact of situational demand 
on personality factors was confirmed. 
Another goal of the project was the exploration of the psychological process 
behind faking. Based on the different results, a model of responding to situational 
demand was proposed. 
Finally, a new method for correcting faked personality scores was tested, but did 
not prove useful with only six items. 
Future research should try to find more evidence for the proposed model. So far, 
variance due to situational demand could not be explained totally. Actually, only a 
small part of the variance could be accounted for. It can be assumed that specific 
knowledge is one of the main sources of individual differences in faking. Other 
sources should be investigated since they might allow a better understanding of the 
psychological process as well as the criterion validity of personality questionnaires. 
Analyzing faked and honest personality facets in regard to their predictive power 
might also foster the knowledge of which specific personality attributes contribute 
to better performance outcomes. 
This project was successful in exploring and explaining situational influence on 
personality questionnaires. However, it was only a first step and many more 
interesting research questions have been proposed. Hopefully, other researchers 
will take up the ideas presented here and join in the quest of finding out how state 
and trait interact in influencing people’s behavior and performance. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                152 
References 
 
Ackerman, P. L. (1996). A theory of adult intellectual development: Process, 
personality, interests, and knowledge. Intelligence, 22, 227-257. 
 
Allik, J. & McCrae, R. R. (2004). Escapable Conclusions: Toomela (2003) and the 
Universality of Trait Structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
87, 261-265. 
 
Allport, G. W. (1961). Pattern and Growth in Personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston. 
 
Allport, G. W. & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait names: A psycho-lexical study. 
Psychological Monographs, 47 (1, Whole No. 2 1 1).  
Aluja, A., Garcia, O., Garcia, L. F. & Seisdedos, N. (2005). Invariance of the "NEO-
PI-R" factor structure across exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 38, 1879. 
 
Amthauer, R., Brocke, B., Liepmann, D. & Beauducel, A. (2001). I-S-T 2000 R; 
Intelligenz-Struktur-Test 2000 R; Intelligence Structure Test 2000. Hogrefe. 
 
Asendorpf, J. B. (2006). On artifacts and meaning in person-centred analyses: 
Comment on McCrae, Terracciano, Costa and Ozer (2005). European Journal 
of Personality, 20, 45-47. 
 
Ashton, M.-C., Lee, K., Perugini, M., Szarota, P., de-Vries, R.-E., Di-Blas, L., Boies, 
K. & De-Raad, B. (2004). A Six-Factor Structure of Personality-Descriptive 
Adjectives: Solutions From Psycholexical Studies in Seven Languages. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 356-366. 
 
References                                                                                                                153 
 
Austin, E. J., Deary, I. J. & Egan, V. (2006). Individual differences in response scale 
use: Mixed Rasch modelling of responses to NEO-FFI items. Personality And 
Individual Differences, 40, 1235-1245. 
 
Baer, R. A., Wetter, M. W., Nichols, D. S., Greene, R. & et al. (1995). Sensitivity of 
MMPI-2 validity scales to underreporting of symptoms. Psychological 
Assessment, 7, 419-423. 
 
Baron, H. (1996). Strengths and limitations of ipsative measurement. Journal of 
Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 69, 49-56. 
 
Barrick, M. R. & Mount, M. K. (1991). The BIG Five Personality Dimensions and Job 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44, 1-26. 
 
Barrick, M. R., Mount, M. K. & Judge, T. A. (2001). Personality and performance at 
the beginning of the new millennium: What do we know and where do we go 
next? International Journal of Selection and Assessment. Vol, 9, 9-30. 
 
Beauducel, A., Brocke, B. & Liepmann, D. (2001). Perspectives on fluid and 
crystallized intelligence: facets for verbal, numerical, and figural intelligence. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 977-994. 
 
Beauducel, A. & Wittmann, W. W. (2005). Simulation Study on Fit Indexes in CFA 
Based on Data With Slightly Distorted Simple Structure. Structural Equation 
Modeling, 41-75. 
 
Biesanz, J. C. & West, S. G. (2004). Towards Understanding Assessments of the Big 
Five: Multitrait-Multimethod Analyses of Convergent and Discriminant 
 
References                                                                                                                154 
Validity Across Measurement Occasion and Type of Observer. Journal of 
Personality, 72, 845-876. 
 
Blackburn, R., Logan, C., Renwick, S. J. D. & Donnelly, J. P. (2005). Higher-order 
dimensions of personality disorder: Hierarchical structure and relationships 
with the five-factor model, the interpersonal circle, and psychopathy. Journal 
of Personality Disorders, 19, 597-623. 
 
Block, J. (1995). A contrarian view of the five-factor approach to personality 
description. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 187-215. 
 
Bollen, E. & Wojciechowski, F. L. (2004). Anorexia nervosa subtypes and the big five 
personality factors. European Eating Disorders Review, 12, 117-121. 
 
Bono, J. E. & Judge, T. A. (2004). Personality and transformational and transactional 
leadership: A meta-analysis. Journal Of Applied Psychology, 89, 901-910. 
 
Bouchard, T. J. (1997). The Genetics of Personality, In Blum, K. & Noble, E. P. 
(eds.), Handbook of Psychiatric Genetics (pp. 273-296) Boca Raton, FL: Circle 
Press Inc.  
 
Bowen, C. C., Martin, B. A. & Hunt, S. T. (2002). A comparison of ipsative and 
normative approaches for ability to control faking in personality 
questionnaires. International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 10, 240-259. 
 
Brand, C., Egan, V. & Deary, I. J. (1993). Personality and general intelligence, 
(1993). Bonaiuto, P., Van Heck, G. L. (Eds), Personality psychology in 
Europe, Vol. 4. (pp.203 228). Tilburg, Netherlands: Tilburg University Press. 
xiv, 416 pp.  
 
 
References                                                                                                                155 
Buehner, M. (2006). Introduction to Test- and Questionnaire Construction 
[Einfuehrung in die Test- und Fragebogenkonstruktion]. Pearson. 
 
Buehner, M., Krumm, S. & Pick, M. (2005). Reasoning is Working Memory and not 
Attention. Intelligence, 33, 251-272. 
 
Buehner, M., Ziegler, M., Krumm, S. & Schmidt Atzert, L. (2006). Ist der I-S-T 2000 
R Rasch-skalierbar? [Is the I-S-T 2000 R Rasch scaleable?]. Diagnostica, 92, 
119-130. 
 
Byrne, B. M. (2001). Structural equation modeling with AMOS: Basic concepts, 
applications, and programming. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor-analytic studies. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cattell, R. B. (1943a). The description of personality: Basic traits resolved into 
clusters. Journal ofAbnorma1 und Social Psychology, 38, 476-506. 
 
Cattell, R. B. (1943b). The description of personality: I. Foundations of trait 
measurement. Psychological Review, 50, 559-594. 
 
Cellar, D. F., Miller, M. L., Doverspike, D. D. & Klawsky, J. D. (1996). Comparison of 
factor structures and criterion-related validity coefficients for two measures 
of personality based on the five factor model. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
81, 694-704. 
 
Chamorro Premuzic, T. & Furnham, A. (2003). Personality traits and academic 
examination performance. European Journal of Personality, 17, 237-250. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                156 
Chamorro Premuzic, T. & Furnham, A. (2004). A possible model for understanding 
the personality-intelligence interface. British Journal of Psychology, 95, 249-
264. 
 
Chamorro Premuzic, T., Furnham, A. & Moutafi, J. (2004). The relationship between 
estimated and psychometric personality and intelligence scores. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 38, 505-513. 
 
Cheung, G. W. & Rensvold, R. B. (2001). The effects of model parsimony and 
sampling error on the fit of structural equation models. Organizational 
Research Methods, 4, 236-264. 
 
Christiansen, N. D., Burns, G. N. & Montgomery, G. E. (2005). Reconsidering 
forced-choice item formats for applicant personality assessment. Human 
Performance, 18, 267-307. 
 
Collins, J.-M. & Gleaves, D.-H. (1998). Race, job applicants, and the Five-Factor 
Model of Personality: Implications for Black psychology, 
industrial/organizational psychology, and the Five-Factor Theory. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 83, 531-544. 
 
Costa, P. T., Jr. & McCrae, R. R. (1992a). Reply to Eysenck. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 13, 861-865. 
 
Costa, P. T., Jr. & McCrae, R. R. (2006). Age Changes in Personality and Their 
Origins: Comment on Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer (2006). 
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 26-28. 
 
Costa, P. T. & McCrae, R. R. (1980). Still stable after all these years: Personality as a 
key to some issues in adulthood and old age, In Baltes, P. B. & Brim, O.G. 
 
References                                                                                                                157 
(Eds.), Live Span development und behaviors (pp. 65-102). New York: 
Academic Press.  
 
Costa, P. T. & McCrae, R. R. (1992b). Revised NEO personality inventory (NEO-PI-R) 
and NEO Five-Factor inventory (NEO-FFI): Professional Manual. Odessa: 
Psychological Assessment Resources. 
 
Costa, P. T. & McCrae, R. R. (1995). Solid ground in the wetlands of personality: A 
reply to Block. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 216-220. 
 
Crowne, D. & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability of 
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 329-354. 
 
Dacosta, M. & Halmi, K. A. (1992). Classifications of Anorexia-Nervosa - Question of 
Subtypes. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 11, 305-313. 
 
De Fruyt, F., Aluja, A., Garcia, L. F., Rolland, J.-P. & Jung, S. C. (2006). Positive 
Presentation Management and Intelligence and the Personality 
Differentiation by Intelligence Hypothesis in Job Applicants. International 
Journal of Selection and Assessment, 14, 101-112. 
 
De Fruyt, F., Bockstaele, M., Taris, R. & Van Hiel, A. (in press). Police Interview 
Competencies: Assessment and Associated Traits. European Journal of 
Personality,  
Deary, I. J. & Pagliari, C. (1991). The strength of g at different levels of ability: Have 
Detterman and Daniel rediscovered Spearman's "law of diminishing 
returns"? Intelligence, 15, 247-250. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                158 
Deinzer, R., Steyer, R., Eid, M., Notz, P., Schwenkmezger, P., Ostendorf, F. & 
Neubauer, A. (1995). Situational effects in trait assessment: The FPI, NEOFFI, 
and EPI questionnaires. European Journal of Personality. Vol, 9, 1-23. 
 
Digman, J. M. (1997). Higher-order factors of the Big Five. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 73, 1246-1256. 
 
Digman, J. M. & Shmelyov, A. G. (1996). The structure of temperament and 
personality in Russian children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
71, 341-351. 
 
Dillman, D. A. & Redline, C. D. (2004). Testing Paper Self-Administered 
Questionnaiers: Cognitive Interview and Field Test Comparisons, In Presser, 
S., Rothgeb, J. M., Couper, M. P., Lessler, J. T., Martin, E., Martin, J. & 
Singer, E. (Eds), Methods for Testing and Evaluating Survey Questionnaires 
Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
 
Ellingson, J. E., Smith, D. B. & Sackett, P. R. (2001). Investigating the influence of 
social desirability on personality factor structure. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 86, 122-133. 
 
Eysenck, H. J. (1992). A reply to Costa and McCrae: P or A and C--the role of theory. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 867-868. 
 
Eysenck, H. J. & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1964). The Eysenck Personality Inventory. 
University of London Press, London. 
 
Fahrenberg, J., Hampel, R. & Selg, H. (1984). Das Freiburger 
Persönlichkeitsinventar (FPI und FPI-R), Handbuch [The Freiburg Personality 
Inventory (FPI and FPI-R), Manual].  
 
References                                                                                                                159 
Farsides, T. & Woodfield, R. (2003). Individual differences and undergraduate 
academic success: the roles of personality, intelligence, and application. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 34, 1225-1243. 
 
Ferrando, P. J. & Chico, E. (2001). Detecting dissimulation in personality test scores: 
A comparison between person-fit indices and detection scales. Educational 
and Psychological Measurement, 61, 997-1012. 
 
Fowler, F. J. (1995). Improving survey questions. Design and evaluation. Applied 
Social Research Methods Series (Chapter 5). Sage. 
 
Freud, S. (1910). The origin and development of psychoanalysis. American Journal 
of Psychology, 21, 181-218. 
 
Furnham, A. (2002). Dissimulation, intelligence and personality. Social Behavior and 
Personality, 30, 527-532. 
 
Furnham, A. & Chamorro-Premuzic, T. (2004). Personality and intelligence as 
predictors of statistics examination grades. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 37, 943-955. 
 
Furnham, A., Chamorro Premuzic, T. & McDougall, F. (2002). Personality, cognitive 
ability, and beliefs about intelligence as predictors of academic performance. 
Learning and Individual Differences, 14, 47-64. 
 
Furnham, A. & Crump, J. (2005). Personality traits, types, and disorders: An 
examination of the relationship between three self-report measures. 
European Journal of Personality, 19, 167-184. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                160 
Furnham, A., Moutafi, J. & Chamorro Premuzic, T. (2005). Personality and 
Intelligence: Gender, the Big Five, Self-Estimated and Psychometric 
Intelligence. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 13, 11-24. 
 
Furnham, A., Moutafi, J. & Paltiel, L. (2005). Intelligence in Relation to Jung's 
Personality Types. Individual Differences Research, 3, 2-13. 
 
Furnham, A. F. (1997). Knowing and faking one's Five-Factor personality score. 
Journal of Personality Assessment, 69, 229-243. 
 
Goldberg, L. R. (1981). Language and individual differences: the search for 
universals in personality lexicons. Review of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 2, 141-165. 
 
Goldberg, L. R. (1992). The development of marker variables for the Big-Five factor 
structure. Psychological Assessment, 4, 26-42. 
 
Gurrera, R. J., Nestor, P. G., O'Donnell, B. F., Rosenberg, V. & McCarley, R. W. 
(2005). Personality differences in schizophrenia are related to performance 
on neuropsychological tasks. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 193, 
714-721. 
 
Hancock, G. R. (2001). Effect size, power, and sample size determination for 
structured means modeling and mimic approaches to between-groups 
hypothesis testing of means on a single latent construct. Psychometrika, 66, 
373-388. 
 
Hancock, G. R. & Mueller, R. O. (2001). Rethinking construct reliability within latent 
variable systems., Cudeck, R., Toit, S. du & Sörbom, D., Structural Equation 
 
References                                                                                                                161 
Modeling: Present and Future - Festschrift in honor of Karl Jöreskog (195-
216). Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International, Inc.  
 
Harris, J. A., Vernon, P. A. & Jang, K. L. (2005). Testing the differentiation of 
personality by intelligence hypothesis. Personality and Individual Differences, 
38, 277-286. 
 
Hough, L. M. (1998). Effects of intentional distortion in personality measurement 
and evaluation of suggested palliatives. Human Performance, 11, 209-244. 
 
Hough, L. M., Eaton, N. K., Dunnette, M. D., Kamp, J. D. & et al. (1990). Criterion-
related validities of personality constructs and the effect of response 
distortion on those validities. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 581-595. 
 
Howell, D. C. (2002). Statistical Methods for Psychology. Duxbury: Thomson 
Learning. 
 
Hu, L. t. & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance 
structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural 
Equation Modeling, 6, 1-55. 
 
Hunter, J. E. & Hunter, R. F. (1984). Validity and utility of alternative predictors of 
job performance. Psychological Bulletin, 96, 72-98. 
 
Hunter, J. E. & Schmidt, F. L. (1990). Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error 
and bias in research findings. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
John, O. P., Angleitner, A. & Ostendorf, F. (1988). The lexical approach to 
personality: A historical review oftrait taxonomic research. European Journal 
of Personality, 2, 171-203. 
 
References                                                                                                                162 
 
Judge, T. A. & Ilies, R. (2002). Relationship of personality to performance 
motivation: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 797-
807. 
 
Kallasmaa, T., Allik, J., Realo, A. & McCrae, R. R. (2000). The Estonian version of the 
NEO-PI-R: An examination of universal and culture-specific aspects of the 
five-factor model. European Journal of Personality, 14, 265-278. 
 
Konstabel, K., Aavik, T. & Allik, J. (in press). Social Desirability and Consensual 
Validity of Personality Traits. European Journal of Personality,  
Kuncel, N. R., Hezlett, S. A. & Ones, D. S. (2001). A comprehensive meta-analysis of 
the predictive validity of the graduate record examinations: Implications for 
graduate student selection and performance. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 
162-181. 
 
Kuncel, N. R., Hezlett, S. A. & Ones, D. S. (2004). Academic Performance, Career 
Potential, Creativity, and Job Performance: Can One Construct Predict Them 
All? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 148-161. 
 
LaHuis, D. M., Martin, N. R. & Avis, J. M. (2005). Investigating Nonlinear 
Conscientiousness-Job Performance Relations for Clerical Employees. Human 
Performance, 18, 199-212. 
 
Liebert, R. M. & Liebert, L. L. (1998). Personality Strategies & Issues. Pacific Grove: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing. 
 
Lounsbury, J. W., Sundstrom, E., Loveland, J. L. & Gibson, L. W. (2002). Broad 
versus narrow personality traits in predicting academic performance of 
adolescents. Learning and Individual Differences, 14, 65-75. 
 
References                                                                                                                163 
 
Marcus, B., Machilek, F. & Schutz, A. (2006). Personality in cyberspace: Personal 
Web sites as media for personality expressions and impressions. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 1014-1031. 
 
Marsh, H. W., Hau, K. T. & Wen, Z. (2004). In Search of Golden Rules: Comment on 
Hypothesis-Testing Approaches to Setting Cutoff Values for Fit Indexes and 
Dangers in Overgeneralizing Hu and Bentler's (1999) Findings. Structural 
Equation Modeling, 11, 320-341. 
 
Martin, B. A., Bowen, C. C. & Hunt, S. T. (2002). How effective are people at faking 
on personality questionnaires? Personality and Individual Differences, 32, 
247-256. 
 
McClelland, D. C. (1987). Human Motivation. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
McClelland, D. C., Koestner, R. & Weinberger, J. (1989). How do self-attributed and 
implicit motives differ? Psychological Review, 96, 690-702. 
 
McCrae, R. R. (1992). Editor's introduction to Tupes and Christal. Journal of 
Personality, 60, 217-219. 
 
McCrae, R. R., Terracciano, A., Costa, P. T. & Ozer, D. J. (2006a). From types to 
typological thinking: A reply to Asendorpf. European Journal of Personality, 
20, 49-51. 
 
McCrae, R. R., Terracciano, A., Costa, P. T. & Ozer, D. J. (2006b). Person-factors in 
the California adult Q-set: Closing the door on personality trait types? 
European Journal of Personality, 20, 29-44. 
 
References                                                                                                                164 
 
McCrae, R. R., Zonderman, A. B., Bond, M. H., Costa, P. T. & Paunonen, S. V. 
(1996). Evaluating replicability of factors in the revised NEO personality 
inventory: Confirmatory factor analysis versus procrustes rotation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 552-566. 
 
McFarland, L. A. & Ryan, A. M. (2000). Variance in faking across noncognitive 
measures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 812-821. 
 
Mielke, R. (1990). Ein Fragebogen zur Wirksamkeit der Selbstdarstellung [Efficacy 
of self-presentation questionnaire]. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie [Journal 
of Social Psychology], 21, 162–170. 
 
Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Mischel, W. & Peake, P. K. (1982). Beyond deja vu in the search for cross-situational 
consistency. Psychological Review, 89, 730-755. 
 
Möttus, R., Allik, J. & Pullmann, H. (2006). Does personality vary across ability 
levels? A study using self and other ratings. Journal of Research in 
Personality, (in press). 
 
Mount, M. K. & Barrick, M. R. (1998). Five reasons why the "big five" article has 
been frequently cited. Personnel Psychology, 51, 849-857. 
 
Mount, M. K., Barrick, M. R., Scullen, S. M. & Rounds, J. (2005). Higher-order 
dimensions of the big five personality traits and the big six vocational interest 
types. Personnel Psychology, 58, 447-478. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                165 
Moutafi, J., Furnham, A. & Crump, J. (2003). Demographic and personality 
predictors of intelligence: A study using the Neo personality inventory and 
the Myers-Briggs type indicator. European Journal of Personality, 17, 79-94. 
 
Moutafi, J., Furnham, A. & Paltiel, L. (2004). Why is conscientiousness negatively 
correlated with intelligence? Personality and Individual Differences, 37, 
1013-1022. 
 
Moxnes, P. A. (1996). On the deeper meaning of the Big 5 and personality 
disorders. International Journal of Psychology, 31, 2804-2804. 
 
Murphy, K. R. & Davidshofer, C. O. (2001). Psychological Testing. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Nguyen, N. T., Biderman, M. D. & McDaniel, M. A. (2005). Effects of response 
instructions on faking a situational judgment test. International Journal of 
Selection and Assessment, 13, 250-260. 
 
Norman, W. T. (1963). Toward an Adequate Taxonomy of Personality Attributes - 
Replicated Factor Structure in Peer Nomination Personality Ratings. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 66, 574-583. 
 
Norman, W. T. (1967). 2800 personality trait descriptors: Normative 
operatingcharacteristicsfor a university population. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, Department of Psychological Sciences. 
 
Ones, D. S., Viswesvaran, C. & Reiss, A. D. (1996). Role of Social Desirability in 
Personality Testing for Personnel Selection: The Red Herring. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 81, 660-679. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                166 
Paulhus, D. L. (2002). Socially desirable responding: The evolution of a construct, 
Braun, H. I., Jackson, D. N. & Wiley, D. E., The role of constructs in 
psychological and educational measurement. (49-69). Mahwah, NJ, US: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
 
Paulhus, D. L., Harms, P. D., Bruce, M. N. & Lysy, D. C. (2003). The over-claiming 
technique: Measuring self-enhancement independent of ability. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 890-904. 
 
Pauls, C.-A. & Crost, N.-W. (2005a). Cognitive Ability and Self-Reported Efficacy of 
Self-Presentation Predict Faking on Personality Measures. Journal of 
Individual Differences, 26, 194-206. 
 
Pauls, C. A. & Crost, N. W. (2004). Effects of faking on self-deception and 
impression management scales. Personality and Individual Differences, 37, 
1137-1151. 
 
Pauls, C. A. & Crost, N. W. (2005b). Effects of different instructional sets on the 
construct validity of the NEO-PI-R. Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 
297-308. 
 
Peeters, H. & Lievens, F. (2005). Situational judgment tests and their predictiveness 
of college students' success: The influence of faking. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 65, 70-89. 
 
Peeters, M. A. G., Rutte, C. G., van Tuijl, H. E. J. M. & Reymen, I. M. M. J. (2006). 
The Big Five personality traits and individual satisfaction with the team. 
Small Group Research, 37, 187-211. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                167 
Pekrun, R., Goetz, T., Perry, R. P., Kramer, K., Hochstadt, M. & Molfenter, S. (2004). 
Beyond test anxiety: Development and vailidation of the Test Emotions 
Questionnaire (TEQ). Anxiety Stress and Coping, 17, 287-316. 
 
Pekrun, R., Goetz, T., Titz, W. & Perry, R. P. (2002). Academic emotions in students' 
self-regulated learning and achievement: A program of qualitative and 
quantitative research. Educational Psychologist, 37, 91-105. 
 
Picardi, A., Toni, A. & Caroppo, E. (2005). Stability of Alexithymia and its 
relationships with the 'big five' factors, temperament, character, and 
attachment style. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 74, 371-378. 
 
Pulver, A. (1999). Vaimsete vo˜imete skaala VVS2. Unpublished manual. Tartu, 
Estonia: University of Tartu, Department of Psychology. 
 
Rindermann, H. & Neubauer, A. C. (2001). The influence of personality on three 
aspects of cognitive performance: Processing speed, intelligence and school 
performance. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 829-842. 
 
Roberts, B. W., Walton, K. E. & Viechtbauer, W. (2006). Patterns of Mean-Level 
Change in Personality Traits Across the Life Course: A Meta-Analysis of 
Longitudinal Studies. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 1-25. 
 
Robertson, I. T., Baron, H., Gibbons, P., MacIver, R. & Nyfield, G. (2000). 
Conscientiousness and managerial performance. Journal of Occupational and 
Organizational Psychology, 73, 171-180. 
 
Rogers, R. (1997). Researching Dissimulation, In Rogers, R., Clinical assessment of 
malingering and deception (309-327). New York: Guilford.  
 
 
References                                                                                                                168 
Rosse, J. G., Stecher, M. D., Miller, J. L. & Levin, R. A. (1998). The impact of 
response distortion on preemployment personality testing and hiring 
decisions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 634-644. 
 
Rost, J. (1985). A Latent Class Model for Rating Data. Psychometrika, 50, 37-49. 
 
Rost, J. (1991). Alogistic mixture distribution model for polychotomous item 
responses. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 44, 75-
92. 
 
Rost, J., Carstensen, C. H. & Von Davier, M. (1997). Applying the mixed Rasch 
model to personality questionnaires, In Rost, J. & Langeheine, R. (Eds.), 
Applications of latent trait and latent class models in the social sciences 
Waxmann.  
 
Rost, J., Carstensen, C. H. & von Davier, M. (1999). Are the Big Five Rasch scalable? 
A reanalysis of the NEO-FFI norm data. Diagnostica, 45, 119-127. 
 
Salgado, J. (2002). The Big Five personality dimensions and counterproductive 
behaviors. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 10, 117-125. 
 
Salgado, J. F. (1997). The five factor model of personality and job performance in 
the European Community. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 30-43. 
 
Salgado, J. F. (2003). Predicting job performance using FFM and non-FFM 
personality measures. Journal of Occupational and Organizational 
Psychology, 76, 323-346. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                169 
Salgado, J. F., Anderson, N., Moscoso, S., Bertua, C. & de Fruyt, F. (2003). 
International Validity Generalization of GMA and cognitive abilities: A 
European community meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 56, 573-605. 
 
Saucier, G. (2003). Factor structure of English-language personality type-nouns. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 695-708. 
 
Saucier, G., Georgiades, S., Tsaousis, I. & Goldberg, L.-R. (2005). The Factor 
Structure of Greek Personality Adjectives. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 88, 856-875. 
 
Saulsman, L. M. & Page, A. C. (2003). Can trait measures diagnose personality 
disorders? Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 16, 83-88. 
 
Saulsman, L. M. & Page, A. C. (2004). The five-factor model and personality 
disorder empirical literature: A meta-analytic review. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 23, 1055-1085. 
 
Schmidt, F. L. & Hunter, J. E. (1998). The validity and utility of selection methods in 
personnel psychology: Practical and theoretical implications of 85 years of 
research findings. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 262-274. 
 
Schmit, M. J. & Ryan, A. M. (1993). The Big Five in personnel selection: Factor 
structure in applicant and nonapplicant populations. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 78, 966-974. 
 
Schmitt, N. & Oswald, F. L. (2006). The impact of corrections for faking on the 
validity of noncognitive measures in selection settings. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 91, 613-621. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                170 
Schmitz, N., Kugler, J. & Rollnik, J. (2003). On the relation between neuroticism, 
self-esteem, and depression: Results from the national comorbidity survey. 
Comprehensive Psychiatry, 44, 169-176. 
 
Shao, L. & Webber, S. (2006). A cross-cultural test of the 'five-factor model of 
personality and transformational leadership'. Journal of Business Research, 
59, 936-944. 
 
Sifneos, P. E. (1973). Prevalence of Alexithymic Characteristics in Psychosomatic 
Patients. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 22, 255-262. 
 
Smith, D. B. & Ellingson, J. E. (2002). Substance versus style: A new look at social 
desirability in motivating contexts. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 211-
219. 
 
Smith, D. B., Hanges, P. J. & Dickson, M. W. (2001). Personnel selection and the 
five-factor model: Reexamining the effects of applicant's frame of reference. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 304-315. 
 
Smits, D. J. M. & Boeck, P. D. (2006). From BIS/BAS to the Big Five. European 
Journal of Personality, 20, 255-270. 
 
Sokolowski, K., Schmalt, H. D., Langens, T. A. & Puca, R. M. (2000). Assessing 
achievement, affiliation, and power motives all at once: The Multi-Motive 
Grid (MMG). Journal of Personality Assessment, 74, 126-145. 
 
Spearman, C. (1927). The abilities of man. Oxford, England: Macmillan. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                171 
Stark, S., Chernyshenko, O.-S., Chan, K.-Y., Lee, W.-C. & Drasgow, F. (2001). Effects 
of the testing situation on item responding: Cause for concern. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 86, 943-953. 
 
Steyer, R. (2005). Analyzing Individual and Average Causal Effects via Structural 
Equation Models. Methodology:-European-Journal-of-Research-Methods-for-
the-Behavioral-and-Social-Sciences, 1, 39-54. 
 
Steyer, R., Ferring, D. & Schmitt, M. J. (1992). States and traits in psychological 
assessment. European-Journal-of-Psychological-Assessment, 8, 79-98. 
 
Steyer, R., Schmitt, M. & Eid, M. (1999). Latent state-trait theory and research in 
personality and individual differences. European-Journal-of-Personality, Vol 
13, 389-408. 
 
Taylor, G. J. & Bagby, R. M. (2004). New trends in alexithymia research. 
Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 73, 68-77. 
 
ter Laak, J. J. F., DeGoede, M. P. M. & Brugman, G. M. (2001). Teachers' judgments 
of pupils: Agreement and accuracy. Social Behavior and Personality, 29, 257-
270. 
 
Toomela, A. (2003). Relationships between personality structure, structure of word 
meaning, and cognitive ability: A study of cultural mechanisms of personality. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 723-735. 
 
Topping, G. D. & O'Gorman, J. G. (1997). Effects of faking set on validity of the 
NEO-FFI. Personality and Individual Differences, 23, 117-124. 
 
 
References                                                                                                                172 
Vasilopoulos, N. L., Cucina, J. M. & McElreath, J. M. (2005). Do warnings of 
response verification moderate the relationship between personality and 
cognitive ability? Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 306-322. 
 
Viswesvaran, C. & Ones, D. S. (1999). Meta-analyses of fakability estimates: 
Implications for personality measurement. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 59, 197-210. 
 
Viswesvaran, C., Ones, D. S. & Hough, L. M. (2001). Do impression management 
scales in personality inventories predict managerial job performance ratings? 
International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 9, 277-289. 
 
Wagner-Menghin, M. (1998). Lexikon-Wissen-Test  [Lexical Knowldege Test]. 
Schuhfried. 
 
Willis, G. (2004). Cognitive Interviewing Revisited: A Useful Technique, in Theory? 
In Presser, S., Rothgeb, J. M., Couper, M. P., Lessler, J. T., Martin, E., Martin, 
J. & Singer, E. (Eds), Methods for Testing and Evaluating Survey 
Questionnaires (299-317). John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
 
Zeidner, M. & Matthews, G. (2000). Intelligence and personality, (2000). Sternberg, 
Robert J (Ed), Handbook of intelligence. (pp.581 610). New York, NY, US: 
Cambridge University Press. xiii, 677 pp.  
 
Zickar, M.-J. & Robie, C. (1999a). Modeling faking good on personality items: An 
item-level analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 551-563. 
 
Zickar, M. J. & Burnfield, J. L. (2003). A Monte Carlo investigation of the polytomous 
mixed Rasch model. Unpublished manuscript,  
 
References                                                                                                                173 
Zickar, M. J., Gibby, R. E. & Robie, C. (2004). Uncovering faking samples in 
applicant, incumbent, and experimental data sets: An application of mixed-
model item response theory. Organizational Research Methods, 7, 168-190. 
 
Zickar, M. J. & Robie, C. (1999b). Modeling faking good on personality items: An 
item-level analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 551-563. 
 
Ziegler, M. & Bühner, M. (submitted). Personality Structure: A Question of Trait and 
State Interaction.  
Ziegler, M., Bühner, M., Krumm, S. & Schmidt Atzert, L. (submitted-a). Motivated, 
Unmotivated, or Faking? Susceptibility of Three Achievement Motivation 
Tests Measures to Faking: Questionnaire, Semi-projective, and Objective.  
Ziegler, M., Bühner, M. & Toomela, A. (submitted-b). A Reanalysis of Toomela 
(2003): Personality Structure – A Question of IQ or Situational Demand?  
 
 
Lebenslauf  174 
M A T T H I A S  Z I E G L E R  
PERSÖNLICHE INFORMATIONEN 
 Familienstand: ledig 
Nationalität: deutsch 
Alter: 28 
Geburtsort: Heiligenstadt 
Eltern: Petra und Eberhard Ziegler 
SPEZIELLE QUALIFIKATIONEN 
 DIN 33430 Volllizenz für Auftragnehmer (A-Lizenz) 
Mitglied der Technical Advisor Group on Faking des Educational Testing 
Service 
AUSBILDUNG 
 1991 – 1998 Ernst Abbe Gymnasium Eisenach Abitur (1,0) 
1999 – 2005 Philipps-Universität Marburg Diplom in Psychologie („Mit 
Auszeichnung“) 
Zusatzfach Betriebswirtschaftslehre mit der Abschlussnote „gut“ 
2005 - 2007 Promotion bei Prof. Dr. Markus Bühner, Psychologische 
Methodenlehre und Evaluation, Department Psychologie, LMU mit dem 
Thema „Persönlichkeit und Intelligenz in Auswahlsituationen“ („Summa 
cum laude“) 
Berufstätigkeit 
 01.04.2005 – 31.03.2006: Wissenschaftlicher Projektmitarbeiter in einem 
durch die Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund finanzierten Projekt  
01.04.2006 – 30.09.2006: Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Department 
Psychologie der LMU München, Abteilung Pädagogische Psychologie 
und Diagnostik  
01.10.2006 – 31.03.2007: Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Department 
Psychologie der LMU München, Abteilung Psychologische 
Methodenlehre und Evaluation 
WEITERE BERUFSTÄTIGKEITEN 
 seit 2003 freier Mitarbeiter bei SHL Deutschland mit den Schwerpunkten: 
Konzeption von Einzel- und Gruppenassessments 
Durchführung von Einzel- und Gruppenassessments 
Verhaltensbeobachtung 
Beobachtercoaching 
Gutachtenerstellung 
Führen von Feedbackgesprächen 
Erstellen eines Konzeptes zur Lehrlingsauswahl für WINCANTON Trans 
European (Deutschland) GmbH, Zweigniederlassung Eisenach 
seit 2005 freier Mitarbeiter bei der Deutschen Flugsicherung 
Beratung für die Firma Organon 
 
 
 
Lebenslauf  175 
WEITERE TÄTIGKEITEN  
 Mitgründer und 2004 Präsident des Debattierclubs „Hartshornes House“ in 
Marburg 
1996 – 2004 Nachhilfelehrer in der Schülerhilfe Eisenach für die Fächer 
Mathematik und Englisch 
2002 – 2003 Nachhilfelehrer für Chemie in einem Wohnprojekt der 
Deutschen Lebenshilfe e.V. in Eisenach 
Seit 01.04.2006 Consultant beim TestLab der LMU 
2005/2006 Durchführung von Workshops zur DIN 33430 
PUBLIKATIONEN 
 
Bühner, M. & Mangels, M., Krumm, S. & Ziegler, M. (2005). Are working 
memory and attention related constructs. Journal of Individual 
Differences, 26 (3), 121-131. 
Bühner, M., Ziegler, M., Krumm, S. & Schmidt-Atzert, L. (2006). Ist der I-
S-T 2000 R Rasch-skalierbar? Diagnostica, 52 (3).  
Bühner, M., Krumm, S., Ziegler, M., & Pluecken, T. (2006). Cognitive 
abilities and their interplay: Reasoning, crystallized intelligence, working 
memory components and sustained attention. Journal of Individual 
Differences. 
Bühner, M., Ziegler, M., Bohnes, B., & Lauterbach, K. (2006). 
Übungseffekte in der Testbatterie zur Aufmerksamkeitsprüfung und im 
Test d2 bei wiederholter Durchführung. Zeitschrift für 
Neuropsychologie (3). 
Ziegler, M., Schmidt-Atzert, L., Bühner, M., & Krumm, S. (submitted). 
Faking Susceptibility of Different Measurement Methods: Questionnaire, 
Semi-Projective, and Objective.  
Krumm, S., Ziegler, M. & Bühner, M., (submitted). Intelligence and 
working memory as predictors of school performance. 
Müller, J., Bühner, M., Ziegler, M. & Sahin, L. (submitted). Are Alexithymia, 
Ambivalence over Emotional Expression,  and Social Insecurity 
overlapping constructs?  
Krumm, S., Schmidt-Atzert, L., Bühner, M., Ziegler, M., Michalczyk, K., & 
Arrow, K., (submitted). Working Memory is not necessary for the 
Prediction of Fluid Intelligence! Towards a Parsimonious Model of 
Cognitive Abilities. 
 
VORTRÄGE 
 Der Zusammenhang zwischen Persönlichkeit und Intelligenz in 
Auswahlsituationen. Doktorandenworkshop der Fachgruppe für 
Differentielle Psychologie, Persönlichkeitspsychologie und 
Psychologische Diagnostik in Landau am 08. September 2005 (Ziegler, 
M.)  
Unmotivierte, Hochmotivierte oder Simulanten? Ein Vergleich der 
Simulationsresistenz verschiedener Leistungsmotivationsinventare. 8. 
Arbeitstagung Differentielle Psychologie, Persönlichkeitspsychologie und 
Psychologische Diagnostik. 28. und 29.09.2005 in Marburg (Ziegler, M. 
Schmidt - Atzert, L., Bühner, M. & Krumm, S.). 
Faking in Persönlichkeitstests. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Personalwesen am 
09. Januar 2006 in Hannover. (Ziegler, M.).  
 
 
Lebenslauf  176 
Einsatz der kognitiven Survey Technik zur Verbesserung des Fragebogens 
zur Patientenzufriedenheit in der  Rehabilitation. 15. 
Rehabilitationswissenschaftliches Kolloquium vom 13. bis 15. März 2006 
in Bayreuth (Ziegler, M., Bühner, M., & Raspe, H.). 
The influence of situational demands on the structure of the big five. 13th 
European Conference on Personality vom 22. bis 2.6 Juli in Athen 
(Ziegler, M. & Bühner, M.). 
Big-Five und die Vorhersage von Ausbildungserfolg: Persönlichkeit oder 
Faking? 45. Kongress der DGPs  2006 vom 17. - 21. September 2006 in 
Nürnberg (Ziegler, M. & Bühner, M.) 
People fake! - So what? ETS Miniconference on Faking, 13.-.14.10.2006, 
Princeton, USA (Ziegler, M.). 
PRAKTIKA 
 2002 Change- und Projektmanagement bei der Dresdner Bank AG 
2003 Forschungspraktikum in der AG Diagnostik an der Philipps-
Universität in Marburg 
2003 SHL Deutschland GmbH 
STIPENDIEN 
  
2002 – 2005 Stipendiat bei e-fellows Deutschland 
 
 
 
